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Civil Society, Participation, and Regional Integration: 
Rhetoric and Reality in the Caribbean Community (CARICOM) 
 
By: Joel Straker 
Abstract 
 
This thesis examines why the numerous declarations by CARICOM Heads of 
Government (HoGs) in support of civil society organization (CSO) participation in the 
regional integration process have not resulted in any tangible, real involvement of CSOs 
in the institutions and mechanisms of CARICOM. To answer this “why” question, this 
thesis posits that above and beyond the obvious challenges of providing the necessary 
framework and capacity building for CSO participation in the CARICOM integration 
process, the current lack of real and substantive inclusion is rooted in the structure of a 
representative democratic framework with limited consideration for the principles of a 
participatory model of democracy. The findings support the concluding position that 
while the stated commitment (rhetoric) of HoGs to CSO participation is clear, the 
tangible manifestations (reality) of those statements are lacking, including a framework 
for participation and capacity building mechanisms for CSOs. This is in keeping with the 
representative model of democracy, which is characterized by engagement limited to the 
protective function, and that, subjected to functional and instrumental usage, when 
amicable and none-threatening of economic and political status quo. This limited 
engagement precludes the region’s integration project from the educative, integrative, and 
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Development is increasingly being undertaken through regional integration (RI) projects. 
One such project is the Caribbean Community (CARICOM), a regional organization, 
comprising fifteen countries1, with the principal objectives of economic integration, 
functional cooperation, foreign policy coordination, and security (CARICOM, 2001). 
Almost without exception, stakeholders in the region view integration as an indispensable 
part of Caribbean development. Pursuant to achieving its objectives, the process of policy 
development embarked upon over the thirty-nine years history of CARICOM has been 
punctuated with numerous declarations, affirmations, and commitments2 by regional 
Heads of Government (HoGs)3 to implement civil society (CS) participation in the formal 
institutions and mechanisms of integration. Stated differently, these declarations can be 
regarded as attempts to democratize 4  the development policy process that drives 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 CARICOM member countries: Antigua and Barbuda; the Bahamas (a member of the Community but not 
the Common Market); Barbados; Belize; Dominica; Grenada; Guyana; Haiti; Jamaica; Montserrat; St. Kitts 
and Nevis; Saint Lucia; St. Vincent and the Grenadines; Suriname; Trinidad and Tobago.  
2 ‘Declarations’, ‘affirmations’, and ‘commitments’ are referred to collectively as the ‘antecedents’ or the  
‘rhetoric’ of participation in CARICOM.  
3 Heads of Government (HoGs) is used interchangeably with and taken to mean, policy makers and 
decision makers who have official responsibility for governing the integration project. 
4 Democratization then means net movement toward broader, more equal, more protected, and more 




CARICOM RI. Up until now, however, these attempts have encountered implementation 
deficits and, consequently, there is widespread dissatisfaction among stakeholders with 
the outcome of these attempts (Bishop & Payne, 2010; Girvan, 2011a; Girvan, 2011b).  
 
Perhaps accordingly, CARICOM is felt to be “distant from the ‘man in the street’ and 
that there is little awareness, let alone buy-in, of ordinary citizens or organisations outside 
of a limited circle of officials” (Bishop & Payne, 2010, p. 18).  At the same time the 
prognosis ascribed to CARICOM is grave, it is afflicted by “a multiple crisis—a crisis of 
implementation, of credibility and—dare I say—of legitimacy” (Girvan, 2011a, p. 1).  In 
view of this CS engagement has attracted increased attention. This attention is 
conceivably predicated on the need to address the deficit of participation and to tap into 
the needed ‘value add’ that CS participation can bring to the integration project. As stated 
already, several antecedents to CS participation have marked CARICOM’s history.  The 
ethos (though not to be construed with a formal mechanism of participation) for engaging 
CS is rooted in the ‘Treaty of Chaguaramas’ (1973, revised 2001). Subsequent iterations 
of engagement were elaborated in the following: ‘The Grande Anse Declaration’ (1989); 
‘The CARICOM Charter of Civil Society’ (1997); the ‘Liliendaal Statement of Principles 
on Forward Together’ (2003), and the ‘CARICOM Civil Society Participation and 
Engagement in Regional Integration Project’. In sum, these antecedents have not resulted 







Evidently, actualizing CS participation in CARICOM RI is problematic.  Even though 
HoGs have publically acceded to engage with CS and CSOs have expressed their 
concomitant desire at this juncture the level and depth of participation envisioned by all 
parties have not materialized. This is possibly because beyond the numerous declarations 
that advocate for participation CSOs require capacity building and resources to 
participate. Moreover, the repeated failure of these antecedents suggests additional 
factors maybe impacting the actualization of CS participation in CARICOM.  
 
This thesis responds to the need to understand the context and complexities surrounding 
actualizing civil society participation in CARICOM RI. This thesis therefore seeks to 
examine the following question: 
 
Why is it the case that numerous declarations by CARICOM Heads of Government 
in support of CSO participation in the regional integration process have not 
resulted in any tangible, real involvement of CSOs in the institutions and 
mechanisms of CARICOM? 
 
In order to examine the research question this introductory chapter sets out the direction 
the research will take by providing the conceptual framework and methodological base. 
Henceforth, the chapter: elaborates the rationale of this study; details the methodological 
approach; provides a theoretical brief; establishes the delimitations and scope of the 
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study, proffers the argument and summary of findings, and outlines the structure of the 
thesis. 
Significance of the Study 
 
This study takes on significance because of the importance attached to the area of 
research: firstly, CARICOM occupies centrality as a key strategy for development and 
attenuating the impacts of globalization on region; and, secondly, increased value is being 
ascribed to CS as interlocutors and key development actors in the region. 
 
Generally, this study seeks to contribute to the development and advancement of the 
literature on civil society participation. This topic has excited practitioners and the 
academic community alike. This excitement is underscored by the need to explore the 
concepts of civil society and participation as empirical rather than abstract phenomena 
and to understand the value and benefits of participation. Specifically, this thesis aims to 
identify and detail of key factors impacting, and requirements for, actualizing CS 
participation in CARICOM. The findings of this thesis may form the basis of further 
empirical inquiry on civil society participation in RI and the recommendations may help 
in the development of future participatory initiatives in CARICOM. 
 
Itinerary of Key Concepts 
 
This section plots outs, in brief, the key concepts employed in this thesis. This itinerary is 
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useful at this point since these concepts—regional integration, civil society, and 
participation—are referenced heavily and with fair exactitude throughout this thesis.  
Participation 
What is participation? The debate on participation is wide and far-reaching. This debate 
will be explored in Chapter 2. For this thesis, participation is defined to as: “a process 
through which stakeholders influence and share control over development initiatives, 
decisions and resources which affect them” (The World Bank, 1994 , p. xi). Stakeholders 
are defined as “those affected by the outcome—negatively or positively—or those who 
can affect the outcome of a proposed intervention” (The World Bank, 1996, p. 125).  
 
Civil Society 
The concept of civil society animates development thinkers globally. Some scholars, 
according to Jude Howell, “have shunned the use of civil society, pointing to its 
conceptual fuzziness, ideological impregnation, and referential ambiguity” (Howell & 
Pearce, 2001, p. 111). In the Caribbean, the concept of civil society has sustained the 
similar nebulosity it carries in the international community. In this thesis, civil society is 
taken to mean: organization/entities operating outside of the tri-partite partnership of 
government, labour and the private sector (CPDC, 2011). The activities of these 
organizations fall within the realm of not-for-profit and are viewed as having a focus on 
development. A typology of these organizations would include: non-governmental 
organizations, non-profit organizations, foundations, community based organizations, 
voluntary organizations and other collectives of citizens organized around a particular 
goal or set of interests. This patchwork of entities attests to the breadth and scope of civil 
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society organizations in the Caribbean, and connectedly, their (potential) importance as 
development actors in both the national and regional space. The contestations 
surrounding the concept of civil society will be dwelled on in Chapter 2. 
 
Regional Integration 
Van Langenhove and Costea argue that the concept of regional integration acquired 
varying meanings as a result of several successive waves of regionalism during the last 
century (2007). Soomer posits, “regional integration can be described in two ways, as a 
process and as an outcome” (2003, p. 1). As a process, it entails a country’s willingness 
to share or unify into a larger whole and as an outcome, regional integration occurs when 
established criteria are met (ibid). The wider discourse surrounding the concept of 
regional integration will be examined in Chapter 3. However, in this thesis, regional 
integration is referred to as: the coming together of two or more countries that are 
geographically close to each other and/or that share common problems, normally through 
reciprocal preferential agreements, for purposes of safeguarding or promoting issues of 





This section details the method and techniques used for data collection and analysis. This 
section includes: the sources of data, the sampling technique, theoretical lens of analysis, 




Stake, in Hammersley and Gomm, states, “research should be done not to increase the 
already existing multitude of research studies, but to further understanding” (2000, p. 20). 
This thesis research hopes to build upon the already existing knowledge by furthering the 
understanding of the intersection of civil society, participation, and regional integration. 
The particular aspect being introduced is an understanding of the nuanced context and 
complexities surrounding actualizing civil society participation in CARICOM. The 
research question outlined earlier provides the avenue through which to explore this 
understanding. This question is explored using qualitative methods and data acquisition 
techniques, which are outlined below. 
 
Qualitative Methods 
Traditionally, methodological approaches have been subsumed under two main 
paradigms, the qualitative and quantitative (Daly, 2003). Babbie and Mouton (2001) 
suggests that the selection of a methodological approach is dependent on: the aims and 
objectives of the study, the nature of the phenomenon, and the underlying theory. With 
due consideration of the espousals of Babbie and Mouton (2001), the substantive themes 
of this study are best explored through the qualitative method and data acquisition 
techniques, which places special importance on the narratives of participants. 
Accordingly, the “demonstrable effort to produce rich and relevant detailed descriptions 
and particularized interpretations” is seen as a defining feature of qualitative research 





Primary and secondary methods of data collection were used to probe the research 
questions. The data collection itinerary was as follows: firstly, a significant review of 
literature and document analysis was undertaken; secondly, qualitative field research was 
embarked upon, this comprised key informant and elite interviews, observation, and 
document collection; and thirdly, (post field research) field documents and 
supplementary literature review, analysis, and theorizing were carried out. 
 
Primary Data 
Comprising semi-structured interviews, field research was undertaken from July to 
August 2011 in the CARICOM member countries of Barbados, Trinidad and Tobago, and 
Guyana. In addition to conducting interviews while in the field, I engaged in observation, 
by attended academic lectures and public discussions—these forums offered venues to 
engage in informal talk on the substantive themes under focus and a chance to generate a 
finer understanding of the issues at play in the Caribbean. Additionally, being in the 
Caribbean provided the opportunity to garner relevant documents that would have been 




With the focus on CS participation in CARICOM, key informant interviews were 
conducted with CSO executives from a range of institutional identities, as well as, elite 
interviews with well-placed experts on the topic—individuals knowledgeable by virtue of 
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their engagement with the CSO sector and CARICOM. Each interviewee was asked a 
series of semi-structured questions was allowed to expand freely on what he/she 
considers to be of importance.  Generally, interviews were used as an exploratory 
process; a means to probe the research focus and question in under examination, 
thoroughly.   
 
Early in the field research process, interviews were recorded by hand. However, after the 
‘initial’ interview guides were refined (see Appendix I) and the research questions fully 
developed, a digital recorder was used to record interviews once the participant 
consented. Brief notes were taken in all recorded interviews, revisited and augmented 
with details, where required, after the interviews. The interviews were transcribed within 
the two-month period following field research. Recording and transcribing interviews 
were important means to preserve the integrity of the research and to provide the chance 
to use the exact words of respondents in the presentation of field research data and 
analysis (Silverman, 2005, p. 184). 
 
Interviews were conducted in two parts. Part one sort to garner an organizational profile 
and perspectives on CARICOM RI, including: support for regional integration, principle 
concerns in relation to regional integration, and attitudes toward engagement. Part two 
focused on the fundamental and technical issues involved in realizing participation: what 
should constitute participation, the benefits of CS participation, CSO capacity to 
participate, constraints on participation, policy changes needs to realize participation, and 
suitable mechanisms for participation. In summary, part one provides an understanding of 
10 
	  
the attitude toward participation and part two allow for patterns, similarities and/or 




“Qualitative research is a form of empirical inquiry that typically entails some form of 
purposive sampling for information-rich cases” (Given, 2008, p. 893). This is to say, 
samples are chosen for how well they typify or illuminate the characteristics of a certain 
demographic or class of what is being studied. This approach is embedded in qualitative 
data collection techniques and supports data analysis and interpretation that goes beyond 
the surface of the data generated. To comment further on this feature of qualitative 
research, it must be established that since qualitative research is based on or its emphasis 
is on gaining a penetrated understanding of particular events, cases or phenomena, its 
samples are generally small, non-representative and non-probability based but geared to 
producing idiosyncratic knowledge. This idiosyncratic knowledge is expressed 
(generally) in narrative, which allow for the richness and complexity of the experience to 
be elucidated. 
 
This thesis research utilizes purposive sampling. As stated earlier, semi-structured 
interviewed were conducted.  Since the quantum of organizations that constitute ‘civil 
society’ in the Caribbean region is large and amorphous, the deliberate strategy was to 
privilege umbrella CSOs at both the nation and regional level, and the sector/issue level 
(for example, the association of women’s NGOs—taken to represent the pool of women’s 
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organizations in the country). By employing this approach, it was felt that these 
organizations would have both a firm grasp of their experience as ‘unitary’ organization 
and would also be able to iterate the realities facing the composite of organization 
affiliated with them. Moreover, these organizations can be viewed as being at the 
forefront of (past and/or current) interface with policy makers by dint of their 
‘representative’ status and the tendency to engage these types of organizations for prior 
mentioned reasons. Accordingly, one can contend that these organizations are best suited 
to provide experiential accounts on the topic under focus. 
 
One must hasten to add, umbrella organizations are only so few and therefore did not 
serve at the solitary constituency from which participants were drawn. ‘Non-umbrella’ or 
‘unitary’ CSOs formed part of the interview sample. Additionally, to diversify and fortify 
the data collected exercise, a few well-placed experts (mainly academics) completed the 
total sample of participants interviewed for this study. 
 
In sum, guided by the choice of qualitative methods, interviews served as an extremely 
useful data collection technique for developing a holistic understanding of the context 
and complexities surrounding civil society participation in the CARICOM, gauged from a 
diverse sample of participants. Moreover, interviews were also useful as a triangulation 
tool (in verifying statements made by other interviewees and in giving credence to 





Secondary data for this thesis was obtained from a plethora of sources, which are 
identified below: 
- Official CARICOM documents: Treaty of Chaguaramas (1973, revised 2001), the 
Charter of Civil Society (1997), etc.;  
- Reports from studies undertaken by CARICOM as well as governmental and donor 
agencies on the region;  
- Reports from studies undertaken by civil society groups and other interested parties; 
and 
- Literature from books, academic and newspaper articles, consultancy reports, speeches, 
communiqués, credible websites, (namely, the CARICOM Secretariat) and other 
relevant publications and texts.  
Documentary sources were indispensable sources of information for this thesis. These 
sources helped to develop and fashion the research focus, to map the problematic, 
theoretically locate the realities surrounding the substantive themes of focus, and to distill 
and analyze the research findings. Moreover, documentary sources were important 
triangulating aids in facilitating the verification of some of the statements or positions 
ventilated by interviewees.  
 
To be brief, the rationale for the primary and secondary methods used for data collection 
in this thesis was very useful in elaborating a clear and plausible argument. Notably, 
interviews and documentary sources were crucial as they helped to shed light on the little 





All research necessarily involves some compromise. The main limitations that can be 
leveled again this thesis study are its small sample and the concentration of field data 
collection within only three of the fifteen countries that comprise CARICOM: Barbados, 
Trinidad and Tobago and Guyana. These limitations are primarily due to time and 
resource constraints.  
 
To counteract these apparent weaknesses several consideration were implemented at key 
inflection points in the data collection process. For instance, although this research was 
limited in terms of geographical coverage the total sample was selected to comprise a 
diverse group of organizations and individuals who represented sectorial, national, and 
regional perspectives. These nomenclatures aided, through their inherent ‘focal point’ 
qualities, in accessing the specific concerns of the broader base of CSOs. As a result, the 
probability of skews in the data garnered was minimized. Additionally, the use of a 
plethora of secondary sources including regional reports and studies served to triangulate 
the finding generated from the primary research. Moreover, the process of observation 
while in the field provided important insight on the topic and served as a supplement to 
the aforementioned considerations.  
 
Despite the limitations of a relatively small sample and geographic scope instituting 
measures at key junctures can serve to counteract the potential effects of such limitations. 
In sum, this research does provide key insight into CS participation in the context of RI, 
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their potential contributions to a RI project, as well as, the factors impacting actualizing 




To investigate the central research question of this thesis, I have chosen three theories 
(theoretical triad) or ‘lines of inquiry’ through which to examine the topic: 1) 
participatory development theory; 2) democratic theory; 3) organizational theory. I 
thought this triad most relevant, and propitious to probe the research question, support 
data interpretation, discussion and analysis, and, moreover, that it would provide a basis 
from which conclusions can be drawn and recommendations proffered. It is worth noting, 
at this juncture, that the triad of theories is taken to hold not order of hierarchy and are 
thus sequenced purely on preference. 
 
Participation development theory attends to the necessity to situate this research project 
in the development vein, an interdisciplinary vein. More importantly, it offers the 
compass with which to locate the raison d'être of the concerted efforts to actualize CS 
participation in the CARICOM. 
 
Enmeshed in CARICOM RI are both the desire to develop and attenuate the impact of 
globalization and the desire of ‘the people’, the Caribbean citizenry, to fashion their 
advancement. “It is our Caribbean and our future” (CPDC, 2002, p. 3). At essence, those 
are the sentiments of the collective body of civil society organizations in the region. In 
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the regional context, the Caribbean citizenry is collectivized as civil society. For this 
reason, the relationship between democratic theory and civil society, and the approach of 
democratic theory towards civil society is significant in the analysis of the approach of 
CARICOM vis-à-vis the engagement of people in the RI process. Through this lens and 
stream of analysis overarching light would be shed on the central research question of 
this thesis.  
 
Completing the triad is organizational theory. Since it is the much avowed and much 
recommended goal of regional policy makers to engage CS, and the concomitant desire 
of CS to be fully participative in the process of integration, organizational theory lends an 
angle of analysis of civil society different from that of democratic theory. Organizational 
theory permits an investigation of whether CSOs are capable of formal and predicable 
involvement in CARICOM. An assessment of their capacity to and the organizational 
imperatives required for meaningful involvement are buried within this theory. In précis, 
this theory will assist in answering how to enable CS participation the RI process. 
 
Having establishes the suitability of the abovementioned theories (participatory 
development, democratic, and organizational) for this thesis the discussion to follow will 




This research is generally descriptive in design as guided by the central research question 
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and theoretical framework. One purpose of the theoretical framework is that it acts as the 
analytical lens through which the empirical findings are analyzed. Data analysis in this 
thesis is based primarily on the country studies undertaken in Barbados, Trinidad and 
Tobago, and Guyana. These cases serve in an instrumental way on the macro level (the 
regional level, CARICOM), to “provide insights into, or refine theoretical explanation, 
making it more generalizable” (Berg, 2009, p. 326). In addition, the empirical data from 
key informant and elite interviewees in the three countries allow for micro level analysis; 
recognition of the intrinsic aspects a particular organization and country, and ipso facto 
separate intrinsic case studies.  
 
With respect to the specificities of the data analysis process, utilizing the triad of theories 
to examine the data garnered, ad-hoc meaning generation was applied to the interview 
manuscripts (Kvale, 1996, p. 189). To elaborate, firstly, interviews were transcribed in 
entirety with only small irrelevant sections excluded from the transcriptions. The 
transcripts were then read as a whole to get the general feeling of what kind of 
information was generated. They were then read a second time (and third time where 
necessary), and important sections were isolated for further analysis (Gerson & Horowitz, 
2003). Nodes (focal areas) were then formed, statements grouped and enumerated in 
order to determine how many times similar sentiments were expressed amongst the 
interviewees, noting patterns and similarities in the texts. Contrasting views were 
highlighted as being important in gauging how diverse parties felt about the specific 
issues. In the final analysis, patterns were clearly developed and a battery of finding 
emerged (see Chapter 4).  
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Analysis is divided into five sections based on focal areas distilled from the field data. 
The focal areas are as follows: 1) participation; 2) potential contribution of CSOs to RI; 
3) considerations for a model framework for participation; 4) constraints to CS 
participation; and 5) institutional approaches to the integration challenge of participation. 
Each focal area is assessed through the lens of participatory development, democratic, 
and organizational theory. Out of necessity, there is a degree of historicized and 
politicized analysis of the data garnered. 
 
Scope of the Research  
	  
It is important at this point to provide a note on the scope of this thesis. This thesis will 
gather from CS their views on participation and why CS participation in the formal 
institutions and mechanisms of CARICOM has not materialized. These primary findings 
will be combined with secondary sources on participation in CARICOM and accessed 
through the theoretical triad to arrive at an empirically supported conclusion. 
 
This thesis does not examine if integration is desirable, though it establishes that CS 
support integration and want to participate. Also, while this study looks, as part of its 
objective, at the 'terms' that may inform a framework for actualizing participation, it does 
not venture into the actual formulation of a framework (for work on model frameworks 
see Appendix V and (CPDC, 2011)). What is study offers are perspectives that seek to 
clarify and explain 'current' participatory practices (rhetoric and reality), and seeks to 
posit views on 'future' participation using empirical data and analytical purchase derived 
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from relevant theories. 
 
Also, this thesis does hold as an objective the macro issue of democracy, that is to say, if 
CARICOM countries practice representative or direct participatory democracy. However, 
what it does look at are the (democratic) principles that emanate from the declarations 
and history of CS participation. While it is obvious that the former feels the latter in some 
way, for rigor and the obligatory demands of focus and analysis, this study treats with the 
narrow target pinpointed. 
 
Further, though reverberations of the debate on democracy chime repeatedly throughout 
this thesis the project steers away from academic debate on development and democracy. 
Again, the focus in not on if and weather CARICOM member states are democratic or 
what type of democracy they employ, what is sort is evidence of their approach to CS 
engagement. Such evidence will provide the basis to a well-reasoned conclusion. 
 
It is worth noting that CARICOM countries have both a history of democracy and 
participatory engagement, various antecedents speak to this history. Also worth noting is 
that participatory engagement exists in both form of democracy (this thesis explores 
representative and direct democracy), however, the quality and rationale of participation 
differs. Importantly, the uptake of one approach should not be deemed as the total 
disregard or the other. Therefore, an examination of the participation can therefore 





I will argue that above and beyond the obvious challenges of providing the necessary 
framework and capacity building for CSO participation in the Caribbean integration 
process, the current lack of real and substantive inclusion is rooted in the structure of a 
representative democratic framework with limited consideration for the principles of a 
participatory model of democracy. 
 
Summary of Findings 
	  
The primarily aim of this research was to undertake a study of CS participation in 
CARICOM regional integration, with the research question being:  
 
Why is it the case that numerous declarations by CARICOM Heads of Government 
in support of CSO participation in the regional integration process have not 
resulted in any tangible, real involvement of CSOs in the institutions and 
mechanisms of CARICOM? 
 
The statements below adumbrate the major findings.  
 
1. On the basis of CSOs own analysis and recommended actions the sector face 
significant constraints to meaningful participation. 
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2. CS places a high premium on what they can contribute to the RI project; this includes 
technical expertise, alternative viewpoints, policy coherence, improved governance 
and legitimacy. 
3. Repeated experiences have led to the opinion that political leaders have no genuine 
commitment to engage civil society. Consequently, the participatory process is 
heavily burdened by suspicion. 
4. Field data indicates that civil society engagement must be predicated on the following 
are key requirements: 
- A new paradigm of engagement where CS contributions are valued 
- An institutional framework to support CSO capacity building 
- A participatory framework/mechanism which is open and accountable  
5. Participatory engagement between CS and government in the region is limited to ad 
hoc and amicable engagement (the protective function) and does not extend to the 
integrative, education and developmental functions. 
6. Considered from the perspectives of the primary and secondary data, the failure to 
implement a framework for participation, capacity building mechanisms, suspicions 
of a lack of genuine intent, and the history of ad hoc and limited engagement, it can 
be concluded that the participatory processes are informed by the protective 
principles of a representative democracy framework as opposed to the deeper 





Outline of Chapters 
 
Chapter 1 is an introduction of the research topic, research question, rationale, objective, 
methodology and argument of the thesis. This introductory chapter provided a guided 
discussion that framed the research direction of the thesis. The organization of the 
remainder of this thesis is presented below. 
 
Chapter 2 establishes the theoretical point through which the substantive focal areas of 
this thesis will be analysed, and explores the landscape of debates on those areas. The 
chapter discusses the theories of participatory development, democracy, and 
organizations, which were introduced in this first chapter. The background, major 
contributors to, and facets of each theory that are germane to the study are delineated. 
Specifically, this chapter plots the debates regarding participation and civil society. The 
chapter is brought to a close with a focused discussion, which sums-up the theories, and 
teases out the implications for the research project. 
 
Chapter 3 has two parts. Part I provides the context of the study—the CARICOM 
Caribbean.  In so doing, the chapter presents an outline of the concept of RI, historically 
sketches Caribbean RI, reflects on the region’s political and socio-economic landscape, 
and the current state of RI. Part II dovetails off Chapter 2 and Part I by moving the 
discussion of CS participation from the general to the specific; that is to say, the chapter 
‘regionalizes’ the debate. The ethos and benefits of CS participation in RI is presented 
together with the history of CSO participation in the Caribbean. To conclude, the 
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discussion is docked by cataloguing the participatory rhetoric of CARICOM; the 
antecedents of CSO participation. From this vantage point, one would be will primed to 
process the empirical unearthing of the study.  
 
Chapter 4 outlines the key findings of the research based on primary data collected in the 
Caribbean. The empirical data is drawn from the fieldwork in Barbados, Trinidad and 
Tobago, and Guyana. The focus of this chapter is to provide a distilled account of the 
findings.  
 
Chapter 5 presents a discussion and analytical examination of the empirical data in line 
with the questions fielded in the primary data gathering process. This discussion and 
analysis dwells on the five focal areas that emerged from the finding in the context of the 
historical/political economy context presented in Chapter 3 (Part I) and the theoretical 
debates outlined in Chapter 2 and Chapter 3 (Part II). This examination is augmented by 
secondary data and seeks to uncover the dynamics at play in the attempts at civil society 
participation in CARICOM.  
 
Chapter 6 concludes the thesis, it pulls together the findings, links these to the grounding 
chapters, clarifies the findings, offers recommendations, and, finally, emphasises the 







This chapter has set out a clear elaboration of the research direction of this thesis. The 
chapter has placed the research within a coherent framework by detailing the broad 
parameters of the study. It has provided the rationale of the study, methodological 
approach, method of data analysis, theoretical framework, limitations, and proffer the 
argument, summary of findings and overall structure of the thesis. 
 
The next chapter focuses on these theories used in this thesis, referred to as ‘the triad’ or 
‘theoretical triad’ in this study. The three theories chosen provide a strong explanatory 






Exploring the Literature and Framing the Study 
 
People today have an urge—an impatient urges—to participate in the events and 
processes that shape their lives…. if properly nurtured in a responsive national[, 
regional] and global framework, it can also become a source of tremendous vitality and 
innovation for the creation of new and more just societies. (UNDP , 1993, p. 1). 
 
This chapter explicates the theoretical lines of inquiry used to explore the research 
question of this thesis. In so doing, this chapter acts as a primer for understanding the 
context and complexities surrounding actualizing civil society participation CARICOM. 
The theoretical triad of participatory development, democracy and organizational 
development, introduced in the first chapter, are detailed. Ultimately, the findings of this 
thesis will be discussed in terms of how they relate to this triad. 
 
Participation and Participatory Development (PD) in Theory 
 
What is participation? The concept of participation is rooted in (participatory) 
democracy, which is guided by the idea that people should be involved in the affairs of 
their well-being. Notionally, participation (in development) emerged in the 1970s in the 
ideas of Freire (1972) and Rahman (1995), whose espousals advanced the need for what 
Martinussen called “development-by-people” (1997, p. 41). Martinussen states, “the 
development-by-people approach regards popular participation as a goal in itself, and as 
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the process through which other development goals must be defined” (ibid). Freire 
contends, “development can only be achieved when humans are ‘beings for themselves’, 
when they possess their own decision-making powers, free of oppressive and 
dehumanizing circumstances; it is the ‘struggle to be more fully human’” (1972, p. 29). 
Chambers (1983, 1994, 1997), a contemporary of the aforementioned, brought 
participation into mainstream development by emphasizing Participatory Rural 
Appraisal. For Chambers, participation is where “the positivist, reductionist, mechanistic, 
standardized-package, top-down models and development blueprints are rejected, and in 
which multiple, local, and individual realities are recognized, accepted, enhanced and 
celebrated” (1997, p. 188). In today’s terms, those ideas form the summary basis of 
participatory development; simply put, development undertakings characterized by broad 
based stakeholder involvement. 
 
The participatory approach to development and development policy formulation is 
considered to have numerous benefits or attractions (Chambers, 1993). Before reflecting 
on these benefits or attractions, a definition of participation is worth exploring. 
'Participation' is a contested term with multiple interpretations that range from 
manipulative participation, consultative participation, and interactive participation to self-
mobilisation (Pretty J. N., 1995; Sarkissian, Walsh, & Cook, 1997). The volition to 
engage and enable people’s participation is viewed as democratizing development and 
the decision-making processes (White, 1996). As a method of change, participation is 
viewed as a means to develop the voice and organisational capacities of those previously 
excluded, e.g. women, indigenous peoples or minorities (ibid). For this thesis, 
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participation is referred to as: “a process through which stakeholders influence and share 
control over development initiatives, decisions and resources which affect them” (The 
World Bank, 1994 , p. ix). Stakeholders are “those affected by the outcome—negatively 
or positively—or those who can affect the outcome of a proposed intervention” (The 
World Bank, 1996, p. 125). Proponents (Chambers 1993; The World Bank 1994, 1996; et 
al.) posit that participation contributes to the practices of ‘good governance’5 and a slew 
of other benefits. “Good governance” is generally understood to mean an array of 
practices that maximize the common/public good” (Veltmeyer, 2008, p. 228). According 
to Veltmeyer, participatory relationships between government and social organization 
“conforms to the following ‘democratic’ principles: transparency, effectiveness, 
openness, responsiveness, and accountability; the rule of law, acceptance of diversity and 
pluralism, and social inclusiveness” (ibid). Moreover, civil society participation is seen as 
promoting partnership, building ownership, and as a complementary role in the 
development process premised on the notions of ‘sustainability’ and ‘empowerment’ 
(Blackburn, Chambers, & Gaventa, 2000). The origins and further debates on 
participatory development are explored in the sections to follow. 
 
A Brief History of Participatory Development  
 
Since its launch after the Second World War, over the decades international development 
has changed (Nelson & Wright, 1995; Gardner & Lewis, 1997; Willis, 2005). The 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5 ‘Good Governance’ implies a democratic regime in which the responsibility for human security and 
political order is not restricted to the government and other institutions of the state but is widely shared by 




dominant discourse of development was born when institutions such as the World Bank 
and the United Nations (UN) agencies shifted their focus from the reconstruction of post-
war Europe to “a bold new program for making the benefits of our scientific advances 
and industrial progress available for the improvement and growth of underdeveloped 
areas” (President Truman cited in Gardner and Lewis 1997:6). In the thirty years to 
follow, it became apparent that “conventional, technocratic, top-down forms of 
development” had not yielded the benefits envisioned (Nelson & Wright, 1995, p. 5). The 
problem was traced to the alienation of beneficiaries; the prescribed remedy was their 
participation in development. Some also believed that, due to the failed agenda of the 
post-colonial state, beneficiary involvement ought to enable self-sufficiency and people’s 
independence from the state. This viewpoint aligned with the World Bank’s neo-liberalist 
structural adjustment policies, which “moved functions from the state to the private and 
non-governmental sectors” (ibid). Expediently, CS (more particularly NGOs) were seen 
as especially apt for promoting participation—“operating at the grassroots level, close to 
the poorest of the poor” (Lane, 1995, p. 182).  
 
However, towards the end of the 1980s, structural adjustment policies were attacked due 
to their adverse effects on vulnerable groups (Mayo, 2001; Nelson & Wright, 1995). In 
addition, “the premise for strategic aid” that existed during the Cold War collapsed along 
with communism, resulting in “aid-fatigue among the western countries” (Khun, 1998, p. 
19). Calls were made from the North, as well as from the South, for a reconceptualization 
of development which would combine people’s participation in economic growth and in 
government decision-making, and equality in access to basic services (Nelson & Wright, 
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1995). Several bilateral agencies experimented with new participatory approaches and 
soon the World Bank established the ‘Learning Group on Participatory Development’. 
The Group produced a report in 1994, where beneficiaries were named as stakeholders 
and participation was seen as “a process through which stakeholders’ influence and share 
control over development initiatives, decisions and resources which affect them” (The 
World Bank, 1996, p. 125).  
 
In contrast to the 1980s, during the decade of the 1900s and onward, donors have begun 
to return ownership over development from the private sector to governments; a trend 
that Mosse labels the “post-Washington consensus” (2005, p. 193). In this context, 
people’s participation implies partnership with the state as a sustainable long-term 
development strategy. Mohanty (2007) explains, this latest form of participation in terms 
of citizenship and democracy, arguing that the emphasis today is on making governance 
institutions responsive, transparent and accountable to citizens. Similarly, Cornwall and 
Coelho write that: 
 
“Enabling citizens to engage directly in local problem-solving activities 
and to make their demands directly to state bodies is believed to improve 
understanding, and contribute to improving the quality of definition and 
implementation of public programs and policies. These policies and 
programs are seen, in turn, as contributing to guaranteeing the access 
of the poorest to social services, thus enhancing prospects for economic 




Who are the people who have been identified as participants? Chambers writes that 
although “practice has lagged behind the rhetoric”, more and more constituencies have 
been invited to participate, including women, poor people, ethnic and religious 
minorities, refugees, the disabled, and the very old (1998, p. xvi). Its rich and clamorous 
history has meant that participation and participatory development have been examined 
with much fervor. The discussions to follow dwell on the key facets of the theory. 
 
Participatory Development: Theoretical Conceptualizations 
 
A number of theorists have cautioned against using and interpreting the term participation 
uncritically as it can mean many different things and carry different implications (Pretty 
& Scoones, 1995). The corollary to this is that there are no universal definitions of 
participatory development (the same has already been said for participation, as discussed 
earlier). What is seen are diverse ideologies, all reflective of the broader goals that 
participation might achieve. What then are the gains of having people participate?  
 
One view is the instrumental (referred to as the ‘institutional perspective’ in some 
literature) in which participation increases the efficiency and cost-effectiveness of 
'formal' development programs (Craig & Mayo, 1995). This view is built on the premise 
that the broad goals of development are valid, however, the institutional practices are not 
working, but can be improved through direct involvement of the beneficiaries who then 
aid in achieving pre-established goals.  
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Another view is that participation is part of a transformative agenda (referenced in some 
literature as the ‘social movement perspective’), which might be anti-developmental 
(Esteva & Prakash, 1998). This stance adopts the posture that 'development' itself is 
flawed and only by valorising other, non-hegemonic voices can meaningful social change 
occur. In this vein, people can be empowered to take their own initiative, which some 
theorist view as the only true form of participation (ibid). In today’s development 
discourse, this empowering form is the ultimate and most fashionable form of 
participation.  
 
These conceptualisations, while useful, are still rather general. Rahnema suggests that 
participatory development involves the following core elements: 
 
- Cognitive in order to generate a "different mode of understanding the realities to be 
addressed" (1997, p. 121) 
- Political in "empowering the voiceless" (ibid) 
- Instrumental in order to "propose new alternatives" (ibid)  
 
In spite of these differences in conceptualization, there has been a growing acceptance 
regarding the importance of popular involvement. At the root of this 'consensus' is the 
belief in not relying on the state—the prime institution of modernity—for development. 
According to Toye (1987) it might not have been coincidental that participatory 
development gained popularity around the same time as the neo-liberal counter-
revolution of the early 1980s with its discourse of self-help and individualism.  
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Participatory Development: Under Theoretical Scrutiny 
 
The conceptual differences cited above, coupled with the popularity of PD has 
occasioned much attention its way, a lot of which has been critical. A number of authors 
have noted the theme of the limited potential of participatory development to alter wider 
social structures. For example, Pretty and Scoones draw attention to the difficulties for 
local level institutions to influence state policies, or to tackle “problems arising out of the 
wider political context” (1995, p. 162). Willis writes, “the scope of ‘people-centered 
development’ will remain limited by the broader structural factors, particularly at a global 
scale” (2005, p. 208). Willis in this context cites the “continued faith in the market as the 
key actor in development” and the theoretical context of neo-liberalism which “shapes so 
much of international development policy today” (ibid). As a result of these espousals a 
charge has been leveled that PD depoliticizes or “undermines resistance” (Nelson & 
Wright, 1995, p. 11).  
 
Critics have scrutinized certain structures at both the macro and micro level to 
demonstrate the shortcomings of PD. Regarding macro structures, many theorist have 
explored the “bureaucratic exigencies” (Mosse, 2002, p. 24) or, in other terms, the 
“organizational demands” of development (Kapoor, 2005, p. 1211). These theorist, 
among others, assert that organizational demands eclipse the needs of beneficiaries 
because the implementing agencies (most frequently NGOs) are accountable to donors 
(upward accountability) rather than to the beneficiaries (Wallace, 2004). Gardner and 
Lewis (1997) posit, PD cannot be fully participatory as long as the bureaucratic structures 
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remain intact—the guise of participation is preserved. As a result, some writers argue that 
PD is the latest trend in development a “politically desirable development idea” where 
participation “can be made into a commodity and marketed” (Mosse, 2003, p. 66). 
 
Connectedly, another macro level constraint of PD has captured attention. Cornwall and 
Coelho assert that the committed involvement of state actors is decisive for the success of 
participatory projects, as they are the ones who plan and deliver services (2007). The 
authors rightly ask, “what is it that motivates state officials to participate and to follow 
through on decision arrived at in these spaces…rather than resorting to quicker and more 
authoritarian decision-making processes? And what do they get out of participating in the 
participatory sphere?” (2007, p. 19). The authors suggest governments might engage in 
participation “as a strategy that seeks to cultivate allies, strengthen networks and gain 
votes” (ibid).  
 
At the micro level, there are several challenges to effective participation. Firstly, people 
may have their own reasons for non-participation and those are not restricted to work 
demands, or inappropriate timing and place of participatory activities (Gardner & Lewis, 
1997). For instance, people might lack confidence or the knowledge necessary for 
“participation in public processes” (Mahmud, 2007, p. 58). People may also be unwilling 
to spend time and effort on actions “that do not have direct and immediate relevance 
for their livelihoods” (ibid, p. 58). In addition, people may be suspicious of 
‘outsiders’/‘developers’ intentions, especially, in instance of previous negative 
experience (Mosse, 2005). Sibley (1998) suggests that there might be aspects of culture 
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which may place a group apart from the dominant society and, in which the group is not 
willing to relinquish it in the event of incorporation into the larger society (also see 
Sibley (1995)). Another reason could be political, such as when more powerful groups in 
a community monopolize the participatory process leaving the less powerful groups 
frustrated (Eyben & Ladbury, 1995). 
 
Many authors have criticized participatory development for its underlying assumptions 
regarding communities or, as Cleaver calls it, the “myths of ‘community’” (1999, p. 609). 
In fact, the concept of community is “often used by state and other organizations, 
rather than the people themselves, and it carries connotations of consensus” (Nelson and 
Wright cited in Mohan (2002, p. 160)), homogeneity (Eyben & Ladbury, 1995; Williams, 
2004) and solidarity (Cleaver, 1999). Eyben and Ladbury warn that this idealized notion 
of community is “a real barrier to understanding the dynamics of participation and 
explaining the circumstances in which participation does, and does not occur” (1995, p. 
194). Precisely because participatory policies tend to be naïve with respect to political 
issues, “dominant power structures in the local communities are reproduced” (Henkel & 
Stirrat, 2002, p. 171). In other words, participation amongst the poorer and more 
marginalized sections of society is likely to be obstructed (Cornwall & Coelho, 2007), 
even when they appear to be participating.  
 
Finally, Mosse (Mosse, 1994) points out that the domination by the most powerful 
sections in a community is not always evident because it does not exclusively take place 
through competitions or confrontation, but more significantly through consensus. The 
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process of consensus-building points to another limitation of PD. Mosse is particularly 
concerned with the way in which consensus not only excludes the less powerful voices, 
but also expresses a unity of option, termed “the official view” (1994, p. 508). The 
‘official view’ conceals the diverging or even conflicting views of local reality. Williams 
suggests, “to take the ‘incorporation’ of participatory events at face value is to ignore 
people’s ability for feigned compliance and tactical (and self-interested) engagement” 
(2004, p. 565). Williams calls our attention to the “space for unintended consequences, 
both positive and negative”, which is always present within participatory development 
(ibid, p. 565). White concludes, “people have never been a blank sheet for development 
agencies to write on what they will” (1996, p. 14).  
 
Distilling Key Elements Of Participatory Development  
 
From the debate that preceded on participation and PD, certain key elements have been 
distilled as highlights for discussion. These key elements are: power processes, new 
knowledge, and civil society.  
 
Power Processes 
It needs emphasising that whichever definition is use the process of PD is fundamentally 
about power (see Craig and Mayo, 1995; and Nelson and Wright, 1995). Participation 
involves political struggle whereby the powerful fight to retain their privileges or to exert 
their dominance, therefore the process can often be marked by reluctance to release 





As discussed, PD aims to reverse the biases that have marginalised and alienated the 
poor. As Rahnema (1992) pointed out one important step in doing so concerns cognition 
and knowledge generation. In contrast to the ‘expert’ knowledge of ‘normal’ 
development, PD stresses the necessity of local knowledge. The expert systems relied 
upon scientific approaches where planners worked from normative social models so that 
the recipients of development were treated as passive or, more often, conservative and 
obstructive. PD reverses this. The research methods for doing this were inspired by Freire 
and have grown into a veritable industry, but all centre upon trying to see the world from 
the point of view of those directly affected by the developmental intervention (see 
Chambers, 1997).  
 
Civil Society 
In rejecting the statism and top-down method of 'normal' development, the focus for PD 
has become overtly local and grassroots in orientation (Mohan & Stokke, 2000). This 
therefore permits a plurality of developmental goals to be realised as well as offering 
citizens the opportunity for self-determination. Given that the State was seen as the main 
impediment to participation, much of PD is organised through civil society (Hyden, 
1997). If state structures are inflexible, bureaucratic, urban-biased and unaccountable, 
then civil society organisations are believed to be smaller, more accountable, locally 
aware and more hands-on. Although civil society has multiple meanings (ibid), in a 
developmental context it has largely been interpreted as the realm of non-governmental 
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organisations (Craig & Mayo, 1995). The debate on civil society will be examined in a 





The choice of democratic theory for this thesis is guided by the recognition that regional 
integration projects are political processes, as much as they are economic. Principally, 
political actors drive the process of integration in the political arena with political and 
economic capital at stake. Democratic theory, therefore, serves as a tool for analysing the 
model(s) of democracy being employed, and, by extension, its implications for civil 
society and participation. Moreover, this theory may serve as a basis from which to draw 
conclusions and make recommendations. 
 
Democracy in Brief   
 
The term 'democracy' has its formal origins in ancient Greek political and philosophical 
thought. It comes from the Greek word demokratia ‘rule of the people’, which conjoins 
dêmos a term for ‘the people’ and kratos the term for power (Luckham, Gotez, Kaldor, & 
al., 2000). Beyond the broad commitment to rule by the majority, democracy involves a 
set of contentious debates6 some of which can be traced to the permanent tension between 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
6  The definition and/or conceptualization of the term ‘democracy’ are heavily contested.  These 
contestations are not the focus of this thesis research. This thesis employs the conventional definition of 
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democracy as an ideal, on the one hand, and as a set of actual public institutions on the 
other (Drèze & Sen, 2002). Competing conceptualizations of the key components of the 
democratic ideal and their proper relationship to each other continue to fuel debates as 
evidenced in the anthology of work of the classical, modern and contemporary 
commentators.  
 
However, despite the multiple and competing conceptions of democracy alluded to 
above, its etymological roots imply that people hold power and that all democracies are 
characterised by the common thread of ‘participation’. It is from this angle that the debate 
on democracy (and more specifically, participation in development policy creation in 
democracy) will be traversed. The goal is by no means to explore the gamut of the 
democratic theory, but to adumbrate the key postulates that resonate with the substantive 
issues to which this thesis research is concerned. Accordingly, comparative exploration 




	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
democracy given by Larry Diamond et al. (1990) in their book Politics in Developing Countries: 
Comparing Experiences with Democracy. According to Diamond et al., “democracy denotes a system of 
government that meet three essential conditions: meaningful and extensive competition among individuals 
and organized groups (especially political parties) for all effective positions of government power, at 
regular interval and excluding the use of force; a ‘highly inclusive’ level of political participation in the 
selection of leaders and policies...and a level of civil and political liberties...” Diamond, L; J. J. Linz and S. 
M. Lipset (1990) Politics in Developing Countries: Comparing Experiences with Democracy. Boulder and 
London: Lynne Rienner Publishers.   
7 Throughout this thesis ‘participatory democracy’ and ‘direct democracy’ are used interchangeably. The 
‘Athenian model’ of direct or participatory democracy should also be noted since it is synomously used in 
the literature on democracy.  
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Models of Democracy Theory 
 
It is customary to distinguish between three overall theoretical clusters in democracy: 
elite, pluralist, and direct democracy theories (with internal differences untold) (Held, 
2006). Each of these theories suggests different roles for citizen participation in the 
democratic process. Stated differently, different forms/levels of democratization 
accompany the respective theory of democracy. 
 
In the elite tradition democracy is conceived a struggle for power between narrow elites 
minority. For Schumpeter, in his classic book, ‘Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy’, 
the incapacity of the common man to make intelligent decisions in areas of politics makes 
it necessary to limit the role of the general populace to the voting process—leaving actual 
rule to an elite minority (Schumpeter (1947) in Pateman (1970)). Thus, the role of 
ordinary citizens is limited to participation in regular elections. Apart from this, the 
citizenry is considered spectators of the political game. The elite tradition, therefore, 
foresees the inevitability of a strong role for expertise and technocrats in complex 
societies (Weber, 2002).  
 
The pluralist tradition claims that policy-making in liberal democracies should be 
determined by a plurality of groups, which effectively mirrors the interests of society 
through the interplay of the different interest groups and organisations (Dahl, 1989). In 
addition to participating in elections, ordinary citizens are expected to participate and 
engage in collective action by involving themselves in organisations that represent their 
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interests in the political arena. Thus, politics is essentially a bargaining process where 
expertise are mobilised between representatives of different interests.  
 
The elite and pluralist theories, in combination, are referred to as the theories of 
representative democracy. Theories of representative democracy8 have attracted criticism 
from proponents of direct (participatory) democracy. This tradition claims that all aspects 
of social life are in some sense political and should be the object of democratic 
autonomy. Hence, the political domain cannot be left to technocratic elites even if it is 
assumed that they can be held accountable as elected representatives of the public. In the 
direct democracy model institutional arrangements are designed to maximise active 
citizenship and laid stress on the notion of civic virtues (Luckham, Gotez, Kaldor, & al., 
2000). Conceptions of direct democracy experienced a revival with the new social 
movements of the 1960s and 1970s, which were critical of existing representative 
democracies. These criticisms entailed ‘participatory’ and ‘deliberative’9 currents, which 
have significantly influenced the debates about expanded public engagement in 
development (Norris, 2011). 
  
Proponents of participatory democracy theory criticise representative democracies for 
offering only very limited possibilities of participation to ordinary citizens, which leads 
to a depoliticised public with little influence over their own lives (Sclove, 1995). 
Consequently, the view is held that democratic procedures should not be restricted to 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
8 In some literature ‘representative democracy’ is refered to as the ‘liberal representative model’. These 
terms are used interchangeably throughout this thesis. 
9 ‘Deliberative’ denotes citizen consultation. 
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politics in its narrow and legal sense, but should also be extended to other key institutions 
of society.  
 
At a granular level, these two strands of democracy—representative and participatory—
reveal key distinctions. However, recent work in democratic theory has begun to question 
the distinction between representation and participation, claiming that representation is 
participation (Plotke, 1997; Urbinati & Warren, 2008). Notwithstanding this stance, 
distinctions between representative and direct democratic models offer valuable insight 
into the often polarised assessments of the democratic merits of participation. Some key 
aspects of the differences between the two competing models are shown in Table 1 
below.  
 
Table 1: Comparison of Representative and Direct Democracy Models  
 Representative Democracy Direct Democracy 
Role of Citizens Elect politicians 
 
Support organisations to represent their 
interest 
Articulate and develop own interest 
 
Participate in all stages of political 
process 
Role of Civil Service Effective and efficient professionals Facilitator of collective decision 
making, co-learners 
Role of Experts Producers of value-free knowledge, 
offer cognitive support to particular 
causes 
Support (self-) enlightenment of 
citizens by acting as co-learners 
Role of Politicians Steers providing authority Overseers meeting demands 
Role of legitimation Indirect: politicians are elected by 
citizens 
Direct: through citizen participation at 
different stages of political process 
Source: Biegelbauer, Peter and Hansen, Janus (2011) “Democratic theory and citizen participation: 
democracy models in the evaluation of public participation in science and technology” Science and Public 
Policy, 38(8), October 2011, (589–597)  
 
It would be an oversimplification to purport that it is an either or scenario vis-à-vis the 
choice to employ representative or participatory democracy model. In actuality, things 
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are often much more nuanced. The espousals of Luckham, Gotez, Kaldor, et al. offers 
currency here: 
 
“twentieth century democracy, however, has brought about a sometimes 
contradictory fusion of the institutions of liberal with the politics of 
participatory democracy, and in some sense it is the product of 
overlapping historical revolution which establishes ‘modern’ 
politics….There are of course synergies between the liberal ideals of 
limited government under the rule of law and the democratic ideals of 
government accountable to their citizens via free and fair elections. Yet 
the two are conceptually and practically distinct” (2000, pp. 7-8). 
 
These ideas offer interesting context for the assessment of citizen participation and 
participatory processes. 
 
Explicating Key Democratic Ideals in the Evaluation of Participatory Development 
 
At the institutional/operational level most contemporary democracies are modelled on 
representative principles, but since the 1960s many democracies have begun to 
experiment with ways to increase participation (and deliberation) (Abels & Bora, 2004). 
In the discussion to following, three central distinctions between the two models of 
democracy (representative and direct/participatory) are explicated vis-a-via how 
participatory policy development processes ought to be organised to be ‘democratic’, as 
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well as the type of criticisms these standards may induce. The differences relate to the 
following headings: principles of inclusion, issue framing and quality of decision-making. 
These categories are borrowed from the work of Biegelbauer and Hansen (2011). 
 
Principles of Inclusion  
In the representative tradition, an important aspect of democratic sovereignty relates to 
the equality of citizens: the interests of all citizens should be given equal weight in 
decision-making processes. It is therefore essential that those articulating views on behalf 
of the citizenry are representative expounders. This requisite usually leads to the demand 
for participants in such procedures to be statistically representative of the general 
population. From this perspective, criticisms are levelled when minority interests hold 
processes captive, which is a foreseeable consequence of unrepresentative processes 
(Horlick-Jones et al. (2007) in Biegelbauer and Hansen 2011).  
 
In the direct democratic tradition, the ideal of sovereignty places more emphasis on the 
idea of self-governance: the possibility that those affected by decision-making will be 
able to take part in and influence decisions. The central criterion for public involvement 
is therefore whether all legitimate interests have been given the opportunity to articulate 
their concerns. In this perspective, criticism is due when particular voices are excluded, 






Issue Framing  
In the representative tradition, it is considered essential that the citizenry is enabled to 
make informed decisions. Therefore, it is important that participants are provided with 
adequate and unbiased information. This can be achieved either through institutionally 
‘independent’ sources or through a plurality of information sources. Criticism is levied if 
information is incomplete or biased by actors serving their own interests.  
 
The direct democratic tradition stresses that ‘information’ cannot be provided in a 
context-free fashion. Therefore, it is equally important that participants in 
participation/deliberations are allowed and enabled to frame questions according to their 
own problem horizons, rather than just acting as recipients of authorised knowledge 
claims. Criticism is due when debates are cast in narrow, technocratic frames, excluding 
broader issues of social concern.  
 
Quality of Decision-making  
The representative tradition assumes that citizens have relatively stable, predefined 
interests. Politics is therefore an arena where different groups struggle to have their 
interests recognised. For this struggle to play out in a fair manner, it is essential that 
decisions are made in a transparent fashion and that the decision-makers can be held 
accountable for their decisions. Criticisms are advance when the basis on which decisions 
are made and those accountable are not transparent (Rowe and Frewer (2000) in 




In the direct democratic tradition, interests and preferences are not considered to be given 
in advance; rather they are shaped in participation/deliberations. Therefore, the critical 
standard is not (only) whether the decision-making process is transparent and decision-
makers can be held accountable, but whether decision-makers are genuinely open to 
arguments. Criticism is issued when decisions are reached through bargaining and 
compromise in the absence of deliberative argumentation (Webler and Renn (1995) in 
Biegelbauer and Hansen 2011).   
 
The dissimilarities between the two models of democracy (representative and direct) and 
the particular expectations and standards they create for citizen and stakeholder 
engagement (in the democratisation of development policy formulation) was explicated 
above. The section to follow ties together the principles of participatory development and 
democracy theory by examining the possible functions of participation.  
 
Key Functions of Participation in Democracy and Development 
 
This section distils four key functions of participation: protective, educative, integrative, 
and developmental. The first three (the democratic functions) are based on the seminal 
work of Pateman (1970) whose work builds on classical participatory theorist, John 
Stuart Mills, Rousseau, and Cole. The developmental function is extracted from the 
cumulative impact of the democratic functions that undergirds participatory development, 




Protective: The protective function includes ensuring that decision makers are kept in 
check and that good policy outcomes are arrived at. It is essentially an attempt to promote 
good governance where participation is used for instrumental or functional reasons. 
Importantly, this view of participation is hardly concerned with the transformation of the 
citizen and his/her social and psychological development. The problem with this 
approach is that when participants are not developed, they cannot genuinely contribute to 
good policy outcomes.  
 
Educative: The major function of participation in participatory democracy is an educative 
one. The educative function refers to the psychological development and the learning of 
democratic skills and procedures. Moreover, through this function citizens become aware 
of matters of their development and issues of wider importance. This function occurs 
through the process of participation itself. Thus, the educative function of participation is 
a means of equipping people with the skills, knowledge and the experience to take greater 
responsibility for their advancement.  
 
Integrative: Participation also serves to integrate the society and assists in the acceptance 
of collective decisions.  This is achieved through genuinely involving citizens in 
decision-making processes, and arriving at decisions and outcomes that take into 
consideration and/or reflect their input. When this function takes root citizens are more 




Developmental: The developmental function integrates the protective, educative and 
integrative functions. In addition to the benefits of participation, democracy and good 
governance, this function advocates participation to ensure that policy outcomes benefit 
people. Moreover, this view promotes the notion that increasing people’s capacity, 
through participation, to improve their socio-economic situation is the true essence of 
development.  
 
Since citizen participation is usually collectivised through civil society organisation the 
next section will explore organisation theory, which is view as having direct resonance 
with the objective of actualizing formal and predictable participation. Before, delving 





The role and importance of civil society as a counter-weight in the democratic process 
and as a driver, facilitator and implementer of participation in development initiatives, 
has been the sources of unremitting debate. As a result, the term civil society pervades 
discussions about (direct) democracy and development. It is first in the democratic milieu 
that this collectivisation of the people is located; however, the discussion to follow 






Plato’s and then Aristotle’s ‘Politike Koinonia’ with the Latin translation ‘societas 
civilis’ are deemed the early predecessors of the term ‘civil society’. This term was used 
to speak of a political society comprising plural forms of association (koinonia) of 
civilised individuals and groups acting with a single set of goals derived from common 
norms and values (ethos) (Ehrenberg, 1999; Cohen & Arato, 1992; Colás, 2002). This 
early notion is quite different from the definitions of CS that exist today. 
 
Today, the concept of civil society animates political and development thinkers alike. 
Notwithstanding the analytical exertion that encircle the term, civil society continues to 
evade the critical gaze, and seemingly, definitive statements about its meaning have 
merely given rise to even more complex labyrinths (Obadare, 2005). According to 
Howell, some scholars “have shunned the use of civil society, pointing to its conceptual 
fuzziness, ideological impregnation, and referential ambiguity” (Howell in Howell and 
Pearce (2001, p. 111)). For Bartton (1994), civil society is a theoretical concept, not an 
empirical one. It is a “synthetic conceptual construct” that is “not necessarily embodied in 
a single, identifiable   structure” (Bayart, 1986, p. 112).  
 
For all its contestations a litany of definitions have emerged for what civil society is 
understood to be: “the population of groups formed for collective purposes primarily 
outside of the state and marketplace” (van Rooy, 1998, p. 30); Emir Sader, “groups and 
networks that are now questioning neoliberal globalization” (2002, p. 87); and Philip 
Resnick, “intermediate sphere of associations, citizen movements, and groups that are 
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autonomous from the state and often invested with the attributes of democratic agency” 
(1997, p. 99). In sum, these definitions attest to the divergence of thought orbiting the 
concept of civil society and the dynamic role these organizations can play in a society, 
especially in the context of democracy and development. 
 
Conceptual Traditions 
The notion of civil society and the construction of the discourse on civil society have 
taken on different ideological traditions. There are three viable conceptual traditions in 
the use of the term civil society (Veltmeyer, 2008).  One of these, associated with 
political science and economics, can be labeled liberal. Fundamentally, the liberal 
tradition is fundamentally concerned with ‘political development’—establishing a 
participatory form of politics and ‘good’ (i.e., ‘democratic’) governance. Here civil 
society is rooted in the Anglo-American tradition of liberal democratic theory in which 
civic institutions and political activities are essential components of ‘political society’ 
based on the principles of citizenship, rights, democratic representation, and the rule of 
law. Liberals see civil society as a countervailing force against an unresponsive, corrupt 
state and exploitative corporations that disregard environmental issues and human rights 
abuses (Kamat (2003) in Veltmeyer, 2008). 
 
The second tradition is rooted in a sociological view of the state-society relations. The 
ideas of Antonio Gramsci, is similarly concerned with this form of politics that sees civil 
society as a repository of popular resistance to government policies and the basis of a 
‘counter-hegemonic’ bloc of social forces engaged in a process of contesting state and 
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other forms of class power. It is based on a radical ideology—a shared belief in the need 
for radical change. “Civil society is therefore seen as a repository of the forces of 
resistance and opposition, forces than can be mobilized into a counter-hegemonic bloc” 
(Veltmeyer, 2007, p. 76). 
 
The third tradition is associated with international cooperation for development. In this 
tradition, civil society is viewed as an array of social organizations representing 
‘stakeholders’ in a process of economic development, and as a strategic partner in the war 
against global poverty waged by the World Bank and other international development 
associations and agencies. Here civil society is viewed as an agency for a participatory 
and empowering form of development. Proponents of a liberal ideology see civil society 
as the beneficial effects of globalization for democracy and economic progress (ibid). On 
the other hand, conservatives view of civil society (non-governmental organizations in 
particular) as ‘false saviours of international development’ (Kamat, 2003). Here the entire 
project of cooperation for international development (technical and financial assistance to 
poor developing countries) is seen as misbegotten, more likely to result in a stifling of 
initiative than to work as a catalyst for an improvement in the physical quality of people’s 
lives (Veltmeyer, 2008). 
 
In effect, the academic discourse in it diverse ideological traditions converges around the 
view that civil society are “agents of change of one from or the other” (Veltmeyer, 2007, 
p. 76). Moreover, civil society is seen to possess the capacity for autonomous 
development and is agents of the virtues of democracy and, in so doing, agents of a 
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participatory and democratic form of development and politics (ibid). These views will 
be expanded on in the section to follow. 
 
Civil Society, Development and Democracy: Some Critical Reflections 
 
The extent to which the strength and characteristics of civil society contribute to and/or 
drive the processes of deepening democracy and enabling development has been hotly 
debated, with enthusiastic optimism and cynical critiques often going head-to-head.  
 
Scholars in Europe and America have argued following the end of the Cold War that a 
“revival of civil society” (Giddens, 2000, p. 18) was a critical step in “deepening 
democracy”, and that civil society is inherently democratizing in character (Putnam, 
1993). These arguments have also been taken up in relation the global South: civil society 
is correlated with the strengthening of democracy (Tusalem, 2007); a strong civil society 
is viewed as an essential component of all “healthy societies” (Corella, Mutesa, 
Hamabuyu, & Mpepo, 2006, p. 8), and CSOs give voice to marginal groups and 
strengthen “ownership of the development process” (Stiglitz, 1998, p. 21). An increasing 
numbers of scholars, however, have lamented these assertions. For example, Glaser 
warns against mistaking the “essentially diverse and non-purposive character of civil 
society” (Glaser, 1997, p. 25), and Fatton demonstrates that civil society can have “both 





Mercer (2002) posits, the reason why NGOs emerged as the embodiment of civil society 
in developing countries in the 1980s and 1990s had more to do with the dovetailing of the 
timing of their growth with changing development discourses than it did with any 
inherently democratizing characteristic of NGOs. Dominant development discourse 
moved away from state-led models of economic development and embraced neoliberal 
policies of minimal state involvement in social services along with ‘good governance’ 
rhetoric of accountability, transparency and rule of law. Fisher, however, contends, 
“nothing is foreordained” about the functions and democratizing potential of CS (NGOs 
in particular) (1998, p. 17).  
 
Recent scholarship on civil society challenges the primacy of hegemonic liberal ‘good 
governance’ discourse and opens conceptual space for theorizing and exploring the 
diverse forms of collective organizing and action (Orvis, 2001; Lewis D. , 2002; Hearn, 
2001; Hearn, 2007; Osaghae, 2006). Seligman (1992) believes that the ideal of civil 
society, rooted in deeply western liberal notions of the individual and the social, and 
developed in a particular and distinct history, not only does not and cannot exist 
anywhere in the contemporary world, but also has little analytical purchase in countries 
with different historical and cultural trajectories. Furthermore, even if western-derived 
understandings of the make-up of civil society do have some relevance in non-Western 
contexts, scholars are far from unanimous regarding the relationship between civil 
society, democracy and development. Increasingly, studies suggest that not only might 
the interface between civil society and good governance be far more complex than 
previously asserted (Jenkins, 2001; Roy, 2008), but also that  ’civil society’ discourses 
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and actors may actually function to limit political space for counter-hegemonic (non-
mainstream) voices/organizing and contribute to the depoliticization of development and 




Organizational theory is chosen for this thesis to illustrate the role and importance of the 
organizational capacity of CSOs in achieving participation in regional integration. 
Specifically, organizational theory will support analysis of the adequacy of their capacity 
to participate and ultimately, this theory will serve as a basis from which to draw 
conclusions and make recommendations.  
 
A Brief History of Organization Theory 
 
Organization theory is not a new theory. Modern organization theory emerged in between 
the late 1800s and early 1900s. Perspectives on organisational theory are generally 
discussed in terms of the historical/classical and the contemporary. The classical 
perspective is associated with efficiency, development of hierarchy and bureaucratic 
organizations. Subfields have emerged to address new concerns, such as employee needs 
and the role of the environment. Elements of each perspective are still used in 
organization design, in fact, they form the basis for the contemporary perspective, which 




Max Weber is seen as the figurehead of classical organisational theory. According to 
Weber, bureaucracies represent the ideal organizational form. The ideal organizational 
structure includes clearly defined responsibilities for workers and strongly controlled 
rules, policies, regulations and procedures. Henri Fayol is another theorist who 
contributed to the organization theory in the beginning of 1900s. Fayol is known for his 
focus on administrative principles, strategic planning, staff recruitment, employee 
motivation, employee guidance, including policies, and important management functions 
in order to create beneficial and successful organizations. Frederick Winslow Taylor 
pioneered scientific management, which focuses primarily on “the technical core—on 
work performed on the floor” (Draft, 2009, p. 23). Taylor is credited with helping to 
define the role of training, wage incentives, employee selection and precise work 
standards in organizational performance.  
 
The hierarchical system and bureaucratic approaches that developed during the Industrial 
Revolution remained the primary approach to organization design and functioning well 
into the 1970s and early 1980s. However, in the late 1980s and early 1990s a central 
problem emerged with the classical perspective, is that, it failed to consider the social 
context and human needs (Draft, 2009).  
 
By the middle of 1900s, researchers began to concentrate on human influences on 
organization rather than the composition of organizations. Abraham Maslow emphasized 
the importance of the human influence in organizations, his chief contribution to 
organizational theory, the hierarchy of human needs. Maslow contribution to organization 
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theory underlines that people have different needs and they need to be motivated by 
different encouragements in order to reach organizational objectives. Moreover, his 
theories indicate that with time people’s needs change and if they are given what they 
need, new needs will arise. His assumptions suggested that when people’s needs are met, 
they would be more productive. Hence, organizational success is related to the 
satisfaction of people’s needs for Maslow. 
 
Douglas McGregor came up with two theories, which are Theory Y and Theory X. In the 
later one, he says the typical human is the one that dislikes their job and because of that, 
they need to be directed, controlled and ruled as they want to avoid responsibility and 
they are more interested in their financial awards. On the other hand, Theory Y says that 
control of punishment is not the only way to make people work. People can learn to be 
responsible and have the ability of solving problems and workers are accomplished 
enough to self-direct at work. McGregor believed that organizations that take up Theory 
Y are generally more productive and successful.  
 
Alongside the development of organizational theoretical perspectives of bureaucratic and 
scientific management, it was felt that the success of these theories had be stymied due to 
their neglect of environmental factors—the contingency factors. This problem was 
emphasis when all organization were treated as similar and thus designed alike. 
Contingency theory, premised on the work of Joan Woodward, Gareth Morgan, Fred 
Fiedler, William Richard Scott, and others, have sought to formulate ““goodness of fit” 
between their structure and the conditions in their external environment” (Pennings 
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(1992) in Draft, 2009, p. 47). Draft sums it up, “what works in one setting may not work 
in another setting. There is no “one best way.” Contingency theory means it depends” 
(Draft, 2009, p. 26). These perspectives serve as the basis of contemporary organisations. 
 
Reflections on Organisational Theory 
	  
What is Organizational Theory? According to Draft, “it is a way of thinking about 
organizations. Organization theory is a way to see and analyze organizations more 
accurately and deeply than one otherwise could” (2009, p. 36). Draft further contends, 
“Organization theory might be considered the sociology of organizations” (ibid, p. 36). In 
reflection, organizational theory is important in the sense of understanding and examining 
organizations, their behaviour and their capacity. On the one hand, organizational theory 
aims to facilitate organizations to achieve their goals in an efficient manner and, on the 
other hand, it informs organizations of the possible problems/challenges that might 
forestall the pursuit of their goal. Notably, organizational theory stresses both the primacy 
of the internal and external interface and issues on the performance of organizations. 
Accordingly, organization theorists are interested in why organizations exist and how the 
social systems function. The usage of organization theory spans political science, 
management and economics. In these disciplines, theorists have tended to focus on the 
following organizational theory issues: 
 




- The effects of individual characteristics and action on organization 
- The performance, success, and survival of organizations 
- The mutual effects of environments, including resource and task, political, and cultural 
environments on organizations and vice versa 
 
Institutions and Organisations  
 
Institutions and organisations are concepts often used interchangeably, yet they refer to 
two different things. According to March and Olsen, an institution is “a relatively stable 
collection of practices and rules defining appropriate behaviour of a specific group of 
actors in specific situations” (1998, p. 943). This definition of institutions is widely 
accepted and used by a variety of scholars (March & Olsen, 1998; Duffield, 2003; 
Koremenos & Snidal, 2003). For Auriacombe and De Giorgi, an institution is “a formally 
ordered and contractually arranged grouping of people and functions which pursue the 
realization of predetermined objectives by means of organized work” (2000, p. 10). It is 
important to note that an institution has an organisation, but is not an organisation.  
 
An organisation represents the structure that supports an institution. “An organisation is a 
tool used by people to coordinate their actions to obtain something they desire or value—
that is, to achieve their goals” (Jones, 2003, p. 4). Organisations have a set of rules, 
statement of objectives and a rationalized administrative instrument, according to 
Duverger (1972). Draft posits, “organizations are (1) social entities that (2) are goal-
directed, (3) are designed as deliberately structured and coordinated activity systems, and 
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(4) are linked to the external environment” (2009, p. 11). In keeping with recent trends in 
management, Draft stresses the importance on people, human resources, and particularly 
their competencies and opportunities to learn and contribute as they work together for the 
common goal. It is the task of managers to deliberately structure and coordinate 
organizational resources to achieve the organization’s purpose. The managers are faced 
with two types of organisations profit organisations and non-profit organisations (Draft, 
2009). 
 
- Profit organizations: managers direct their activities toward earning money (profit) for 
the company.  
- Non-profit Organizations: Managers direct their effort toward generating some kind of 
social impact (ibid). 
 
The clear distinction between the two types of organisations is the focus on profit versus 
social impact. The unique characteristics and needs of non-profit organizations created by 
this distinction present a unique challenge for these organizations (Drucker, 1992; Wolf, 
1990). Hence, non-profits face several key problems: securing a steady income, difficult 
to measure the effect, marketing as well for the clients but also for volunteers and donors 
(Draft, 2009). According the Letts et al., keeping organizational costs as low as possible 
and demonstrating a highly efficient use of resources is the main challenge of non-profit 




The discussion which to follow will dwell on: organizations and institutions; 
organizations and environment; strategy, organizations and effectiveness; and 
communication. 
 
The Organisation and the Environment 
Draft argues, “turbulence and complexity have replaced stability and predictability as the 
defining traits of organizations today” (2009, p.36). Consequently, organisations face a 
number of key challenges including: globalization, intense competition, ethical scrutiny, 
digital communication, efficiency and effectiveness. The challenges in today’s 
environment have led to changes in organisations design and management. Draft 
contends, “organizations adapt to and are influenced by a rapidly changing environment” 
(2009, p. 14). The environment includes all elements outside the boundary of the 
organization including the industry, government and regulations. Environmental 
influences has occasioned a trend away from highly structured systems based on a 
mechanical model toward looser, more flexible systems based on a natural, biological 
model. Additionally, the movement is toward the learning organization, which is 
characterized by a horizontal structure, empowered employees, shared information, 
collaborative strategy, and an adaptive culture (Draft, 2009).  
 
Strategy, Organizations and Effectiveness 
Organizational dimensions fall into two type: Structural dimensions provide labels to 
describe the internal characteristics of an organization; and Contextual dimensions 
characterize the whole organization, including its size, technology, environment, and 
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goals (Draft, 2009). It is based on an understanding of these two dimensions that 
organisational design takes place and the strategies for high performance and 
effectiveness are developed.  Managers adjust structural and contextual dimensions to 
most efficiently and effectively transform inputs into outputs and provide value. 
“Efficiency refers to the amount of resources used to achieve the organization’s goals.  
Effectiveness is a broader term, meaning the degree to which an organization achieves its 
goals” (Draft, 2009, p. 20). When combined, effectiveness and efficiency leads to a result 
orientation which feeds organisational success.  
 
Communication 
In organization theory, communication is a key element. Human relations are based on 
communication. Organization and human relations are in close relationship, and for both 
communication are critical to achieving goals. Information flow, usage and relevance are 
essential for organisations to work well. Therefore, information should be reliable, 
timely, and understandable. Coupled with efficient information provision, 
communication is necessary between the following: individuals; individuals and groups; 




In this study, an organisation refers to formal structures with defined roles, 
responsibilities and decision-making processes that support institutions to realize their 
predetermined objectives. North (1993; 1994) proposes that institutions are the game and 
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organisations are its players. From the foregoing, we can deduce that institutions have a 
wider application and comprise a system of relationships that do not necessarily find 
expression in concrete manifestations of regulated relations, as is to be seen in the formal 
and material aspects of organisations.  
 
It is clear that organizations are not simply influenced by the constituents that comprise 
the organizations but also the environment within which it exist. This is to say that 
organisation should be mindful of both internal and external considerations. An 
organization should endeavour to ascribe to the twin principle of efficiency and 
effectiveness and, therefore, use their resources in a manner that is in line with achieving 
its goal.  
 
Conclusion 
This chapter reviewed the theoretical triad used in this thesis—participatory 
development, democracy and organizational theory. Participatory development 
established the rationale for and posited the benefits of CS involvement. PD also cited 
critical issues and considerations regarding participation, in and of itself, its potential 
uses, misuses and shortcomings. Democratic theory provided the ethos and summary 
basis for citizen involvement—collectivised through CS—in the affairs of their 
governance. The democratic merits of participation were traced using two conflicting 
assumptions and influential normative models of democracy—‘representative’ and 
‘direct’—about what constitute legitimate participation, with each valuing participatory 
61 
	  
processes according to different criteria. The ensuing conclusion was that participatory 
processes of involvement are ideologically framed and materially structured. 
Organizational theory enunciated the considerations that orbit organisations and, by 
extension, affect their ability to achieve their goals. In CARICOM, it is envisaged that 
organisations within CS will serve as the conduits of citizen participation and, thus, 
considerations of organisational capacity and resource factors are of principal relevance. 
Moreover, organizations are not simply influenced by the constituents that comprise 
them, but also the environment within which it exist. This is to say that organisation 




SITUATING THE RESEARCH: 
CARICOM Regional Integration and the Rhetoric of Civil 
Society Participation 
 
“Responsive as it is to the economic and political realities of the post-war world, 
Caribbean regionalism is the outgrowth of more than 300 years of West Indian kinship—
the vagaries of the socio-economic political history of a transplanted people from which 
is evolving a Caribbean identity. Without that element of West Indian Identity a 
Community of the Caribbean would be mere markings on parchment—a Community 
without a soul, without vision of a shared destiny, without the will to persist and survive” 
(The Caribbean Community in the 1980s, Report by A Group of Caribbean Experts, 
(1981, p. 1)). 
 
 
This chapter comprises two parts aimed at situating the research contextually. Part I 
provides the context of CARICOM regional integration. It commences with an 
exploration of the concept of regional integration. The second section offers a brief 
background sketch of CARICOM member countries. The third section provides an 
historical overview of CARICOM vis-à-vis the political economy of Caribbean RI. The 
next two sections map the organizations of CARICOM and its four pillars. Part I is 
brought to a close by locating CARICOM in its current milieu of issues, challenges and 
opportunities. Part II ‘regionalizes’ the debate on CS, participation and RI. It provides the 
ethos and benefits of CS participation in RI, together with the history of CSO 
participation in the Caribbean region. To conclude, the discussion is docked by 





PART I: CARICOM Regional Integration 
 
Regional Integration  
 
Regional integration (RI) as a strategy for development has gained increased currency 
with the rise of globalization—to which it can be seen as a counter-point. RI has taken on 
many shapes and forms: varying from tiny associations that include no more than a few 
actors and focus on a single issue; to huge continental-unions that address a multitude of 
common problems, from territorial defence to food security. Far from being solely a 
state-led undertaking, RI projects have come to include a variety of actors, including civil 
society, private businesses and interest groups. Together, these actors engage in collective 
problem solving of transnational issues.  
 
RI is a concept that has been defined in a variety of ways. According to Odhiambo 
(2010), RI can be seen as the process through which states within a region form trading 
blocs or federate politically and/or cooperate functionally. Van Langenhove and Costea, 
defines regional integration as “a process of deepening cooperation over areas that 
countries agree on as common interests” (2007, p. 2).  Soomer posits, “regional 
integration can be described in two ways, as a process and as an outcome” (2003, p. 1). 
As a process, it entails a country’s willingness to share or unify into a larger whole; the 
degree to which the unifying states share and what they share determines the level of 
integration. As an outcome, Soomer (2003) sees regional integration as occurring when 
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pre-established criteria are met. These criteria are outlined in the treaties or agreements 
that establish regional integration institutions and its goals. Thus, Soomer (2003) advises, 
RI as an outcome means recalling goals previously agreed upon, evaluating progress 
made and specifying the next course of action.  
 
According to some authors, this conceptual pluralism makes regionalism a phenomenon 
notoriously difficult to study beyond the remit of specific case studies of regional 
organizations/projects (Behr & Jokela, 2011). Yet, according to Tavares (2004), 
notwithstanding the numerous academic concepts and definitions it is possible to 
conclude that all regional projects share four essential elements: (1) a common 
geography; (2) regular and intense interactions on both a political and economic level; (3) 
commonly shared regional perceptions; and (4) agency and outside recognition. Beyond 
these elements, it is possible to note that regionalism evolves in close relationship with 
both global and national forces (ibid).  
 
It is important to distinguish between policy-induced and market-induced regional 
integration processes. Policy-induced processes are arrangements based on treaties. In 
this context, policy-makers in response to changes in the world economy devise regional 
integration projects. The resultant treaties codify the economic framework that has been 
agreed upon through negotiation and bargaining. Policy-induced regionalist projects seek 
to manage the substance and direction of social change represented by the globalisation 
and regionalisation trends. Market-induced integration, on the other hand, produces an 
economic regionalisation that is driven mainly by private actors (Dieter (1997), in Soko 
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(2007)). Consequently, it can be argued that regional integration represents not only a 
reaction to the increasing globalisation of the economy, but also as a reaction to growing 
problems in specific policy areas. Regional integration therefore represents an attempt to 
strike a balance between, on the one hand, exploiting the advantages of free trade and 
growing markets and, on the other hand, safeguarding the ability of the state to craft and 
implement social policies intended to mitigate the negative aspects of economic 
globalisation.  
 
In contemporary global political economy RI projects have been bifurcated between ‘old 
regionalism’ and ‘new regionalism’ (New Regionalism Approach (NRA)) (Dieter 1997, 
in Soko (2007)). Propelled primarily by the forces of globalisation, the new regionalism 
has been a crucial catalyst in the breakdown of the old regionalism, which was 
characterised by the division between the capitalist and the socialist worlds. It has 
coincided with fundamental changes to the world economy. Firstly, there has been a trend 
towards the triadisation of the world economy; the great majority of merchandise and 
capital flows in the world economy take place between the three poles of Europe, North 
America, and East Asia. Secondly, the new regionalism has been characterised by a 
growing integration of previously marginalised developing countries into the capitalist 
world economy—even though a large number of these developing countries are still 
excluded from the globalisation processes. Thirdly, global economic actors have become 
more diverse. Participation is no longer confined to state actors it also includes non-state 
actors, as stated above. In this regard, transnational corporations have played an 
increasingly prominent role in the world economy. Additionally, integration projects in 
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the new regionalism have been typified by trade strategies oriented towards the world 
market (Gamble & Payne, 1996). 
 
In summary, the parallel dynamics of globalisation and regionalisation have gained 
ground in both the developed and developing world. According to Jakobeit (1997), 
experience has highlighted a need for integration approaches that are sensitive to the 
unique development problems being faced. Therefore, it is imperative that developing 
countries seeking to integrate their economies at the regional level recognise the necessity 





CARICOM: The Region  
 
Figure 1: Map of the Caribbean Regional
 
Source: J. F, Hornbeck (2008), CARICOM: Challenges and Opportunities for Caribbean Economic 
Integration. 
 
CARICOM is a project of regional integration that comprises fifteen states and territories 
in the wider Caribbean Basin. The members are: the independent countries of the 
Commonwealth Caribbean (Antigua-Barbuda, Bahamas, Barbados, Belize, Dominica, 
Grenada, Guyana, Jamaica, Trinidad and Tobago, St Kitts-Nevis, St Lucia, and St 
Vincent and the Grenadines) as well as Haiti, Montserrat and Suriname. The Bahamas 
and Montserrat are not members of the CSME. Haiti has acceded to but its CSME 
obligations have been waived for several years following the January 2010 earthquake. 
There are also five Associate Members which are overseas territories of the United 
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Kingdom: Anguilla, Bermuda, British Virgin Islands, Cayman Islands, and Turks and 
Caicos Islands.  
 
In order to better understand CARICOM, it may be useful to present a characterisation of 
the region and member countries. CARICOM members are mainly islands (except for 
Belize, Guyana and Suriname) and the majority of them are very small. All members are 
classified by international organisations as developing countries, many of which are 
referred to as Small Island Development States (SIDS). The CARICOM Secretariat 
distinguishes member states between least developed countries (LDCs) and more 
developed countries (MDCs).  
 
The Bahamas has the highest GDP per capita income at 22,431 US-$ per year (data for 
year 2011)(World Bank, 2012). According to the UNDP Human Development Index 
(HDI), the Bahamas reach position 53 in the World ranking (out of about 160 
countries)(UNPD, 2011). Compared to the least developed member states (that is, Haiti 
with a GDP per capita of 725 US-$ in 2011 (World Bank, 2012) and an HDI ranking of 
153 (UNPD, 2011) this reflects huge differences in the average standard of living 
between the CARICOM member states. The same heterogeneity can be detected with 
regard to population size. Population ranges from 53,000 in St. Kitts and Nevis up to 
10,000,000 million in Haiti (World Bank, 2012).  
 
The economies of CARICOM member states are not very diversified. Agriculture the 
historical mainstay for many countries is losing importance, but still accounts for a high 
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proportion of GDP in most CARICOM countries. Manufacturing constitutes only a small 
part of industrial production and its share has been declining in most countries over the 
last twenty years. Because the Caribbean is a very attractive region for tourism, the 
service sector is well developed in most countries and still growing in many of them. 
 
Trade is focused on a few exported goods. Main trading partners for most of the 
CARICOM states are Jamaica and Trinidad and Tobago as well as the US, for some 
states also Britain and Japan. CARICOM as a whole has negative trade balances with all 
its main extra-regional trading partners, except for the United Kingdom. The deficits are 
most severe with Japan, Venezuela and the Latin American Integration Association.  
 
Historical Overview of Caribbean Regional Integration 
 
Integration has been deliberate over in the English-speaking Caribbean for centuries 
(Mordecai (1968), in Girvan 2010; Bishop, Girvan, Shaw, Mike, & Kirton, 2011). In 
terms of it recent evolution, that is, from the post-colonial era to date, Caribbean 
regionalism presents a number of distinct phases of action (Payne, 2008; Bishop & 
Payne, 2010; Bishop, et al., 2011). These phases are outlined below: 
 
Decolonisation and Federation: The West Indies Federation (‘The Federation’) agreed to 
in principle in 1947 was “the first modern attempt to craft a comprehensive regional 
settlement” (Bishop & Payne, 2010, p. 5).  Forged out of the crucibles of the post-World 
War II era, The Federation’s expressed aim was to create a single federated political unit 
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that would become independent of Britain. The Federation lasted from 1958-1962; in-
fighting, British ambivalence and the desire for national independence on the part of the 
larger countries (namely, Jamaica and Trinidad and Tobago) rendered it a short-lived 
political union. 
 
CARIFTA: Conceptualised in 1965 as a result of calls from the government of Trinidad 
and Tobago for a ‘Caribbean Economic Community’, the Caribbean Free Trade 
Association (CARIFTA) was consummated in 1968 as a “standard free trade agreement” 
(Bennett, 1999, p. 135). CARIFTA liberalised trade in manufactured goods, provided for 
trade in agricultural goods and established special arrangements for the LDCs. Four years 
into the life of CARIFTA, the head of member states decided to take their cooperative 
endeavours a step further and deepen relations, mainly, due to dissatisfaction with trade 
creation levels. 
 
CARICOM: CARICOM replaced CARIFTA in 1973 with the signing of the Treaty of 
Chaguaramas. In addition to the issues of economic concern, political matters influenced 
the decision to move beyond CARIFTA. Notably, countries saw the need for greater 
cooperation, broader development objectives and a unified approach to international 
affairs (via foreign policy coordination) (CARICOM, 1998; Bennett, 1999; Lewis V. , 
1999). Acquiescent to those wishes, CARICOM emerged as a stronger form of 
integration with three ‘pillars’: economic integration (a common market in goods), 
functional cooperation (education, health and several other areas), and foreign policy 




CSME: CARICOM Single Market and Economy (CSME) has its legal basis in the 
revised Treaty of Chaguaramas (2001). The Single Market component of CSME was 
officially inaugurated in 2006 and the Single Economy is scheduled for completion in 
2015.  At this juncture, it is widely noted that CARICOM is suffering from an 
‘implementation deficit’; the CSME has been afflicted by this deficit and, thus, its 
implementation is off schedule in the number of key areas. 
 
Why Integrate?  
 
As is the stipulation with all RI schemes, the question of ‘why integrate’ always emerges. 
In the case of the Caribbean, stakeholders and the wider development community have 
accredited integration as a key mechanism for advancing the region’s development. 
"Only a unified Caribbean, politically and economically, can save the regional from its 
fatal particularism" according to Pasty Lewis (Lewis D. , 2002, p. 363). Girvan, in 
reference to the Caribbean, the “regional option is a survival imperative, a development 
imperative” (2011b, p. 26). "To provide dynamic leadership and service, in partnership 
with Community institutions and Groups, toward the attainment of a viable, 
internationally competitive and sustainable Community, with improved quality of life for 
all" (CARICOM, 2012). This is the mission statement of CARICOM.  
 
Specifically, Caribbean countries are greatly aware of their small size, and this constraint, 
perhaps more than anything else, has driven the regional integration process—coupled 
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obviously with the impact of globalization (INTAL, 2005). While the constraints of small 
size and globalization provide powerful incentives for integration among Caribbean 
countries, history, shared identity and culture have also played important roles (ibid). 
While those factors provide overarching rationale, largely, the motivation for these forms 
of integrated assemblages are based on the need to attenuate particular constraints on 
(economic) development—small markets, limited capital, and limited resources, among 
others(Girvan, 2010). Several ‘extra-economic’ benefits can be realized by countries that 
are contiguous or in close proximity. For example, small islands developing countries, 
can gain economies of scale, share costs by operating common services, pool negotiating 
power and political clout in their interface with the wider global community, and more 
broadly, can derive synergies from combining human, financial, institutional and other 
resources. Considering the aforementioned factors, the regional integration has been 
concretised as a viable pathway to economic competitiveness and sustainable 
development for the Caribbean.  
 
Political Economy of Caribbean Regional Integration 
 
Over the more that forty-year history of integration efforts in the Caribbean, specific 
political economy strategies have characterized different epochs. The table below 







Table 2: Political Economy of Economic Integration Initiatives 
 





CARICOM Organizational Mapping 
 
Figure 2: The Organs and Bodies of the CARICOM 
 
Source: CARICOM (2005) Our Caribbean Community Kingston, Jamaica: Ian Randle p. 233 
 
Figure 2 shows the organs and bodies of CARICOM, as established by the revised Treaty 
of Chaguaramas (2001). The basic institutional structure of CARICOM was developed 
from the intergovernmental structure of CARIFTA, its predecessor. The structure serves 
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to support the four ‘pillars’ of CARICOM, which are economic integration, functional 
co-operation, foreign policy co-ordination, and crime and security.   
 
Initially CARICOM was divided into the Community and the Common Market. The 
Community was charged with implementing political and functional aspects of 
coordination, while the Common Market dealt with trade issues, namely the Common 
External Tariff (CET) and Free Trade. The two main centres of authority were the 
Conference of Heads of Government and the Common Market Council of Ministers. In 
addition to these two a Secretariat (now known as the CARICOM Secretariat) was 
established (out of the Commonwealth Caribbean Secretariat of CARIFTA) to coordinate 
and facilitate the activities of CARICOM (Chernick, 1978; Axline, 1979; Erisman, 1992). 
 
Since the 1990s the institutional configuration of CARICOM has changed somewhat; 
there is no longer the somewhat artificial division between the Community and the 
Common Market. The two main ‘organs’ in CARICOM responsible for making decisions 
remain the same though:  
 
The Heads of Government Conference (HGC) in which each country has one vote and 
binding resolutions can only be made with unanimity. This body holds ultimate decision-
making power and has the mandate for concluding treaties and overseeing relations with 




The Council of Ministers (previously Common Market Council of Ministers) comprises 
government representatives and meets throughout the year; usually convening prior to the 
HGC to work out the details of the issues to be considered by their heads of government. 
Both the HGC and the Council, has governmental representatives, and may focus on 
national rather than regional interests if they wish.  
 
Apart from these main organs, there are now four others that did not exist at the time 
CARICOM was created:  
 
-­‐ The Council for Finance and Planning (COFAP)  
-­‐ The Council for Trade and Economic Development (COTED)  
-­‐ The Council for Foreign and Community Relations (COFCOR)  
-­‐ The Council for Human and Social Development (COHSOD) (CARICOM, 2005). 
 
There are now also three assisting ‘bodies’ dealing with:  
 
-­‐ The Committee for Legal Affairs 
-­‐ The Budget Committee  
-­‐ The Committee of Central Bank Governors (CARICOM, 2005). 
 
The CARICOM Secretariat, which is independent of national officials and is not a 
decision-making organ, remains part of CARICOM. It now includes various specialised 




In addition to these organs, bodies, and the Secretariat there are CARICOM institutions 
such as the University of the West Indies and the Caribbean Development Bank that have 
been formed over the years, some prior to and some during the life span of CARICOM, 
with the Caribbean Court of Justice (established in 2005) being the most recent. In 1997 
CARICOM leaders created a body floating somewhere between the Secretariat, 
Community institutions and the Council of Ministers in the Caribbean Regional 
Negotiating Machinery (RNM), which was to develop and execute a negotiating strategy 
for trade issues in the region.  
 
Nevertheless, the basic intergovernmental plus Secretariat structure adopted from 
CARIFTA remains but has expanded and evolved, as has CARICOM. The main point to 
note though is that the institutional structure of the group continued to reflect the need for 
decision making to be located in national governments. Autonomy was not ceded to any 
overarching body that would coordinate economic policies within the region or towards 
the outside world.  
 
Mapping CARICOM’s Four Pillars 
 
The four pillars of CARICOM—economic integration, functional co-operation, foreign 





The pillar of economic integration is aimed at promoting trade and economic 
development. The key bodies that drive this pillar are: The Council for Trade and 
Economic Development (COTED), and the Council for Finance and Planning (COFAP); 
which have wide-ranging Treaty responsibilities for the monitoring and implementation 
of the Single Market and Economy. The Office of Trade Negotiations (OTN) is an 
important body responsible for the negotiation of bilateral trade agreements between the 
Community and extra-regional partners, and the coordination of multilateral negotiations 
in the WTO. The Committee of Central Bank Governors relates mainly to COFAP and is 
responsible for monetary policy cooperation and coordination. Other functional bodies in 
this pillar include: the Caribbean Organisation of Tax Administrators (COTA); Caribbean 
Regional Fisheries Mechanism (CRFM); Caribbean Regional Organisation for Standards 
and Quality (CROSQ); Caribbean Telecommunications Union (CTU), CARICOM 














Functional Cooperation is, arguably, the most successful aspect of CARICOM 
integration. There are twelve areas of functional cooperation, shown in Figure 2.  
 




3. Environment and Sustainable Development 
4. The Caribbean Sea 





10. Gender and Development 
11. Illicit Drugs—Traffic and Abuse 
12. Information and Communication 
 
Source: CARICOM (2005) Our Caribbean Community Kingston, Jamaica: Ian Randle p. 233 
 
Notable examples of successful functional cooperation are: the Caribbean Examinations 
Council (CXC) in secondary education, the University of the West Indies (UWI) in 
tertiary education, and the Pan-Caribbean Partnership against HIV/AIDS in the area of 
health. Environment, natural disasters, research, and development are other notable 
successes of functional cooperation. The following institutions are subsumed under this 
pillar: Caribbean Agriculture Research and Development Institute (CARDI), Caribbean 
Centre for Development Administration (CARICAD), Caribbean Disaster Emergency 
Response Agency (CDEMA), Caribbean Environment Health Institute (CEHI), 
Caribbean Food and Nutrition Institute (CFNI), Caribbean Meteorological Institute 
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(CMI), the Caribbean Meteorological Organisation (CMO), the Council of Legal 
Education (CLE) and the Caribbean Community Climate Change Centre (CCCCC).  
 
Foreign Policy Coordination 
The Council for Foreign and Community Relations (COFCOR) has responsibility for the 
coordination of the foreign policies of CARICOM states, as well as, their political 
relations with third-party states and multilateral institutions. COFCOR attempts to ensure 
that common policies and positions are both consistent with the goals and objectives of 
CARICOM and are promoted and implemented effectively. Moreover, given the myriad 
other associations, institutions and organisations to which many CARICOM states either 
belong or have relations, COFCOR’s role involves ensuring the compatibility and 
congruency between the agendas and commitments made by members and those of 
CARICOM.  
  
Crime and Security 
Crime and security are highly important issues for CARICOM member states. Their 
geographic location and make-up as largely geographic discontinuities render them 
susceptible to the virulence of crime and security issues. These issues have implications 
for the safety of individual safety and socio-economic well-being of individual states and 
the region as a whole. In response to security concerns, CARICOM states have proposed 
a multi-dimensional definition that encompasses human security, including access to 
sustainable livelihoods, protection from transnational criminal networks and 
environmental security.  The lead institution in this pillar is the Council of Ministers 
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responsible for National Security and Law Enforcement. Support institutions include: the 
Caribbean Aviation Safety and Security Oversight System (CASSOS); the CARICOM 
Implementing Agency for Crime and Security (IMPACS); and the Regional Security 
System (RSS). 
 
On the Cusp of Collapse: Challenges, Issues and Opportunities 
 
Ruminations have been tendered ad nauseam on the current state CARICOM. These 
ruminations, largely, detail the challenges, issues and imperatives that currently beset the 
project. The most recent dictum is the January 2012 Landell Mills report, ‘Turning 
Around Caricom: Proposal to Restructure the Secretariat’, which provided a trenchant 
assessment of the current state of CARICOM, with particular emphasis on CARICOM’s 
organizational engine, the Secretariat. The excerpt below captures the gist of the report: 
 
“CARICOM is in crisis. This if for three reasons: 
-­‐ Longstanding frustrations with its slow progress have continued to 
mount; 
-­‐ A serious weakening in its structure and operation over a number of 
years; and 
-­‐ Continued economic retrenchment since the 2008 financial crisis and 




Fanning out the variety of challenges the RI project has faced over the years brings into 
view a few key trends. The region’s trajectory has been characterized as an experience 
defined by moments of advances, stagnation and renewal; “these are often linked to the 
interplay between internal political, economic and socio-cultural dynamics, and larger 
global forces” (Grenade, 2011, p. 4). More specifically, in terms of stagnation, “a lack of 
capital, whether natural, human, political, technical or financial, has represented an 
enduring barrier to the implementation of agreements which already exist, let alone 
embarking upon new ones” (Bishop & Payne, 2010, p. 4). Hence, in recent years the 
project seems to be defined more by stagnation than by advances. 
 
Given the prognosis presented in the accounts above the major challenge for the 
Caribbean is the apparent stagnation of CARICOM (Bishop & Payne, 2010; Grenade, 
2011; Stoneman, Pollard, & Inniss, 2012). After thirty-nine years, it is generally felt that 
CARICOM provides a “mixed picture” (Grenade, 2011, p. 6). The prevailing view is that 
CARICOM has achieved relative successes in the realm of functional cooperation, and it 
has been less successful in the terms of the pillars of foreign policy coordination and 
economic integration (ibid). This record of mixed success has been punctuated by 
moments of renewal and stagnation.  
 
The 1989 Grand Anse Declaration was an attempt to inject life into an ailing CARICOM 
with the promise of a Caribbean Single Market and Economy (CSME) in the shortest 
possible time. The Report of the West Indian Commission (WIC), which followed in 
1992, recommended a number of measures to resuscitate the regional project. However, 
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many of the recommendations of the WIC were not readily adopted. Based on the Rose 
Hall Declaration in 2003 CARICOM Heads of Government agreed to the establishment 
of a CARICOM Executive Commission to address its ‘implementation paralysis’ and 
strengthen the governance arrangements. To date that debate is ongoing. The Treaty of 
Chaguaramas was revised in 2001 and the Caribbean Court of Justice (CCJ) was 
established in 2005 with the launch of the Caribbean Single Market (CSM) in 2006. 
However, while twelve member states of CARICOM can access the CCJ as a dispute 
settlement mechanism for the CSM, only Guyana, Barbados and Belize are members of 
the CCJ, their appellant jurisdiction.  
 
The CSME, particularly the CARICOM Single Market (CSM) component has become 
the foremost arena of operation for CARICOM in the past 15 years or so.  Its goal is to 
integrate the economies of CARICOM into a unified market in which people, goods and 
services, and capital move without restraint and into a single economy. The CSME 
project has been fraught with challenges, thus solidifying the view that while integration 
is seen as an imperative—and one that can perpetuate a myriad of benefits—it is 
problematic. Grenade points to four factors that are impact the pace of integration in the 
current context: “effective governance arrangements, issues of sovereignty, legitimacy, 
and democracy” (2011, p. 12). 
 
Frustrations with the movement have placed CARICOM on the anvil of regional 
criticisms. Eminent Caribbean journalist, Rickey Singh, in an article ‘‘Sick’ Caricom 
needs a dose of ‘people power’’, makes the point that, “the bloodstream of our regional 
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integration process is threatened by anaemia and need an infusion of people power to 
resuscitate what we know as Caricom” (Singh, 2011). Ron Sanders, a former Caribbean 
diplomat sums it up lucidly:  
 
“What the region needs now is more not less integration. The leaders of 
CARICOM, therefore, should be strengthening and sharpening the 
regional integration process as a vital instrument in improving the 
conditions of their countries individually and collectively.  
 
But the process has to start with a willingness by leaders to talk with 
each other frankly, openly and with empathy, and it has to be infused 
with an acknowledgment that they have side tracked the regional 
integration process, and must put it back on a main track because their 
countries need it. The conversation has to be underlined by a desire to 
reach collective decisions that take account of the circumstances of each 
in trying to achieve benefits of all (2011). 
  
Caribbean scholar, Professor Norman Girvan, in his assessment points to the “original 
sin” of CARICOM and contends, “the Caribbean Community is suffering from a major 
crisis, or more accurately, a multiple crisis—a crisis of implementation, of credibility 
and—dare I say—of legitimacy” (2011a, p. 1) Girvan refers to the “original sin” as “a 
two-headed sin” (ibid). One head is the absence of supranationality, or collective 
85 
	  
sovereignty, which is the underlying source of the implementation deficit of the 
Community, and the second, is called a “participation deficit” (ibid).  
 
One of the Caribbean’s eminent statesmen, Sir Shridath Ramphal, recently asked, “Is the 
West Indies West Indian?” Ramphal laments the current state of CARICOM, which is 
quoted at length below:  
 
“Despite the new external compulsions, therefore, the pursuit of even 
economic unity, which publics largely accepted, has been a passage of 
attrition. It has taken us from 1965 to 2010 - 45 years – to crawl through 
CARIFTA and CARICOM, through the fractured promises of 
Chaguaramas and Grand Anse, and through innumerable pious 
Declarations and Affirmations and Commitments. The roll call of 
unfulfilled pledges and promises and unimplemented decisions is so 
staggering that in 2011 a cul de sac looms.  
 
At Grand Anse in 1989, West Indian political leaders declared, “inspired 
by the spirit of co-operation and solidarity among us (we) are moved by 
the need to work expeditiously together to deepen the integration process 
and strengthen the Caribbean Community in all of its dimensions.” They 
agreed a specific work programme to be implemented over the next four 
years with primacy given “towards the establishment, in the shortest 
possible time of a single market and economy”. That was 22 years ago. 
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The West Indian Commission (also established at Grand Anse) 
confidently charted the way, declaring it a “Time for Action”. West Indian 
technicians took their leaders to the brink with the Revised Treaty of 
Chaguaramas. But there was no action—no political action, no political 
will to act. In twenty-two years, nothing decisive has happened to fulfil 
the dream of Grand Anse. Over those two decades, the West Indies has 
drawn steadily away from being West Indian.  
 
...Words alone are never enough, except to deceive. As Paul Southwell 
used to remind us in Shakespearian allusion: “Words, words, words; 
promises, promises, promises; tomorrow and tomorrow and tomorrow”. 
Nothing has changed. In the acknowledged quest for survival (including 
political survival) the old urge for ‘local control’ by those in control has 
not matured to provide real space for the ‘unity’ we say we need. Like 
19th century colonists we strive to keep our rocks in our pockets—despite 
the enhanced logic of pooling our resources, and the enlarged danger of 
‘state capture’ by unelected groups and external forces while we dally.  
 
...When the unsung benefits of regionalism are no longer available as 
instruments to bolster local development, and bargaining with larger 
countries, and coping with the destructive reach of drug trafficking—only 
then perhaps will Governments be forced into reconstructing those vital 
elements of regional support that neglect had helped to destroy. We will 
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then, perhaps, as with CARIFTA in 1965, resume the old cycle of 
rebuilding what we once had, but carelessly destroyed; and so ad 
infinitum. But let us remember, a civilization cannot survive save on a 
curve that goes upward, whatever the blips in between; to go downward, 
whatever the occasional glimpses of glory, is to end ingloriously. 
Caribbean civilization is not an exception. It is now as it was ninety-five 
years ago with Marryshow: The West Indies must be West Indian” (2011, 
pp. 5-6). 
 
Ramphal pinpoints the nucleus of the problem: the absence of action and the refusal to 
capitalize on cultural synergies. In sum, “CARICOM is in serious flux… this is no 
surprise. After almost forty years, what has emerged is a schizophrenic model” (Grenade, 
2011, p. 12).  
 
PART II: Regionalizing The Debate—Participatory Rhetoric 
 
 
“It is our Caribbean and our future” (CPDC, 2002, p. 3). At essence, this is the sentiment 
of the collective body of CSOs in the region. Connected with that sentiment is the 
postulate that participation in development initiatives has become “an imperative—a 
condition for survival (UNDP , 1993, p. 99).  In a newspaper article by Anselm Caines, 
titled, ‘Commentary: Caribbean Integration...For Whom?’ Caines quotes the discerning 
remarks of a participant at a public forum who describes the integration movement as a 
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"prime ministerial, piecemeal, paper-based and people-less process" (2010). The article 
goes on to cite the need to "discontinue the trend of having the process being driven 
predominantly by government ministers and regional technocrats" (ibid). This, therefore, 
calls for engendering greater ownership of the regional integration process by all 
stakeholders. 
 
How does the interface between civil society, participation and Caribbean regional 
integration, principally structure through CARICOM, play-out? Evidently, the Caribbean 
is a particular part of the world, particular history, particular issues, particular geography 
and a particular culture(s). Regional governments and by extension the Caribbean people 
have articulated, with few antagonists, that regional integration is good and desirable. 
These reverberations have been cited ad nauseam. However, the processes and pace with 
which the project is proceeding has been a point of much contention. Importantly, for 
“integration processes to move forward there is a need not only for political will, but also 
for the commitment and participation of all sectors of society” (Commonwealth 
Foundation, 2004, p. 30). Therefore, ultimately, government remains arbiters of who 
plays what role. As per CS, for it to play its role effectively alongside government and the 
private sector, its contributions must be recognized and encouraged (ibid). 
 
The sections to follow ‘regionalizes’ the debate on CS, participation and RI. The ethos 
and benefits of CS participation in RI are presented, together with the history of CSO 
participation in the Caribbean region. To conclude, the discussion is docked by 
cataloguing the participatory rhetoric of CARICOM, the antecedents of CSO 
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participation. From this vantage point, one is well primed to process the empirical 
unearthing of the study, which will be presented in the next chapter. Before proceeding 
with the discussing on the ethos and benefits of participation an assessment of the 
literature is presented.  
 
Gaps in the Literature 
 
Despite the wealth of scholarship on the study of regionalism10, significant gaps exist in 
the literature on understanding civil society in regionalism, and regional governance in 
particular (Söderbaum & Godsäter, 2008; De Lombaerde, Söderbaum, Langenhove, & 
Baert, 2010). Most sites of RI are covered in a bounty of studies that contribute to a 
deeper understanding of the process from a range of theoretical and disciplinary 
viewpoints. However, these studies focus on state and market forces issuing relatively 
scant treatment to civil society in regional assemblages, thus, suggesting the low 
relevance of CS in these contexts (Söderbaum F. , 2007). Soderbaum and Godsäter argue 
the converse, and contend, “the neglect of civil society in regionalism and in regional 
governance is at least partly a theoretical and methodological problem” (2008, p. 2).  
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
10 ‘Regionalism’ represents the policy and project, whereby mostly state actors cooperate and coordinate 
strategy within a particular region or as a type of world order. It is usually associated with a formal 
programme, and often leads to institution building. ‘Regionalisation’ refers to the process of cooperation, 
integration, and cohesion creating a regional space (issue-specific or general). “At its most basic it means 
no more than a concentration of activity—of trade, peoples, ideas, even conflict—at the regional level. This 
interaction may give rise to the formation of regions, and in turn to the emergence of regional actors, 
networks, and organisations” Fawcett, L. (2005) ‘Regionalism in Historical Perspective’ in M. Farrell, B. 
Hettne, & L. V. Langenhove (Eds.), The Global Politics of Regionalism. Theory and Practice. (p. 25). 




Accordingly, the authors cite a need to develop the theorization of civil society at the 
regional level; linking civil society to regionalism theory and grounding the logic of civil 
society involvement in regional governance in the socio-cultural and political context 
with which they operate. Moreover, Soderbaum and Godsäter posit “theories and 
conceptualisations of civil society rooted in the Western or European experience risk 
misunderstanding the logic of…civil society and its involvement in regional governance” 
(2008, p. 2). This observation implies the need to develop context specific engagement of 
the topic that transcends the normative ascriptions of the Western or European traditions. 
Furthermore the debate on governance would also have to be refashioned “bringing in the 
regional dimension in contrast to the current emphasis on either ‘global governance’ or 
‘good governance’ at the national level” (Söderbaum, 2004, p. 419). 
 
During the last decade, a more critical orientation has developed in the literature on 
regionalism. As reference in Chapter 3, these debates have emerged in the new 
regionalism approach (NRA). In the context of RI and economic globalisation, NRA 
stresses a return to the political force. In keep with this persuasion, NRA emphasises a 
triangle of regionalising actors—the state, market and civil society—who are deeply 
involved in processes of regionalisation, including its political dimensions and in formal 
and informal ways (Söderbaum & Godsäter, 2008). Moreover, the authors suggest that 
not only economic but also social and cultural issues impact regionalist projects 
(Söderbaum & Godsäter, 2008). The NRA perspective therefore represents a look beyond 





Thus far, the fledging literature on civil society as actors in regional governance provides 
a few diverse offerings. Largely, these scholarly thoughts align with most of the wider 
view on CS in the political and development frames—the liberal, the conservative and the 
radical traditions (see Veltmeyer (2007); et al.). However, the contention is, their role 
requires more nuanced and problematized conceptualisations. Soderbaum and Andres 
highlights the views of Bjorn Hettne and James Mittelman who points to CS as protectors 
of the poor, emphasising the counter-hegemonic and transformative role of civil society 
(2008). The authors assert that such a view is problematic since CS involvement is more 
complex that has been presented. Thus, there is a “pressing need to sharpen our tools for 
analysing these processes”, which should result in the development of broader empirical 
outcomes vis-à-vis CS participation in RI (Söderbaum & Godsäter, 2008, p. 7). 
 
The typology of Armstrong, Lloyd, and Redmond(2004) has emerged as a useful 
analytical tool for assessing the role of CS in RI. The authors’ emphasis three partly 
competing and partly overlapping types of civil society participation in regional 
governance: (1) civil society as partners in regional governance; (2) civil society as 
legitimating regional governance; and (3) civil society as resisting regional governance. 










Table 3: Typology of Civil Society in Regional Governance 







































National and local 
social movement, 
regional networks 
Adapted from: Söderbaum & Godsäter, The Role of Civil Society in Regional Governance: The Case of 
Eastern and Southern Africa, 2008, p. 12 
 
In sum, out of the literature has emerged that civil society together with the state and 
market are the key actors deeply involved in processes of regionalisation, including its 
political dimensions and in formal and informal ways. Historically, however, the 
academic focus has been on state and market led forces, only in the last decade has CS 
garnered more attention, particularly from the NRA. The consensus remains that there are 
significant gaps in the literature as the CS-regionalism nexus remains under theorised and 
methodologically weak.  
 
Evidently, transitioning the debate of CS in RI to the site of CARICOM presents a 
difficult proposition. Not only because of the sparseness and parallels of scholarship that 
exist globally are replicated in CARICOM, but also because of a far more limited degree 
of theorizing exist. Like in other sites of RI, studies on CARICOM have tended to focus 
on: the necessity for RI; the benefits of RI; and the economic and political issues vis-à-vis 
trade, sovereignty and implementation. While CS has occupied particular focus of 
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CARICOM regional Heads over many years and their role and engagement has been 
conjectured over, it is only in recent years that CS has received critical 'academic 
treatment'. Girvan (2011b), Thomas (2011), and sundry others through their 
commentaries have advocate for and articulated the need for CS engagement, in a general 
sense. CPDC (2011) and Bishop, et al. (2011) have, in a more specific sense, surveyed 
the issue of CS in CARICOM RI, concluding on empirical grounds on the need for 
greater CS engagement. Hinds (2007) and Montoute (2010) have provided decidedly 
academic treatments of CS in CARICOM RI. However, their specific focus was on their 
role in CARICOM trade matters, thus, paying less attention to engagement with 
CARICOM in its broader sense. While these studies have obvious implications for 
understanding of the need for, benefits and value of CS participation they have not, in 
any substantial way, tackle head-on the question of 'why CS participation has not 
materialized'. Perhaps this harkens back to the theoretical and methodological issues 
highlighted through work of Soderbaum and Godsäter (2008) in the preceding 
paragraphs. 
 
The purpose of this section was not to weigh in on any element of the debate. The goal, 
however, is to establish that significant gaps exist in the literature and highlight that the 
theoretical and methodological point of departure in the analysis of civil society 
participation in regional integration are blurred. Therefore, as suggested, studies of CS 
participation in RI require custom assessments and the development of methodological 




Ethos and Benefits of Civil Society Participation in Regional integration 
 
Regional integration schemes in various parts of the globe display diverse levels of civil 
society participation. Notwithstanding their role (e.g., partner, legitimator or resistor) 
value has been ascribed to CS involvement. In view of this value, considerable effort and 
resources are directed at enabling participation. As a consequence, several benefits have 
emerged, these include: more effective policy development and implementation; and 
more sustainable program/project outcomes. CSOs have also brought to participatory 
processes technical expertise, independent monitoring capacities, and increase access to 
the mass of population, especially the grassroots. 
 
At a more substantial level, CS play a vital role in representing and giving voice to the 
needs and aspirations of ordinary people within the integration process. With its 
community-level presence, CS is able to bring the experience, concerns and priorities of 
the ordinary citizens to the policy making and implementation process. Similarly, CSOs 
are well placed to sensitize and rally people surrounding their government’s policy 
undertakings at the regional level and the considerations it may entail. This is what 
Pateman (1970) refers to as the ‘educative’ and ‘integrative’ potential.  
 
CSOs are not only important in advocating for the needs for the people with governments 
and development partners, but also for holding governments and their development 
partners accountable to their commitments. Therefore, CSOs can be seen as strengthening 
the democratic process on both the national and regional front. In this way, CSO 
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participation fosters a bottom-up character of the regional integration processes. In doing 
so these organizations bring the rich experiences and lessons from the ground to bear on 
the integration process, ensuring a more thorough approach to development and 
assessment of initiatives. 
 
In view of the key benefits CS participation brings to the regional integration project, 
there are risks associated with failing to provide for substantial CS participation. Failing 
to provide opportunities for such engagement risk alienating CS actors and undermining 
the prospects for benefiting from their value—thereby reducing the prospects for 
successful regional integration efforts, its design, development and implementation. 
Evidently, without the contributions of CSOs it may be difficult to development effective 
and last approaches to forging and fostering meaningful integration efforts (Odhiambo, 
2010). 
 
General History of Civil Society Participation in the Caribbean Region 
 
“Caribbean people have a long history of community giving, sharing, and participating” 
(Caribbean Philanthropy Network, 2010, p. 5). This legacy has its roots in the context of 
slavery and colonization (OAS, 2008). Conspicuously, relations between civil society and 
government vary between cooperation and conflict (Witter, 2004). The ‘watershed’ 
period for participation (forced participation) in the Caribbean was the riots of the 1930s 
(Potter, Barker, Conway and Klak, (2004); Blackman, (2007) in OAS (2008)). Outside of 
this, there was very little if any participation with the State. The 1960s and 1970s, the era 
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of independence for many Caribbean countries, compelled governments to undertake 
robust development policy interventions characterized by state-led developmental 
approaches (Thomas C. , 2001). Essentially, the modus operandi of little or no formal 
participation between civil society and state was maintained. It was not until the late 
1980s and early 1990s and the advent of structural adjustment programs (SAPs) and 
attendant conditionalities, coupled with the influences of global norms and standards that 
‘change’ came to the Caribbean. In the 1990s, governments began to recognize “the 
legitimate role of civil society as a partner in governance, in large part because of its 
regional and international commitments” (Witter, 2004, p. 14). These commitments, 
together with the global development sway, have influenced the uptake of participatory 
development approaches at the national level. These approaches are not widespread and 
in fact are rudimentary, with variance from one Caribbean country to the next. Variance 
is reflected in many respects, including: the level and degree of engagement; the issues of 
engagement; and the ways in which CSO are engaged. How this picture of engagement 
maps out at the regional level is equally interesting.  
 
History in CARICOM 
Obviously, CS can play diverse roles in regional governance—the typology of 
Armstrong, Lloyd, & Redmond(2004) offers currency here. Historically, CARICOM has 
had a very minimalist and state-centered approach to governance, and thus provided 
limited opportunities for civil society participation (Hinds, 2007; Montoute, 2010). Of the 
engagement that has taken place, it has surrounded matters of trade and, traditionally, 
involvement has been limited to the trade union movement. Historically, trade unions 
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have a rich history in the Caribbean.  In the colonial era, they were the only non-state 
actors that made a noticeable contribution to the integration movement (Wickham, 1998, 
p. 35). Trade unions were then converted to political parties, which then became the force 
propelling Caribbean colonies to independence.  
 
The movement from the Federation to the Caribbean Free Trade Area (CARIFTA) saw 
little opportunity for non-state actors largely because of the focus on private sector trade. 
However, when CARICOM replaced the CARIFTA, it brought with it the inclusion of 
functional cooperation and an opportunity was created for participation with CSOs. In 
reality however, there has not been meaningful participation because the integration 
movement in the English Caribbean has been centred on the CARICOM Secretariat, 
which does not promote the inclusion of diverse interest groups. Additionally, the focus 
on trade has meant that engagement has been isolate to organisation that deal with such, 
thus, with disregard for the larger and wider group of organisations who tackle other 
issues of development (ibid). Another feature of CS engagement in CARICOM has been 
its tendency to ad hoc; this is tied to the fact that engagement has depended heavily on 
external initiation. Put another way, CS engagement has been project base and the 
consequence and conditionalities set by of an external organisations (donors, etc.). 
Outside of trade, and to a much lesser extent, CS participation in CARICOM includes 
engagement with conflict resolution, disaster relief, poverty reduction, and social 
development (Montoute, 2010).  
 
Cognizant of the espousals of Wickham reference above, there have been numerous 
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declarations for including civil society in a more formal and predictable way in the 
CARICOM regional integration. This participatory rhetoric is captured in the section to 
follow, which examines the antecedents of CSO participation in CARICOM. 
 
Participatory Rhetoric: Antecedents of Civil Society Engagement in 
CARICOM 
 
Thomas characterizes RI in the Caribbean succinctly, “our actions sometimes contradict 
our public rhetoric” (Thomas T. , 2011). According to Girvan, “our (i.e., the Caribbean’s) 
problem is not lack of thinking, lack of technical and analytical work, or even lack of 
formal decisions.  Our problem is, and has always been, lack of implementation” (Girvan, 
2011b, p. 27). Those lamentations speak to the undeniable gap between policy decisions 
and implementation in CARICOM. Policy decisions express “certain value (institutional 
dimension), imply particular stakes (political dimension) and hardly ever speak for 
themselves (practical dimension)” (Hupe, Nangia, & Hill, 2011, p. 5). Therefore, it is 
through implementation that policies are given true life, and policy makers in CARICOM 
continue to fall short in giving true life to policies by closing the institutional, political 
and practical gaps in implementation. 
 
A survey of the mechanisms aimed at actualizing formal and predictable in CS 






The commitment to participation in the Caribbean regional integration is not new. 
CARICOM traces its engagement of people back to the 1973 (Isaac, 2004). The preamble 
of the ‘Treaty of Chaguaramas’ (1973, revised 2001), states, it is “desirous of 
restructuring the organs and institutions…and redefining their functional relationships so 
as to enhance the participation of their peoples, and in particular the social partners, in 
the integration movement” (CARICOM, 2001, p. 1). Article 26 goes on to flesh-out, in 
detail, the particulars of such participation; “to enhance the decision-making process in 
the Community…establish and maintain an efficient system of consultations at the 
national and regional levels” and further, that “consultations [will be] undertaken at 
successively lower levels of the decision-making process.” Institutionalised annual 
exchanges with the Joint Consultative Group (JCG) were also listed. The JCG was then 
made up of the Caribbean Association of Industry and commerce (CAIC), the Caribbean 
Congress of Labour (CCL), and the Caribbean Consumer Committee (CCC). At this time 
also the JCG engaged in dialogue with the Common Market of Minister via meetings. In 
the late 1980s, however, discussions with the JCG took the form of direct exchanges with 
Heads of Government instead of the Common Market of Ministers.  In 1995, The 
Caribbean Policy Development Centre (CPDC) assumed the umbrella role of NGO 
participation in the JCG. 
 
The next participatory antecedent ensued from the Grande Anse Declaration (1989) in the 
form of the Assembly of Caribbean Community Parliamentarians (ACCP). The ACCP 
was established 1994 as a deliberative body for deepening the integration movement 
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through the following objectives:  
 
1. To involve the people of the Community, through their representatives, in the process 
of consolidating and strengthening the Community 
2. To provide opportunities for involvement in the issues of the integration process by 
members of Parliament in each Member State and Associate Member, in addition to 
those who now participate 
3. To provide a forum for people of the Community to make their views known through 
their representatives 
4. To provide more frequent contact in the monitoring of the policies of the Community 
5. To provide enhanced opportunities for the coordination of the foreign policies of 
Member States 
6. To promote greater understanding among Member States and Associate Members for 
the purpose of realizing and safeguarding the ideals and principles of democratic 
governments in the Community and facilitating the economic and social 
advancements of their peoples 
7. To encourage the adoption by the Governments of Member States of the Community 
of a common policy on economic, social, cultural, scientific and legal matters 
deliberated upon by the Assembly 
 
The inaugural sitting of the Assembly took place in Barbados in May 1996. Since that 
time the ACCP has had two other sittings, in October 1999 and November 2000 in 
Grenada and Belize respectively. The ACCP fell short of what was envisaged at it 
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conception largely based on the fact that its powers were limited to posing question to 
CARICOM organs and passing resolutions that had no legal force.  
 
The next participatory antecedent came in 1997 with the CARICOM Charter of Civil 
Society (1997) (referred to as ‘The Charter’, see Appendix IV for a copy). The Charter 
arose out of the recommendations of a ‘Time for Action’, a report by the West Indian 
Commission11. According to Isaac: 
 
“The Commissioners contended that CARICOM needed “normative 
moorings’ and that they had found “a yearning for giving the Community 
a qualitative character – values beyond the routine of integration 
arrangements; indeed standards by which these arrangements themselves 
can be judged and to which they can be made to conform.” In their view 
“the Charter [could] become the soul of the Community, which needs a 
soul if it is to command the loyalty of the people of CARICOM” 
(2004:27). 
 
The Charter was approved (subscribed to) by Head of Government of the CARICOM 
member states and was intended to be legislated nationally, however, at this juncture it 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
11 The CARICOM Heads of Government established an Independent West Indian Commission comprising 
eminent West Indians to carry out a process of public consultation with leaders, teachers, writers, 
intellectuals, creative artistes, businessmen, sportsmen, trade unionists, churches and other community 
organizations, as the Community prepared to face the challenges of the 21st century. The report of that 





remains without legally binding on member states. In substance, the Charter enumerates 
overarching principles and key issues of good governance. In the Charter, Heads of 
Governments articulated their determination to “create a truly participatory environment 
within the Caribbean Community which will be propitious to genuine consultation in the 
process of governance” (CARICOM, 1997). Beyond this central ethos, the document 
delineates the process for reporting and monitoring the implementation and provisions of 
the Charter. Spanning both the national and regional ambit, member states were tasked 
with submitting periodic reports on engagement with social partners to the Conference of 
Heads of Government. Further, at the national level, states were asked to establish 
national committees or designate a body to monitor and ensure the implementation of the 
Charter. Evidence to support whether follow-up reports or the mechanisms to monitor 
such were ever implemented or is not available. 
 
Another participatory antecedent came in 2002 when regional Heads sort to chart a new 
path for civil society engagement by holding a broad based civil society conference titled 
‘Forward Together’—the aim being, “to foster partnership and collaboration in order to 
advance regional development” (CARICOM, 2002). Consonant with this aim the 
conference objectives were to: 
 
- Identify strategies for financing development that pay attention to the needs of the poor 
and marginalised groups; 
- Establish new approaches to collaboration and consultation between civil society and 
government, especially in the pursuit of the CSME; and 
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- Strengthen the scope of dialogue and collaboration among the various strands of Non-
State Actors in promoting regional development. 
 
The ‘Liliendaal Statement of Principles on Forward Together’ (referred to as ‘Liliendaal 
Statement of Principles’ or ‘Liliendaal Principle’, see Appendix III for a copy) was the 
culminating document of the conference Forward Together. This statement vocalized the 
dissatisfactions of government and civil society regarding the current state of 
engagement. At its core, the Liliendaal Statement elaborated the agreed upon typology 
for engagement and expressed for both parties (CS and Heads) several broad principles 
for strengthening their relationship. The principles included “the establishment of 
mechanisms for continuous dialogue between the Conference of Heads of Government of 
the Caribbean Community and Civil Society” and, an “essential way to complement 
relevant programs to ensure social reconstruction, cohesiveness, peace, poverty 
reduction, and equity that would enhance regional integration and make the community 
more economically viable” (CARICOM, 2002). Further, the Heads of Government also 
“emphasized the need for more constructive participation of CS representative in 
appropriate decision making organs of the Community, such as, the Council Trade and 
Economic Development (COTED), the Council for Finance and Planning (COFAP), the 
Council for Human and Social Development (COHOSOD), etc.” (ibid). To date the 
nature of engagement has not proceeded as was envisioned in the 2002 Liliendaal 
Statement of Principles. One example, the (intended) annual presentation of Civil Society 




‘The CARICOM Civil Society Participation and Engagement in Regional Integration 
Project’ (2010-11) is the most recent participatory antecedent. The project was funded 
under the Caribbean Integration Support Program (CISP) of the 9th European 
Development Fund (EDF) (an external source) and implements by the Directorate for 
Foreign and Community Relations, CARICOM Secretariat. The Project primary goal was 
the creation of a Regional Strategic Framework and Plan of Action for instituting civil 
society participation in CARICOM, including the CSME. The report was concluded in 
2011 and the contents submitted to the Heads of Government for them to opine. 
 
Conclusion: The Confluence: Civil Society, Participation, and 
CARICOM 
 
At this time, while the stated commitment (rhetoric) of Heads of Government to the 
participatory engagement of CS is clear, as suggested in the antecedents above, the 
tangible manifestations of those statements are lacking. What is also clear is the relative 
consensus that the active participation civil society is critical for successfully advancing 
the regional integration project. It is there for paradoxical that meaningful engagement 
has not been actualized.  
 
Part II of this chapter brought together the strands of debates presented in Chapter 2. The 
section commenced by exploring the gaps in the literature vis-à-vis CS, RI and 
Participation. The rationale CS participation in a regional integration project was outline. 
The historical antecedents of participatory engagement of CS in CARICOM were 
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surveyed. The debate now rests at the point of return, the research question. The chapter 





PRESENTATION OF FIELD RESEARCH DATA: 





The previous chapter provided a contextual, historical and literature background to CS 
participation in CARICOM specifically and, generally, in the Caribbean. This chapter 
presents the primary field research data. In order to maintain the integrity of the data, this 
chapter does engage in analysis. After the findings are presented objectively, in the next 
chapter the implications and conclusions will be analysed against the theoretical triad set 
out in Chapter 2. 
 
In July 2011, I completed in-depth of semi-structure key-informant and elite interviews in 
the CARICOM member territories of Barbados, Guyana, and Trinidad and Tobago. Key-
informant interviews were conducted with CSO executives from a range of 
organizational identities. Elite interviews were carried out with well-placed regional 
experts on the topic. During the field investigation and empirical data collection exercise, 
five focal areas emerged. These focal areas coalesce around the research question of this 





2. Potential Contributions of CS to Regional Integration 
3. Considerations for a Framework for Participation 
4. Constraints on Civil Society Participation 
5. Institutional Approaches to the Integration Challenges of Participation 
 
Participants in the interviews have been assured anonymity. In keeping with this, code 
names are attached to direct quotations. A legend that established the logic of the code 




For this research project, and this focal area in particular, establishing what the Caribbean 
Community (CARICOM) means was an essential starting point for a discussion on RI 
and, equally so, for participation. Accordingly, a coherent view of what CARICOM 
means, from the perspective of CS, was sought.  
 
For CS the concept of CARICOM is thought of as fluid and viewed as bifurcated, that is, 
having both an institutional and an organic form:  
 
1) The institutional form: In this mould CARICOM is viewed largely as the regional 
body charged with ‘integration’ (economic, political, social, etc.) matters, “Pooling 
resources, and allowing the collective benefits of cooperation and collaboration to 
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redound to the people of the region” (TTInt2). The Secretariat (and other 
organizational component of CARICOM, in particular, the HoG Conference) is 
viewed constitutively as the institutional sum of CARICOM. 
 
2) The organic form: From this perspective, CARICOM is defined as “the people of the 
region” (TTInt3). It is a community, “as people live it and know it” (BBInt1). 
Moreover, it is a “real reality, a real life thing—CARICOM is an organic thing, 
meaning, it touches our lives historically and culturally—it is part of our ethos in the 
region. It's a lived experience” (TTInt2). 
 
Having defined CARICOM in their own terms, CSOs noted that they seek engagement 
with both forms. Consequently, all of the CSOs interviewed collectively and 
unequivocally declared their support for Caribbean RI. Accordingly, such support is for 
some organisations their “raison d'être” (BBInt1), and for others their “purpose, mission 
and overall motivation” (GYInt2).  
 
Consequently, the view that, yes, CARICOM should be a mechanism through which 
CSOs participate in regional integration was propounded with unanimity among 
respondents. The institutional form of CARICOM held as an important “platform for 
future change” (TTInt3). The deliberations regarding making it such a platform will be 
cogitated on in the focal areas to follow. Suffice it to say, CARICOM needs “an injection 




Respondents were quick to add, CARICOM is not the only mechanism through which 
they can participate citing “organic integrated impulses” which lie outside of the “policy 
focus and elitist” natures that characterises formal institutions (BBInt2). Concurrence 
emerged around “a meeting of these two different forms of integration (institutional and 
organic) if it is (CARICOM is) to mean anything to ordinary people” (BBInt2). 
Accordingly, a diverging position surfaced that CS involvement should also have an 
existence outside of CARICOM—which will serve as a complementary avenue and a 
supplement to CS participation in CARICOM (the institutional form). 
 
In view of the support for CARICOM (the regional integration project), the follow 
emerged as the primary concerns of interviewed participants:  Regional integration, 
regional identity, regional loyalty, regional links, regional interaction, a common 
platform in the international arena, a common sense of being one people from one space. 
 
Probing the question of ‘primary concerns’ vis-à-vis regional integration further, and with 
greater exactitude, wide ranging concerns emerged. These trepidations are discussed 
below: 
 
- An out of sync conception of CARICOM: “People of the regional want to get together 
in a less restrictive way than is conceived by our policy makers” (BBInt1). The view 
was advance that the conception of ‘CARICOM’ held by regional Heads seems to be at 




- A lack of political will: The pervasive outlook is that “HoGs don't have any real 
commitment to RI and, thus, the regulations that have been put up serve more as a 
hindrance than as a facilitator of peoples’ integration” (BBInt1).  
 
- Leadership: A major issue with RI “has to do with the lack of leadership and vision of 
current leaders in the region”. 
 
- Implementation deficit: This view is mounted on the limited legal capacity that 
CARICOM, in its current configuration, has to implement decisions and take ideas 
forward. This is an area of unnerving concern.  
 
- A low level of awareness: The feeling is that people and organizations are not 
sufficiently aware and knowledgeable of what development cooperation (RI) means for 
them and for the CARICOM region. 
 
- Sovereignty: Some informants characterised the RI project as “a group of sovereign 
states” with members not fully committed to integration. As a result, the short-term 
political interests of individual states are often given priority over the longer-term 
common good. 
 
- Representation: The acknowledgement that the RI project remains primarily a top-
down process and therefore lack the integral element of ‘peoples’ participation was 




The concern of participation lies at the heart of this thesis and was therefore surveyed 
with detail and intensity. The expressed intent was to determine from CSOs, what would 
constitute participation in Caribbean regional integration for them. The ruminations of a 
key informant offer an appropriate starting point to this area: 
 
“Participation ranges along a continuum: first, providing information; 
second, providing support via resources from CARICOM governments to 
CSOs; third, the actual decision making and governance structure that 
allow CS inputs and opinions into decisions; and fourth, feedback and 
evaluation thereafter” (TTInt2). 
 
Another explanation on participation points with vehemence to the view that CS 
engagement constitutes “consultative status, at minimum” (GYInt1). The espousal of an 
elite interviewee augments this perspective: 
 
“Civil society engagement should go beyond consultation.  Consultation 
suggests two-way communication with no guarantee that the suggestions 
will influence final decisions. Their inclusions should be genuinely 
participatory, having the ability to contribute to decision making, e.g., 




Querying another participatory option, the concept and consideration of observer status 
was mentioned with some disdain and was viewed as limiting and restrictive. A key 
informant posited that they “would want to participate as fully as possible” (BBInt1) and, 
therefore, observer status does not permit the level and quality of engagement envisage. 
Accordingly, it was expressed that participation should therefore include: consultations 
on particular issues; the ability to make submissions on matters; the option to act as 
project implementers; avenues to provide technical input; the chance to engage in public 
education; among other considerations. 
 
The summary position of interviewees is that a system of engagement should provide 
CSOs with the opportunity to participate in a working relationship that enables CSOs to 
make practical and theoretical contributions to the programs and goals of CARICOM.  
 
2. Potential Contributions of CS to Regional Integration 
 
Musings in support of CS engagement in the Caribbean regional integration project have 
come from diverse quarters. Largely this idea of CS participation is founded on their 
potential to contribute to the RI project in a myriad of way. CSOs were asked to share 
what their engagement would bring to CARICOM integration. The views are distilled 
below, as the key contributions of CS to RI: 
 
Alternatives to development: “We present an alternative from the technical view of 
development”, this was a position of accord held by the research sample. More 
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specifically, they contend that, “CS can present a view or model of development that 1) is 
more long-term, and 2) is more responsive to people’s lives and actual experiences at the 
community level” (BBInt1).  
 
Skills and technical expertise:  Defining CS in its broadest sense—everyone outside of 
the administration of government—one interviewee asserted, “we possess the widest 
array of skills and expertise” (BBInt1). Through formal channels, those skills and 
expertise can be brought to the fore in the form of a substantial contribution to 
development. 
 
Improved governance: This contribution was discussed in two ways. Firstly, CS view 
their inclusion as having the potential to result in improved performance from policy 
makers, as CS will serve as ‘checks and balances’ in the regional integration project. 
Moreover, their inclusion will “help to strengthen the accountability of governments to 
constituents, through increasing their awareness and understanding of the programmes” 
(GYInt2). Secondly, CS involvement would constitute a responsibility on their behalf to 
deliver and in so doing “improve the governance of the regional so that democracy 
becomes not just a formalize structure, a structural something, but something that is lived, 
vibrant and responsive to the emerging Caribbean civilization” (BBInt1).  
 
Provide an understanding of the needs ‘on the ground’: The position that CS understands 
the needs of people ‘on the ground’ was advanced stridently. Accordingly, CS is 
therefore able “to bring proposals and make input towards the regional integration 
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process, to advance the lives of ordinary people” (TTInt1). One example cited is through 
furnishing policy makers with ‘evidence based research’ which may guide and shape 
development policy formulation. Another example is though impacting policy with ‘local 
knowledge’. In so doing, “the regional integration process would therefore not be based 
on theoretical models (only) but be driven by the needs of the citizenry (and reflect) a 
more realistic approach to governance and integrating people” (TTInt2).   
 
Ownership and legitimacy: The position resound that when CSOs participate and 
contribute to RI process, the voices and needs of the ordinary people are included in 
decision-making. The corollary to this is that inclusion “fosters ownership and brings 
legitimacy to the development process” (TTInt1).   
 
3. Considerations for a Framework for Participation 
 
Having established their willingness to participate, defined the nature of participation CS 
is desirous of, enumerated their keys regional integration issues of concern, and outlined 
the potential value CS can bring to the integration project, the focus in now being shifted 
to actualizing their participation in RI. This focal area dwells on the main considerations 
surrounding creating a framework for CS participation. Stated differently, this section 
seeks to unearth some of the key ‘terms of reference’ that should inform any framework 




The proposals of interviewees with respect to a model framework for participation are 
best captured in this statement, “we want formal and predictable channels” (BBInt1). 
From this assertion a number of specific terms for consideration were tendered, the 
essence of which is captured in the discussion to follow. 
 
Civil society informants concurred that to actualized participation and deepen 
engagement a shared level of responsibility exists for both parties (CARICOM and CS). 
Respondents contend that genuine recognition of civil society as development partners at 
the national and regional level by government is the core of and the base starting point for 
catalysing the process of meaningful participation. The indicators of this genuine spirit of 
engagement are variegated—and as a consequence, highly noticeable and very much in 
contrast to the historical antecedents that presage participation. 
 
Interviewees expressed the need for creations of democratic space(s) where CSOs can 
funnel their input into the overall machinery of CARICOM. These spaces must have both 
national and regional dimensions with complementarities between the two. Candid in 
their remarks, there was overriding solidarity on the stance that for engagement to take 
place a commitment to restructure/strengthen the CARICOM Secretariat was obligatory. 
Moreover, distinct mention was made of the need to adopt regulations and institute 
administrative actions, which would impel implementation of decisions approved at the 
regional level. The most radical of the calls advanced was for a modification of the 
“existing model of governance from liberal to participatory democracy to incorporate 




Key informants and elite interviewees alike, alluded to the provisions outlined in the 
CARICOM Charter of Civil Society, the Liliendaal Statement of Principles and, most 
recently, the CARICOM Civil Society Project Report, as being highly instructive on the 
requirements for facilitating CS participation and engagement in CARICOM process. 
The illuminations of those documents may serve as a broader point of reference and in 
many instances are captured in the espousals below. Specifically, interviewees suggested 
that the following terms should be addressed or should serve as points reference when 
framework for participation:  
 
- Any framework should be instated based on a legally binding model of participatory 
operation, which should see the CARICOM Charter of Civil Society brought into law 
(through national legislation) 
 
- A genuine response to the CS sector’s capacity development needs is a prerequisite for 
greater involvement in regional integration at all levels 
 
- Any framework should be genuinely transparent, inclusive and representative, and 
thereby, facilitate the participation of a wide cross-section of CSOs 
 
- Of necessity, any framework should be characterised by structural, procedural and 





- Any framework should be open and consensus based; allow for wide-ranging 
discussions on the gamut of issues that encircle Caribbean development 
 
- Any framework should facilitate an agreeable level of meaningful interface between 
policy makers and CSOs at the national and regional level 
 
- Any framework should be characterized by an adequate level of systematised dialogue 
and feedback 
 
- Any framework should be imbued with a result-oriented culture—one characterised by 
engines of intellectual inquiry and the implementation of decisions 
 
- Establish designated conduits that facilitate effective information flow and sharing 
from policy processes vis-à-vis the national-regional nexus of participation 
 
- Pre-establish the regularity of meeting engagement, which, of necessity, should specify 
a clear forum and timetable for participation  
 
- Install institutional touch points, nationally and regionally (perhaps a national focal 
point (NFP) and/or NGO DESK) to provide a means to influence government policy 




Despite the abovementioned points of reference CSO were keen to note, “you needed the 
governance arrangements (referenced earlier) – the legal framework and the facilitating 
unit. The main issue for CSO is for action to be supported financially.  That framework 
for them should be informed by the terms outlined above. For sample frameworks, see 
Appendix V. 
 
4. Constraints on Civil Society Participation in Regional Integration 
 
The link between capacity and resources, and the attendant ability to participate is one 
that was clearly established by respondents. According to respondents, the capacity and 
resources that CSOs require to participate are as important as any agreements that 
advocate participation. Thus, informants contend, having a space to participate and not 
having the capacity and resources to do so render it ineffectual. For this reason, this focal 
area examines the capacity and resource constraints affecting CSOs ability to be 
meaningfully participants in CARICOM RI if called upon. It should be noted that the 
discussion to follow does not treat with issues of the governance mechanisms required to 
participate (which was deliberated on in the section that preceded) but focuses on the 
capability of CSOs to be participatory actors in the context of CARICOM RI.  
 
Diverse views were tabled regarding the present capacity of CSOs to participate in 
CARICOM. These views ranged from CSOs not having the capacity to having some 
capacity and having the capacity. Probing the question, at a granular level, what emerged 
was the common sense that capacity is an ‘organization specific’ issue. National umbrella 
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organisations, regional umbrella and regional organization are seen as having ‘fair’ 
capacity to participate. It is important to note that the fair capacity referenced here should 
be interpreted in the context of the follow statement, “the only resource we don't have is 
money. As far knowledge, skills, experience, etc., we have that” (BBInt3). However, 
umbrella organisations stand in stark contrast to ‘unitary’ civil society organisations, 
some of which do not necessarily have the technical, organizational and financial 
capacity to engage CARICOM in a meaningful and sustained way. This, according to 
some respondents, does not mean that those organizations would not like to engage 
CARICOM. The belief, however, is that the demands of fulfilling their domestic mandate 
takes priority. Therefore, incurring the comparatively onerous resources demands of 
regional participation would make such participation unfeasible for these organizations.  
 
The consensus prevailed among all informants is that the “funding situation is quite 
difficult” for the sector and, as a result, “at this present junction most of the organizations 
are not operating at their optimum” (BBInt1). This lack of resources typifies a sector that 
is weak, struggling and dependent. The cyclical impact of the financial predicament the 
CS sector faces is explained in the remarks below:  
 
“One thing feeds the other, so because the organizations have been eroded 
they have been losing their capacity, managerial staff and expertise. Their 
governance structure has been slipping—there are slippages in the 
governance in terms of the requirements that they should and ought to 
uphold. There is also lost of physical infrastructure—old equipment that 
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needs replacing. So the technical, the financial, the governance, the 
managerial, all of these aspects are below par at the moment—so there is a 
real challenge in term of their full participation. So at the same time that 
there is a desire to participate, the ability to participate and engage at this 
present time is quite limited” (BBInt1). 
 
The menu of issue constraints cited in the interview excerpt above is synopsized below: 
 
Technical 
“To participate in the technical dialogue (of regional integration) on an on-going basis 
would be a challenge for us—that's for sure” (BBInt1). “One of the main ones relate to 
research capacity.  I think that research should drive policy and the direction of regional 
integration and regional development” (TTInt1). The key technical capacity issues 
highlighted by respondents were: 
 
- Research  
- Analytical  
- Legal literacy 
- Monitoring and evaluation 







“I will say that Caribbean civil society generally face several challenges in participating 
in any process” (TTInt1). The main organizational capacity issues highlighted by 
respondents were: 
- Limited manpower power 
- Competent human resource 
- Managerial acumen 
- Governance concerns 
 
Financial 
As it pertains to finance, one respondent explained: 
 
“Governments in the regional have not yet developed a culture of 
(financial) allocation so we (civil society) rely on external funding, and 
since the end of the Cold War the Caribbean is no longer seen as a priority 
area for international grant making. This means that the capacity that 
existed within a lot of organizations has eroded steadily over the years—
so that organizations that were once vibrant at the national and regional 
level do not have that institutional capacity anymore. This is one of the 
drawbacks at the moment—so it we are thinking of real engagement of 
civil society from the national level in the process, some rebuilding has to 




The main financial constraints highlighted by respondents were: 
- Limited funding 
- Dependence on external funding 
- Inadequate diversity of funds sources 
- The existence of little or no level of self-sustainability 
 
Operational 
In the words of a respondent: 
 
“No consistent integrated media/communication network exists through 
which we and other CS networks can reliably come into contact with each 
other, and where we can converge along a certain vision, because there are 
some many CSOs doing things in silos that you are not aware. The sharing 
and spreading information and network it critical to how we operate” 
(TTInt3). 
 
The main operational constraints highlighted by respondents were: 
- Inadequate availability of information (from the CARICOM Secretariat and in a timely 
manner) 
- Loss of and/or antiquated physical infrastructure 
- Assorted impediments to communication and networking for idea convergence 
- Limited ability to (fund) sustain travel 




Additional Factor Considerations—CSO’s notes to themselves 
 
With genuine participation as the major goal, the following were tendered as factor 
considerations for CSOs in order to better position and enable themselves as effective 
participants and meaningful contributors to regional integration. CS espoused that they 
need to: 
 
- Rationalize functions: The prevailing opinion is that given the current state of the 
sector, in terms of, slippage, loss of vitality and capacity, “CSOs need to rationalize 
their functions and instead of having small remnant organizations to coalesce into 
stronger tighter units that bring more skills together” (BBInt1). 
 
- Cross-fertilize and synergize: The view was advanced, repeatedly, that a greater 
amount of networking among organizations—NGOs, trade unions, and volunteer 
service clubs—is needed. According to informants, the upshots of this networking are 
the promotion and establishment of cross-sector linkages across focal areas and the 
forging of national and regional synergies. 
 
- Articulate clearly what ‘we’ mean by and want from RI: The need for issue 
convergence around common agreed regionalist themes, and need to articulate clearly 
what RI means and what they want from RI were reoccurring themes among 
respondents. The feeling expressed is that a CSO posited vision for RI and, equally, the 
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interpretation and explanation of that vision is important for the RI project.  
 
- Develop a different leadership style: This need is best captured in the words of a 
respondent: 
 
“We are guilty of adversarial politics—confrontational engagement. We 
have to being to think more in terms of partnership than confrontation. 
You must be willing to invest the time it takes, to build thrust and to work 
toward a common goal. If we come with a criticism we should also come 
with a solution to” (BBInt1). 
 
- Skills training and development: CSOs held in oneness the belief that skills 
development and training are certain imperative en route to be full and meaningful 
participants in RI. Some of the key areas cited for skills training and development 
were:  
 
- How to tap into and diversify funding sources 
- How to reach target audience with greater efficiency and effectiveness 
- How to improve organizational efficiency 
- How to market the work of the organization and RI 
- How to mobilize people; both volunteers and the regional citizenry  




5. Institutional Approaches to the Integration Challenge of Participation 
 
This focus area is very much a capstone; it captures the overriding and underlying 
sentiments, and prevailing themes that permeated both the key informant and elite 
interviewee discussions. The derivate remarks were the result of both direct questions 
that interviewees were broached with and digressions they felt incited to discuss or allude 
to. In particular, these remarks enwrap the why questions of this thesis, which is, the 
central question.  
 
Engagement: Feeding history into the present 
The history of both RI and engagement in the Caribbean is long and storied. One 
respondent noted that the initial ‘architects’ of RI were national leaders of the post-
independence period who had fought on the front lines of colonialism and “wanted to see 
a new way of life for the people”. The current architects are:  
 
“A generation of leaders who I believe, to be fear to them—despite the 
popular sentiment that they don't want to surrender their spheres of power 
and influence—I think defining ourselves in an increasingly globalized 
world is challenging. What is our identity? What is the Caribbean 
sensibility? What is the Caribbean persona? 
 
Marking and defining our development direction as a unique people rather 
than just part of a globalizing world—is a challenge—with the 
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penetrations of the media people reference point are more global that they 
are national or regional” (BBInt1). 
 
The prevailing consensus among informants is, “we need a (participatory development) 
model compatible with us” (BBInt3). “We are on a new frontier in administration and 
governance in the Caribbean—we have to become the thinkers in our own regards” 
(BBInt3). Notwithstanding this reality “CARICOM have remained a top-down 
institution, which lack and affinity with on the ground people”. The posture of CS to this 
reality is “(we) can offer services at the national and regional level, both on the practical 
and theoretical level. It’s really about the spirits… (and) so if the recommendations that I 
made earlier can be incorporated we would have created the space, the framework and 
the possibilities for doing” (BBInt1).  
 
Institutional approach toward engagement 
CSOs were frank in expressing their opinions on the approach and disposition of regional 
Heads towards their participation in RI. Their assertions congregate around the view that 
regional heads have been apathetic towards their engagement at the national level, and 
consequently, CSOs “have little faith that they would engage us at the regional level, 
although we are very keen on engaging the heads at the regional level” (BBInt1). CSOs 
indicated that this is in contrast to quotidian politics at the national level, where 
politicians engage denizens in their communities to procure votes. However, the 
engagement arrangement at the regional level is vastly dissimilar. The following vignette 




“It’s not the frameworks and the structures, in and of themselves, that fail 
us, it’s the lack of political will that fail us. The lack of will by our policy 
makers to engage us, the suspicions that we have of each other; that we are 
coming to overthrow each other or we must prove our decision makers 
wrong. So when you ask if it (CARICOM) can be an appropriate structure, 
it can, if the political will to engage is there” (BBInt1).  
 
Why is the uptake so slow? 
At the heart of this research study is the central issue of unearthing why uptake of civil 
society participation in CARICOM regional has not materialize. The ruminations of a key 
informant below encapsulate this best: 
 
“Governments generally think of CS as a type of opposition, because you 
have your lens of what is happening and you critique what is happening—
as you know the democratic framework allows you the right of decent, 
freedom of speech, of opinion and of association. Governments tend to not 
see the enabling side of CS until they want it, but rather that CS constitute 
a threat; they function more as an opposition party, they tend to be more 
critical than helpful. If CS were viewed as a resource, that can enable, we 
would have more (rapid) uptake. The views of CS have been shared 
through the length and breadth of the region; governments are not 
committed to RI because they will have to surrender their spheres of 
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power. So if you are defensive of your little space and status you would 
not want to take onboard people that you perceive to be critical—but if 
you saw it as enabling resources to bring to bear on the development of the 
country and the region then you would.  
 
It is a more difficult process as our democratic framework says elections 
every five-year. It’s based on representation rather than participation, and 
what we are asking for in the 21st century is ownership, involvement, 
participation not the old model of representation where people elect you 
and you go about your business…The Caribbean is a much more educated 
and informed region—this current generation more so than fifty to sixty 
years ago. So our democracy needs to live and grow, it needs to mature to 
the state where you have free access to information, and free interaction, 
where that kind of engagement between the citizenry and the policy 




This chapter has presented, in detail, the primary field data of this thesis. The findings 
delineated in the five focal areas were drawn from key-informant and elite semi-
structured interviews in the CARICOM member territories of Barbados, Guyana and 
Trinidad and Tobago. The data collected focused on answering the research question of 




The next chapter will examine the findings presented in this chapter, and discuss and 
analyse them in the context of the theories, literature and context presented in the 
foundation chapters (2 and 3). I will then attempt to draw conclusions, define the 
implications of the findings and make recommendations, which will be presented in the 








ANALYSIS AND DISCUSSION: 
The Rhetoric and Realty of Civil Society Participation in 
CARICOM 
 
This chapter sets out the analysis of field research data by merging the theories outlines 
in Chapter 2 with the empirical realities presented in Chapter 4. For congruence, the 
analysis presented in this chapter mirrors the five focal areas distilled from the empirical 
field data and elaborated in the last chapter: 
 
1. Participation 
2. Potential contribution of CSOs to Regional Integration 
3. Considerations for a Framework for Participation 
4. Constraints to Civil Society Participation 
5. Institutional Approaches to the Integration Challenge of Participation 
 
Before delving into the focal areas, it is beneficial to restate the central question and 







As evidenced in the literature (Chapter 3), relations between CSOs and regional Heads 
goes back to the inception of the region’s RI project, although the declarations, 
affirmations and commitments that advocated their inclusion has changes several times. 
At the present time the responsibility for crafting the development direction of the region 
remains the exclusive preserve of CARICOM Heads—despite the acknowledged 
importance of the role of CS. This acknowledgement is premised on the participatory 
development paradigm which espouses key benefits from CS involvement; the 
democratisation of the development process and the promotion of development that is 
more economically, socially, culturally and environmentally attuned to the needs of the 
regional, to name a few. Thus, in principle, CS involvement should be viewed as 
participation for development. 
 
This thesis seeks to understand the nuanced context and complexities surrounding 
actualizing civil society participation in the CARICOM RI development process. 
Accordingly, the central question is: 
 
Why is it the case that numerous declarations by CARICOM Heads of Government 
in support of CSO participation in the regional integration process have not 
resulted in any tangible, real involvement of CSOs in the institutions and 




This thesis argues that above and beyond the obvious challenges of providing the 
necessary framework and capacity building for CSO participation in the Caribbean 
integration process, the current lack of real and substantive inclusion is rooted in the 
structure of a representative democratic framework with limited consideration for the 
principles of a participatory model of democracy. 
 
The sections in this chapter treat empirically, theoretically and analytically with the 
research question and argument of this thesis. Participatory development, democracy and 
organisation theories are used in this thesis. Their relevance and direct bearing on the 
thesis were iterated in Chapter 2. Participation is embedded in democracy, democracy is 
needed for involvement in (successful) development outcomes, and for successful 
development outcomes correct problem specification is needed. Participation is 
collectivised through CS. Democracy theory demarcates what is provided to CS and its 
involvement in policymaking and implementation processes. Organisational theory 
enables an assessment of the capacity, resources and effectiveness of CSOs, and stresses 
the importance of these factors for their engagement in RI policy development.  
 
1.   Participation 
 
As a point of discussion and analysis, CARICOM serves as an important place to start, 
after all, its conception holds great bearing for this study. Equal in this regard is the 
concept of participation. How participation is defined holds immense consequence for its 
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realizations, its role, and ultimately, its impact. In the theoretical and methodological 
context of this study both conceptions are of particular import for analysis.  
 
Primary field data signalled that CSOs hold a bifurcated notion of CARICOM, that is, 
having both an institutional and organic form. The former being the organizational and 
structural remit of CARICOM, and the latter being a “lived experience” (TTInt2) for the 
people of the region. CSOs avowed support for RI and seek engagement with both forms. 
Such support is for some organisations their mission and overall motivation, and for 
others, their raison d’être. However, aspirations of engagement are attached 
predominantly to the institutional form of CARICOM, as it is recognised as a “platform 
for future change” (TTInt3). Engagement in actuality is participation. Field data indicated 
that CSOs possess a firm grasp of what participation should mean (in the RI context). 
Briefly, they defined participation as a “continuum” (TTInt2) involving: the provision of 
information, support via resources provision, a decision-making governance structure, 
and a feedback and evaluation loop. Further, CSOs were clear on the need for 
participation that is not simply observer status and for whatever form selected to 
transcend consultative status. What is envisaged is for CSOs to “participate as fully as 
possible” (BBInt1). Decisively, participatory engagement should be genuine and allow 
CSOs to make theoretical and practical contributions to the goals and progress of 
CARICOM. 
 
The summary of empirical data in the focal area of participation, provided above, offers a 
rich plane for discussion and analysis. The data suggest, CSOs see themselves as 
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stakeholders in the RI project, “affected by the outcomes—negatively or positively—or 
those who can affect the outcome of a proposed intervention” (The World Bank, 1996, p. 
125). Moreover, empirical indicators have strongly suggested that CSOs possess a 
genuine interest in participation and have a clear conception of what participation should 
look like. What is envisioned is a break with what Chambers calls the “top-down model” 
and the uptake of a model in which “multiple, local and individual realities are 
recognised, accepted, enhanced and celebrated”(1997, p. 188). 
 
2.   Potential Contributions of Civil Society to Regional Integration 
 
The focal area of the potential contributions of CS to RI policy development is an 
important one. Support for CS participation has its origins in diverse quarters and is 
premised, largely, on the potential of CSOs to add value in a multiplicity of ways. In 
terms of the CARICOM RI project the key ways cited were: 
 
- CS can present an alternative model of development 
- CS can offer technical expertise 
- CS can contribute to improved governance  
- CS can provide a real understanding of the needs ‘on the ground’ 
- CS can foster (people’s) ownership of the RI project  




This focal area brought into view the many substantial potential contributions CSOs can 
make to CARICOM RI. Theoretically and notionally the issue of participation—whether 
in democracy, PD or organisational theory—is founded on the potential benefits to be 
accrued from operating inclusively. Through the lens of democratic theory CS 
involvement, to the extent elaborated above, would constitute ‘democratization’ of the RI 
development policy process (White, 1996). Moreover, such engagement constitutes 
meaningful involvement and stands to deepen and advance the region’s integration 
movement. Moreover, it would buttress the furtherance of ownership of the RI process 
and aid in legitimizing the integration process. From the perspective of PD theory, the 
conceptualization of Rahnema (1992) offers analytical purchase on this point. Rahnema 
characterises PD as having three core elements: cognitive, political and instrumental 
(1992). Applying this characterization to the potential contributions of CS to CARICOM 
it is clear their involvement span these three elements, as follows: 
 
1. Cognitive: CS can offer a firm understanding to the needs ‘on the ground’ 
2. Political: CS can represent and empower the voice of the voiceless 
3. Instrumental: CS can provide an alternative understanding of the Caribbean reality 
 
The addition of the technical expertise and knowledge of CSOs of to the realities ‘on the 
ground’, CSOs can provide invaluable contributions towards improving the efficiency 
and effectiveness of the RI project in delivering on its advertised goals and objectives. 
Therefore, from and organisational theory perspective, their contributions and input can 
serve to produce and enhanced vision for CARICOM RI. 
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3.   Considerations for a Framework for Participation 
 
Empirically, this focal area delved into the main considerations surrounding the creation 
of a framework for CS participation in CARICOM. Evidently, the prior focal areas have 
discussed and analysed the willingness of CSO to participate, the nature of participation 
CSOs are desirous of, and their potential contributions the RI project. The next logical 
step is to cogitate on the empirical findings vis-à-vis a framework for participation. 
 
CSO were categorical in their espousals regarding a framework for participation. Their 
views were best summarized in this quote, “we would want formal and predictable 
channels” of engagement (BBInt1). Other sentiments were tendered to overarch this 
edict, including: the need for genuine recognition of CS as development partners; the 
necessity of a genuine spirit of participation; the need for capacity development for 
CSOs; and the creation of democratic space(s) to channel input into CARICOM, with 
national and regional complementarities between the two structures. Some key structural 
considerations were cited, these included the needs for: a framework for participation; 
support mechanisms; institutional touch-points for participation; pre-established meeting 
frequencies; and systematic dialogue and feedback mechanisms. 
 
The focal area regarding a model framework for participation is one rich with discussion 
and ripe of analysis. The field data presented a myriad of considerations. It is worth 
noting that the express intent was not to elaborate an actual framework (for elaborations 
and recommendations in this regard, see Appendix V and CPDC Report 2011) but to 
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inform such a framework (or to provide the empirical basis for such). The data suggest, a 
numbers of factors are at play and ought to be given due consideration. These factors are 
embedded in the in the theoretical triad provided in Chapter 2 and the historical 
antecedents discussed in Chapter 3. 
 
The undercurrent of the considerations advanced by respondents bespeak apprehension 
fuelled, largely, by the history of failures to implement agreed upon mechanism for 
participation. Foremost in the memory of CS, academics, scholars and people in the 
region is that implementation is the Achilles heel of the RI project. In light of this, one 
can concluded that the considerations proffered are aimed at addressing and countering 
the implementation deficit. 
 
The theoretical reverberations that flow from this data set are numerous and display 
interesting perspectives. The twinning of several key considerations can be used to 
illustrate this. The issue of creating a framework that is transparent, inclusive and 
representative, and thereby facilitative of participation of a wide cross-section of CSOs 
relates to PD, but has its genesis in democratic theory. From a PD perspective, Mohan 
and Stokke (2000), White (1996) and Chambers (1983; 1994; 1997) all posit that 
participatory processes should be characterised by those core features (among others) for 
participation to be effective—to serve a developmental function. In democratic theory, 
democracy and particularly direct democracy, advocates for participation that is widely 




The consideration to establish designated conduits to facilitate effective information flow 
and sharing from policy processes has both organizational and democratic theory 
underpinnings. In the arena of organizational theory, ‘information’ is critical and so to 
‘structure’. Successful decision-making and overall organization performance hinges on 
the effective and efficient flow of information. Organization theorist Draft (2009) 
contends, to build agreement among diverse groups widespread information sharing is 
imperative. Moreover, Draft (2009) espouses that information sharing is a vital attribute 
for organisations in turbulent environments. In the democratic sphere, for the 
representative tradition, it is considered essential that citizens are enabled to make 
informed decisions—premised on adequate and unbiased information. In the direct 
democratic tradition it is stressed that information be provided in a specific context. 
Criticisms are levelled when debates are casted in narrow, technocratic frames, which 
exclude issues of social concern. For Pateman (1970) information is a core component of 
the educative and integrative functions as for both to take place an adequate supply of 
information is needed. It is therefore conclusive that the timely provision of information 
is an integral part of the participation process. 
 
The appeals for any participatory framework to be imbued with a result-oriented culture 
are grounded in organizational theory and PD. Organization theory contributes to 
facilitating organizations in achieving their goals and informs them of the possible 
problems/challenges they may encounter. Organisations are tasked not just with 
achieving their goals but also with attainment them in an efficient and effective manner. 
Therefore, the recommendation for a participatory process marked by a result-oriented 
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culture is closely linked with the organization theory concepts of effectiveness and 
efficiency. The adoption of such a measure can bring much benefits and tangible result to 
a participatory process in the sphere of RI. 
 
PD places results at the very core of the participatory process. The stance is that, on the 
one hand, the involvement and coming together of development actors is aimed at a result 
that represents a better achievement that would have been possible through individual 
effort. On the other hand, the result created through collective effort is thought to be more 
sustainable—efficient and effective—and thus, the impact greater. 
 
4.   Constraints on Civil Society Participation in Regional Integration 
 
Data analysis and discussion in this focal area revolves around the capacity and resource 
constraints affecting CSO’s ability to participate in a sustained and meaningful way. 
Having a framework and space to participate and not having the capacity and resources to 
do so render it useless. Therefore, capacity is an area that carries important implications 
for CSO participation and, thus, requires careful study.  
 
The field data garnered presented diverse views concerning the capacity of CSOs to 
participate in meaningful and sustained way. In short, these viewpoints captured capacity 
as an organisation specific phenomenon that ranges from: ‘not having the capacity’, to, 
‘having some capacity’, and ‘having the capacity’. In the case of having the capacity, this 
fair capacity to participate is attributed to ‘umbrella’ organization, as opposed to, ‘non-
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umbrella’ ‘unitary’ organisations, and is even further, contextualised to mean technical 
capacity and not financial capacity/resources to participate. The empirical data indicated 
that, regionally, CS bemoans their current financial situation. Financial exigencies have 
rendered the operations of organisations uncertain and organisational performance has 
fallen well below optimum. The corollary impacts noted in the data were: technical, 
organisational, financial and operational slippages. The sum of this reality is that while 
CSOs express the desire to participate their capacity to engage is quite limited at this 
time. 
 
In contemplation of the constraints CSOs face, the data demonstrates they have tendered 
measures aimed at better positioning and enabling the sector to be meaningful 
contributors to the RI project. These measures included: the rationalization of functions; 
cross-fertilizations and synergising of operations; the development of a different style of 
leadership; the need for skills training and development; and the articulations of a clear 
vision of what they want and mean by RI. 
 
The set of data on the focal area of constraints to participation offers much fodder to 
analyse further from various angles. In applying the theoretical triad, each theory holds 
the issue of capacity with much importance and concurs on it as an imperative for 
meaningful and sustained participation. For example, PD holds capacity as important and 
like organisational theory places emphasis on building capacity, especially where absent. 
In fact, White (2006) and others have stressed that an elemental part of participation is 
building capacity and by extension empowerment. Organizational theory treats capacity 
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as central to efficiency and effectiveness, and, by extension, the achievement of 
organisational goals. Drucker (1992) and others highlight the unique proposition CSOs 
face in relation to their prime goal of social impact versus profit, and the unique 
challenges this creates in supporting themselves. In addition, organisational theory places 
special emphasis on the external environment. A school of thought in organisational 
theory, the contingency theory, underlines the need for organisations to be keen on 
adapting to their environment. 
 
Delving further into the empirical field data, one can note the ‘self-declared’ variance in 
the capacity of CSO to participate. This reality brings into view a numbers of issues 
regarding the prospects of participation. Among those issues are: 
 
1. Their ability to engage in a meaningful and sustained way; 
2. The number of organisations capable of participating; and 
3. The representativeness of that quantum. 
 
The infirmed financial position of the CS sector was the key reason underlying the issues 
listed above. The financial position of CSOs carries further ramifications of 
organisational and operational slippages, which can debase their operations, and thereby 
impact their very ability to survive. 
 
Notwithstanding the encumbrances states above, this dataset illustrates awareness among 
CSOs regarding their capacity to participate. This was conveyed in the measures CSOs 
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proffered to attenuate their current financial pressures and, at the same time, better enable 
organisations to make meaningful contributions in the region. The measures reeked with 
organizational, operational and financial tones. The key measures included the need for 
the following: 
 
- Rationalise and synergise operations 
- Develop a different style of leadership 
- Skills training and development 
- Articulate a clear vision RI 
 
One would have to agree that these measures are substantive and needed 
recommendations that can only serve to improve the efficacy of the CS sector to make a 
more meaningful contribution to the RI project. Whether or not they can and would be 
implemented is a topic for another discussion. 
 
5.   Institutional Approaches to the Integration Challenge of Participation 
 
As it did in the Chapter 5, this focal area will serve as the capstone for this chapter. The 
sources and composition of the data to be discussed and analysed in this focal area is 
derived from both key informant and elite interview discussions and is based on direct 
questions, digressions and inferences. This focal area, draws support from the other focal 





As suggested by the data and supported by the antecedents provided in Chapter 3 (Part 
II), attempts at CS participation in CARICOM RI is long and storied. This history and so 
to the history of Caribbean RI, is set into two contexts. The first context, marked by the 
initiators of the region’s RI project, forged out of the crucibles of the post-colonial period 
and fuelled by the desire to create a “new ways of life for the people” (BBInt1). The 
second context is set out by the current architects, who are tasked with the challenges of 
“marking and defining our (the Caribbean’s) development direction as a unique people in 
an increasingly globalized world” (BBInt1). In engaging with this challenge, the data 
points to two realities: (1) CARICOM has remained a top-down institution, and (2) 
paradoxically, although repeatedly admonished to engage CS, has not created the space, 
framework or possibilities for meaningful participation. 
 
With specific regard to the disposition to engage CSOs, the field data suggested that 
regional Heads are apathetic towards engagement and, consequently, CSOs have ‘little 
faith’ that they would be engaged, especially at the regional level. Probing further, the 
primary field research presents the unmistakably prevalent view that regional Heads have 
little political will to engage CSOs. The data suggests, this may be fuelled by mistrust, 
skepticism and the mutual suspicions held of each other.  
 
Surveying the implication of the three roles CS can play in RI (Armstrong, Lloyd, & 
Redmond, 2004) may seem intimidating for the HoGs. CS involvement stands to see 
them become a significant force in the RI project, which maybe or is perceived as their 
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potential influence. This position is consonant with this views of Williams who contends 
that “participation may indeed…. provide its subjects with new opportunities for voice, 
and its consequences are far from pre-determined” (2004, p. 559).  Accordingly, HoGs 
may find this as too substantial a role and thus a potential threat. This harkens back to the 
trepidations cited in the data, which states that HoGs do not see the enabling side of CS 
participation, but see CS as a threat. Moreover, the pervasive sentiment surfaced that 
HoGs are “afraid to surrender the spheres of power” (BBInt1)—from the representative 
democracy viewpoint deep participation maybe regarded as tantamount to such. This 
stance also pervades the literature, according to Girvan, “the root of the problem is that 
governments are not willing to surrender any of their sovereign decision-making 
powers…where their sovereignty may be exercised collectively” (2012, p. 7).  
 
Evidently, participation in the sphere of RI requires the investment of serious political 
capital. Moreover, while the gains of such investment may seem clear—the advancement 
of the region—the returns are equally uncertain (from the perspective of HoGs). The 
oddity of political wins, losses, and gains vis-à-vis political mileage in the regional 
context and its implications for the politics of the national context is uncharted territory, 
with sparse reference points globally, for political leaders in CARICOM. Keeping in 
mind that RI is in part a political process; this may be a consideration weighing heavily 




Applying Armstrong, Lloyd,  and Redmond (2004) typology of the three roles civil 
society can play in regional governance, these are the potential implications that analysis 
offers vis-à-vis the primary field research data: 
 
Civil society as partner 
By way of data analysis, one can conclude that the primary role CSO seek to play in 
CARICOM RI project is that of partner. In principle, the partner role in RI is a supportive 
one, established on a commitment to integration and the promotion of socio-economic 
growth and sustainability of the region (Söderbaum & Godsäter, 2008). This intention 
was espoused strongly in the primary data. An important point to note, which is typical of 
the partner role, is that CSOs in the region have advanced the need for modifications in 
the approaches to achieving the aforementioned RI goals. In addition to contributing to 
the governance facet of RI, the data highlighted CSO in the following roles: service 
provider, project implementer, monitor, advocate and lobbyist—all traits of the 
partnering role and geared toward improving and advancing the RI project. 
 
Civil society as legitimating regional governance  
Through analysis of the field data the intended legitimating role of CS in CARICOM was 
identified. By their very engagement and their own admission, CSOs assert they would 
“foster ownership and bring legitimacy” (TTInt1) to the RI process in the region. In the 
material sense, this would be actualized through collaboration with policy makers and by 
critical engagement with the governance process (as opposed to the more benign role of 
partner). Characteristically, the legitimating role is marked by intentions of radical policy 
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change, rather than the review and implementation of existing policies (Söderbaum & 
Godsäter, 2008). Furthermore, at its core, the legitimator is tasked with making the RI 
process more accountable and democratic—and, therefore legitimate. The retort of a 
respondent vis-à-vis RI equates to this, “yes CARICOM is a mechanism… (it is a) 
platform for future change” (TTInt3). Moreover, “people of the region want to get 
together in a way less restrictive than conceived by our policy makers” (BBInt1). These 
statements, coupling with the issues of concern articulated by CSOs indicates their 
intended legitimating role in CARICOM. 
 
Civil society as resisting regional governance  
The role of resistor to CARICOM RI warrants meticulous consideration. In contrast to 
what obtains under the roles of CSOs as partner and legitimator, the aims and objectives 
of states-led regional governance are interpreted differently and resisted. It is important to 
note that ‘resisting’ should not be conceived of as resisting the project of RI but the 
approaches, processes, policy positions and prescriptions of RI. Resisting is done by 
building local and national mobilisations and converging regionally to campaign, protest, 
demonstrate displeasure and occasion transformation, where needed.  
 
The CARICOM RI project is largely void of such actions; in fact, examples of CS12 
(potentially) resisting regional governance are somewhat difficult to identify in both 
primary and secondary data. However, there are some attitudes and opinions which offers 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
12 Note, as defined in this thesis, civil society organisations exclude trade unions who’s history of resistance 
in the Caribbean is well documented. 
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sway in this direction. For instance, respondent vigorously criticized CARICOM for 
being a top-down organisation—not rooted in the people. To remedy this gap CS 
advocate for more participation; the development of a more people-driven regionalism, 
from below, in characteristic contrast to the current state-centric approach. Another site 
of resistance referenced in the data is that CARICOM’s policies are too heavily oriented 
toward liberalisation of intra-regional (CSME) and international trade (economic 
development), with lesser consideration for functional (development) co-operation. This 
view is substantiated in the literature (Grenade, 2011). CSO hold the view that functional 
co-operation offers many tangible benefits and therefore should be advanced with greater 
alacrity. 
 
In view of the menu of roles presented above—CS as partner, legitimator and resistor—
and their implications for RI, a recall of a statement from the field presents a telling 
perspective: 
 
“Governments are not committed to RI because they will have to 
surrender their spheres of power. So, if you are defensive of your little 
space and status you would not want to take onboard people that you 
perceive to be critical—but if you saw it as enabling resources to bring to 





That vignette brings into focus the approach of HoGs to the process of participation. In 
brief, it reveals that the lack of participation serves a protective function—protective of 
political space and power. This protective function is buttressed by the democratic 
framework under use in the Caribbean and, by extension, its precepts in the CARICOM 
space. In sum, primary field data coupled with the historical antecedents supports the 
position that the democratic framework used to inform participatory process is a 
representative one, rather than a participatory model. With that in view, the antecedents 
of engagement, or lack thereof, and the current posture of apprehension appear much 
more comprehendible. 
 
It therefore seems fitting to end this sub-section with a quotation from the field, it sets a 
context of the future of engagement in the region: 
 
“Our democracy needs to live and grow; it needs to mature to the state 
where you have free access to information and free interaction, where that 
kind of engagement between the citizenry and the policy makers can 
happen in a non-threatening way” (BBInt1). 
 
This section teased out a conclusive position—according the primary and secondary data, 
theory, and analysis—on the central question of why CSO participation is yet to 
materialize in CARICOM RI. This position is woven together and presented 






For analysis, this thesis utilizes a theoretical triad: participatory development, democracy 
and organisational theories. It is worth noting that prior sections employed the 
aforementioned sequencing of the theoretical triad. This section, however, diverts from 
that sequence for reasons of analytical purchase and hierarchy, it proceeds as follows: 
first, organisational theory, then participatory development and, finally, democratic 
theory. The rationale and application of their employ will be discussed below. 
 
Organizational Theory: Speaks to the organizational factors and considerations that 
orbit the realization of meaningful participation. In the context of CARICOM, it is 
envisaged that organisation within CS will serve as the conduits for citizen participation. 
Thus, considerations of organisational capacity and resource factors are of overriding 
significance to the achievement of CSO participation.  
 
Through the facility of organisation theory one can elicit, from the data, several capacity 
and resource constraints facing CSOs. Before going into those constraints, it is worth 
reiterating what is an organisation. Jones defines “an organisation is a tool used by people 
to coordinate their actions to obtain something they desire or value—that is, to achieve 
their goals” (2003, p. 4). The organisation is this case is a CSO and the goal is 
participation. The data attest to significant problems/challenges that constrain the ability 
of CSOs to participate in a meaningful and sustained way. The data indicated that 
umbrella CSOs possess fair capacity, however, regionally and in general, organisations 
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bemoan their financial situation. The ramifications of the financial state of CSOs are 
significant organisational and operational slippages. Without exaggeration, these 
ramifications have serious implications for both the prospects and quality of CS 
participation—if participation were to be operationalized. For instance, in terms of 
prospects, the number of organisations available to participate and the representativeness 
of those organisations are important issues that affect both the viability and credibility of 
the participatory process. In terms of quality, the ability of CSOs to conduct research and 
analysis, and connectedly, their ability to make meaningful and substantial contributions 
as participants underlie the very goal of participation. 
 
From the perspective of organisation theory, the awareness within CS regarding their 
capacity constraints and the measures proffered to attenuate those constraints can be 
deemed incisive, prudent and well founded. The measures tendered included: to 
rationalise and synergise operations; to develop a different leadership style; to engage in 
skills training and development; and, to articulate a clear vision RI. 
 
White (1996) asserted that participation is a means to develop the voice and 
organisational capacities of those previously excluded. Accordingly, there is shared 
responsibility, given the value CS would add to the RI project, to capacitate CSOs to 
participate. However, taking the representative democratic stance, the one seemingly 
under deploy, capacitating CS (to this extent) would not be seen as an imperative and ad 
hoc participation is sufficient for the goal of protection. However, in contrast, the 
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approach of the direct democratic model will treat this responsibility with much intent 
given the educative and integrative participatory functions.  
 
Participatory Development: Established the rationale for and posited the benefits of CS 
involvement while also citing the critical issues and considerations regarding 
participation, in and of itself, its potential uses, misuses and shortcomings. 
 
The analysis extracted through the lens of PD from the data is as follows. The aim of CS 
participation in CARICOM RI is to infuse the process with a sense of peoples’ 
participation, as a goal in itself and to use this as a basis through which other 
development goals can be furthered. This is very much in keeping with a camp of the 
literature on general participation that propounds participation as both a means and an 
end. CS engagement in CARICOM can also be seen as promoting ‘good governance’ 
and, thus, the democratic principle of: transparency, effectiveness, openness, 
responsiveness, and accountability; acceptance of diversity and pluralism, and social 
inclusiveness (Veltmeyer, 2008). There is affirmative evidence in the primary data to 
support this. The benefits tendered vis-à-vis CS engagement represents significant value 
for the regional project. Markedly, the benefits parallel Rahnema’s (1992) core elements 
of PD: 
 
- Cognitive: CS can offer a firm understanding to the needs ‘on the ground’ 
- Political: CS can represent and empower the voice of the voiceless 




In term of the specificities of participation the data resonates with the emancipatory form 
of participation (UNDP , 1993; Chambers, 1994; The World Bank, 1998)—participation 
as a “platform for future change” (TTInt3). This is also exemplified in the views of 
respondents that participation should go beyond consultative status. 
 
It would be short-sighted not to extent a critical treatment to this area. Despite the 
potential benefits CS participation offers CARICOM, the belief is pervasive that CSOs 
are not acknowledged as development actors and, further, calls for participation are not 
genuine. As a result, there is an unavoidably lack of confidence that formal and 
predictable participation would material at the regional level. Despite of the cautious 
optimism, the feeling is that sporadic engagement, when it is politically expedient or 
external initiated, may persist. Given the antecedents of engagement there is merit in this 
view. However, the gravity of what is at stake might occasion different results.  
 
Democracy Theory: Provided the ethos and summary basis for citizen involvement—
collectivised through CS—in the affairs of their governance. It also attests to the 
constructs surrounding how participatory processes of involvement are ideologically 
framed and materially structured.  
 
Using the optic of democratic theory to analyse the approach to participation in 
CARICOM offers interesting perspectives and revelations. The volition to engage and 
enable CS participation is viewed as deepening and strengthening democracy as CS is 
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deemed to be inherently democratizing in character (Putnam, 1993; Tusalem, 2007). 
Moreover, in relation the global South, civil society is correlated with strengthening 
“ownership of the development process” (Stiglitz, 1998, p. 21). The democratic merits of 
participation can be traced to conflicting assumptions about what constitute legitimate 
participation. In Chapter 2 a comparison of how two influential normative models of 
democracy—‘representative’ and ‘participatory’—value engagement processes according 
to different criteria was advanced, as well as, the attendant material/support 
considerations that follow the respective models.  
 
The fact that citizen participation has little extension beyond voting in the national 
context of CARICOM member states, and that civil society engagement is irregular and 
restricted in the regional context, is broadly suggestive of the representative democratic 
approach to participation.  In the representative tradition the role of the general populace 
is limited to the voting process (in regular election) (Schumpeter (1947) in Pateman 
(1970)). This is largely the reality in the CARICOM and Caribbean context. The level 
and depth of participatory involvement depicted and envisioned by CSO in the field data, 
and indicate in the historical antecedents advocating participation bespeak a level of 
engagement concomitant with the traditions of direct (participatory) democracy.  
 
In direct tradition, engagement is premised on a framework that is genuinely 
participatory, and accordingly, it extends well beyond voting and irregular engagement 
into further stages of the political process, with concomitant apparatuses to support such 
engagement. Moreover, it involves the criteria of ‘inclusion of all affected (groups)’ and 
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issue ‘framing by the participants’, central tenets of the direct democracy tradition. 
Translating this into the development domain, the notion is that the development cannot 
be left to technocratic elites and therefore must include and facilitate wider and 
meaningful stakeholder involvement. Proponents of participatory democracy theory 
criticises representative democracies for offering only very limited possibilities of 
participation to ordinary citizens, which leads to a depoliticised public with little 
influence over their own lives (Sclove, 1995). In principle, representative theory has no 
problem with the reliance on experts and the exclusion of the broader public and 
stakeholders  (participation) in policy development as long as, in the end, the decisions 
remain in the hands of the elected politicians (Biegelbauer & Hansen, 2011).  
 
One might ask, why the continuous rhetoric of participation by CARICOM regional 
Heads? Why this rhetoric has not translated into a reality of participation? Rhetoric 
pervades the political milieu of both representative and direct democracy. All indicators 
in the data and literature point to the employ of the representative framework in 
CARICOM, however the distinction between the two traditions are the accompanying 
package of ideas vis-à-vis participation, which fashions the form, structure and impact of 
participation. The work of Cornwall and Coelho (2007) offers valuable perspective here, 
they assert that the committed involvement of state actors is decisive for the success of 
participatory projects, as they are the ones who plan and deliver services. The authors 
appropriately ask, “what is it that motivates state officials to participate and to follow 
through on decision…rather than resorting to quicker and more authoritarian decision-
making processes? And what do they get out of participating in the participatory sphere?” 
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(2007, p. 19). The authors suggest that the government might engage in participation “as 
a strategy that seeks to cultivate allies, strengthen networks and gain votes” (ibid). Let me 
hasten to add, in the context of CARICOM RI there are no electoral votes to be had, per 
se, as electoral politics is a national feature not a regional one. Literature from Mosse 
offers analytical insight here also, PD is a “politically desirable development idea”, and 
participation “can be made into a commodity and marketed” (2003, p. 66). These 
contentions offer a glance at some of the perspectives surrounding the rhetoric of 
participation. 
 
The final point on the disposition towards participation provides a critical perspective. It 
would be naive to suggest that the view of all CSO would be pure and wholly well 
intended vis-à-vis RI participation. In the simplest sense, the indication of slippages in 
the organizational governance of CSOs is cause for concern. At the macro level, issues of 
interest, political intent and political biases are latent factor possibly fuelling their zeal to 
participate. However, this position remains empirically uncorroborated (as it was not a 




Merging theory, data and analysis together, the following conclusion can be posited—on 
the backdrop of the antecedents; “innumerable pious declarations and affirmations and 




The empirical data supports the conclusion that the failure of CARICOM policy makers 
to materialize formal and predicable CS participation in CARICOM steams for the 
participatory reference frame within which participation is being conceived. The 
framework is deemed to be that of the representative democratic. Consequently and 
notwithstanding the participatory antecedents, a requisite framework for participation in 
the formal institutions and mechanisms of CARICOM has not been implemented, 
coupled with the support structures, chiefly, legal framework, and capacity and resources 
mechanisms. This scenario is in keeping with the limited scope of the principles a 
representative democracy participatory process where participation is limited to the 
protective function. This limiting precludes the regional integration project of the benefits 





CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS: 





Summary of Findings and Conclusion 
 
This study commenced by posing the question of why is it the case that numerous 
declarations by CARICOM Heads of Government in support of CSO participation in the 
regional integration process have not resulted in any tangible, real involvement of CSOs 
in the institutions and mechanisms of CARICOM? This was justifies as a significant 
issue given the central importance of CARICOM RI as a strategy for advancing 
development and attenuating the impacts of globalization on the region. Coupled with 
this is the ever-increasing importance ascribed to CS as interlocutors and (potential) key 
actors in the region who can offer significant value to the RI project. CS engagement 
within CARICOM has attracted additional attention given the critical prognosis of 
CARICOM as being “in crisis” (Stoneman, Pollard, & Inniss, 2012, p. 7) and “under 
existential threat” (Girvan, 2011b, p. 25). Thus, the need to understand the nuanced 
context and complexities surrounding the actualization of CS participation in the 




Preceding with this objective, the study reviewed the theoretical debates and competing 
models of participation and participatory development, democracy, and organisational 
theory—this theoretical triad served as the ‘lines of inquiry’ for this thesis. Participatory 
development established the rationale for and posited the benefits of CS involvement. PD 
also cited the critical issues and considerations regarding participation, in and of itself, its 
potential uses, misuses and shortcomings. Democratic theory provided the ethos and 
summary basis for citizen involvement—collectivised through CS—in the affairs of their 
governance. The democratic merits of participation were traced using two conflicting 
assumptions and influential normative models of democracy—‘representative’ and 
‘direct’—about what constitute legitimate participation, with each valuing participatory 
processes according to different criteria. The ensuing conclusion was that participatory 
processes of involvement are ideologically framed and materially structured. 
Organizational theory enunciated the organizational considerations that orbit actualizing 
meaningful participation. In CARICOM, it is envisaged that organisations within CS will 
serve as the conduits of citizen participation and, thus, considerations of organisational 
capacity and resource factors are of principal relevance. Moreover, it was concluded that 
organizations are not simply influenced by the constituents that comprise the 
organizations themselves, but also the environment within which it exist. This is to say 
that organisation should be mindful of both their internal and external environment. 
 
The thesis proceeded to focus on CARICOM as a geographic area and site of regional 
integration. A sketch of the concept of regional integration and a snapshot of the socio-
economic picture of CARICOM member states were presented. A historical overview of 
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CARICOM vis-à-vis the political economy of Caribbean RI, in addition to a mapping of 
CARICOM as an organization and its four pillars were propounded. Finally, the 
discussion was brought to a close by situating CARICOM within its challenges, issues 
and opportunities, at the present juncture.  In sum, it was concluded, “CARICOM is in 
serious flux… and this is no surprise. After almost forty years, what has emerged is a 
schizophrenic model” (Grenade, 2011, p. 12). Moreover, CARICOM has evolved into a 
4-Ps framework: it is prime-ministerial, paper-based, piece-meal and people-less (Caines, 
2010). This reality, according to many, needs to be addressed and redressed with 
immediacy. The sobering recognition is, however, that RI is an indispensable part of 
Caribbean development—the “regional option is a survival imperative, a development 
imperative” (Girvan, 2011a, p. 26). 
 
This thesis then went on to converge the strands of the debate by ‘regionalizing’ the 
discourse on civil society, participation and regional integration, and within CARICOM 
specifically. Firstly, the rationale for the inclusion of civil society in the regional 
integration project was explored. Then the antecedents of participatory engagement of CS 
in CARICOM were elaborated. The concluding position was that at this time, while the 
stated commitment (rhetoric) of Heads of Government on CS participation is clear, the 
tangible manifestations (reality) of those statements are lacking. The debate was therefore 
rest at the point of return, the central research question. 
 
Moving beyond the history of and beyond theorizing about the civil society participation 
in both the general and regional sense, this thesis looked at the reality of CS participation 
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in CARICOM, through primary field research data collection. This data was discussed 
and analyzed, and a conclusive argument crafted. The data collection exercise explored 
the nuances and complexities surrounding why formal and predictable CS participation in 
CARICOM had not been actualized to date, from which five focal areas emerged: (1) 
participation; (2) potential contributions of civil society to regional integration; (3) 
considerations for a framework for participation; (4) constraints on civil society 
participation; (5) institutional approaches to the integration challenge of participation. 
 
Drawing on the analytical frames of Armstrong, Lloyd, & Redmond (2004), Rahnema 
(1992) and Pateman (1970) and the theoretical triad, a review of the primary field data 
and secondary sources presented several findings; the main ones are recounted below: 
 
- CS view CARICOM RI as a bifurcated concept, having both institutional and organic 
components, and they want engagement with both, especially with the institutional 
component. They view the institutional component as a critical site for influencing the 
future course and direction of the regions’ development. Thus, CS therefore wants 
recognition as genuine development partners with formal and predictable participation 
in the institutions and mechanisms of CARICOM. 
 
- Not only does CSOs have a genuine desire to participate, they also have a keen 
understanding of what participation entails, what qualities genuine participation should 
exhibit, what are the implications of participation of CARICOM development, and the 




- CS posits a potent menu of benefits that they can contribute to CARICOM RI. Their 
main contributions are summarized as follows (leveraging Rahnema’s (1992) core 
elements): 
- Cognitive: CS can provide a real understanding of the realities ‘on the ground’ that 
CARICOM nationals are confronted with and that require addressing; 
- Political: CS can represent and empower the voice of the voiceless, and, in so 
doing, add legitimacy, foster ownership, and improve governance of the RI process; 
and 
- Instrumental: CS can propose ‘new’ and ‘alternatives’ models of development for 
the emerging Caribbean civilization and connectedly can bring their skills and 
expertise to bear. 
 
- While CSOs possess a strong desire to participate, by their own admission, they are 
affected by low capacity and weak institutional structures, which are more broadly 
defined as organisational, operational, financial and technical constraints. It is felt that 
these constraints stand to debilitate the ability of CSOs to participate in a meaningful 
and sustained way.  
 
- The CS sector is characterised by the lack of specific identity and a degree of 
fragmentation. In view of which, CS by their own compulsion advanced several key 
measures—including networking, coalescing, synergizing, and converging—to 




- The CARICOM governance environment is a highly nuances and complex one, thus it 
makes the actualization of meaningful participation a demanding task. Accordingly, 
several key terms were tendered as requisites for formulating any framework for 
participation. The key terms include, the need for: 
 
- Instating a participatory arrangement that is legally constituted 
- A genuine response to the CS sector’s capacity development needs 
- Structural, procedural and organizational complementarities between the national 
and regional level of participation 
- An agreeable level of direct interface between regional Heads and CSOs 
- Any framework should be imbued with a result-oriented mechanism and culture 
- Designated conduits to facilitate effective information flows and sharing 
- Any framework should be open and consensus based 
 
- It is clear that the participatory environment in CARICOM bears the heavy burden of 
‘deficits’ of implementation, trust, and resources, which is felt to be rooted in the 
approach of CARICOM Heads to participation, and by extension the framework of 




Analysis of the primary data and secondary sources underlined the deficits cited above 
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and offered affirmative evidence to support the claim that the approach to participatory 
processes in the formal institutions and mechanisms of CARICOM RI is premised, 
largely, on the principles of representative democratic framework. In practice, this 
framework is characterized by engagement that is protective and, therefore, limited and 
unthreatening of the base of political power of regional Heads.  Evidently, the employ of 
a representative approach to participation is at variance with the quality of participation 
articulated in the antecedents of participation in CARICOM and the espousals of CS vis-
à-vis what they envision should constitute participation. This lends an answer to the 
research question of this thesis. Moreover, it corroborates the argument of this thesis: that 
above and beyond the obvious challenges of providing the necessary framework and 
capacity building for CSO participation in the Caribbean integration process, the current 
lack of real and substantive inclusion is rooted in the structure of a representative 
democratic framework with limited consideration for the principles of a participatory 
model of democracy. 
 
Implications of the Study 
 
So what are the implications of the findings and conclusion presented above for the study 
of Development/International Political Economy and Regional Integration?  
 
This research conveys some implications of study and theorising of civil society 
participation in regional integration. I must however caution that the Caribbean is a 
unique place with a particular history, distinct socio-political context and geographic 
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landscape. Therefore, the case study of CARICOM can be valuable, but ought to be 
treated in cognizance of the hitherto mentioned. As a result, the findings should not be 
harshly extended to other sites of RI without due consideration. 
 
A deciphering of the ideological frame that informs the participatory process in a RI 
space (or in a development project generally) can serve as a highly instructive indicator 
of the form, structure and (potential) impact of the participatory engagement that can be 
acceded to by decision makers. In addition to this, the motivating benefits or functions 
that are being sort vis-à-vis participation, whether protective, educative, integrative, 
developmental, can also be gauged. 
 
Adopting the representative approach, that is, largely the protective function in a RI 
project may essentially bar the project from accessing the full gamut of value that CS 
engagement offers. In instances where the principles of participatory democracy are 
embraced greater access is available to the breadth and scope of value CS can bring to the 
process. Some of the values/functions of participatory democracy include the integrative 
and educative function. It should also be noted that each framework is accompanied by 
both a package of material and support considerations for participation, and inevitably, a 
respective degree of political engagement. The latter may seem disconcerting or assuring 
for decision makers, therefore, resulting in the choice of one framework over the other. 
 
As an optimist, I hope that the CARICOM member governments would move swiftly 
beyond rhetoric toward a reality of participation where engagement is informed more by 
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the principles of participatory democracy framework. I would also hope that CSOs would 
do all they can to enable and position themselves for such. Below are some 




The following recommendations are based on data from primary field research and the 
numerous secondary sources used in this thesis. Together, this research has led me to 
conclude that the following key recommendations are vital requirements toward the 
actualization of formal and predictable CS participation in the institutions and 
mechanisms of CARICOM. The recommendations aim at CS will be presented first, 




Build Capacity  
The need for CSOs to build capacity, in many respects, cannot be overstated. While some 
CSOs possess fair capacity to participate there are definite areas that require 
enhancement across organisations and the gamut of CSOs. This is not to say that the 
(technical) capacity to participate is not there but increased capacity, notwithstanding 
financial considerations the sector faces, can only augur well for the organisations 




Ameliorate Funding Issues  
The current financial handicap the CS sector face is an issue that demands meaningful 
attention, not just for the sake of participation in CARICOM, but also for the vitality and 
survival of the sector. Funding considerations undergird the organisational, operational, 
technical and financial constraints highlighted in this thesis. It is therefore imperative that 
CSOs act with ingenuity and immediacy to diversify their sources of funding in the short, 
medium and long-term. Moreover, they must seek to engage in activities that can 
engender a level of self-sustainability in the medium and long-term—for the price and 
implications of funding dependencies are all too well known. 
 
In terms of the diversification of funding sources CSOs can consider, nationally, targeting 
indigenous sources of financial support (group and community based giving), 
government institutions, local foundations and businesses. Regionally and internationally, 
official development assistance agencies, multilateral development banks, international 
foundations, international NGOs, individual donors and the Diaspora. With regards to the 
development a level of self-sustainability, CSOs are urged to consider fundraising 
through the sale of branded merchandise and organisational paraphernalia. In addition, 
offering services, for example consulting or project implementation, in line with the 
organisation’s mission can also serve as a real avenue for generating earned income. 
Network and Coalesce  
It is crucial that CS network and coalesce, meaningful participation depends heavily on 
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this. The importance of networking and coalescing is increased manifold given 
considerations of capacity and constraints the sector is currently ensnared in. Some 
recommended areas of networking and coalescing include: 
 
- Capacity building: training and development 
- Supporting research 
- Developing concentrated thematic areas of priority 
- Articulating and promoting a clear vision for regional integration  
- Supporting awareness campaigns 
- Needs assessment of the sector 
 
Consider Alternative Avenues for Participation 
CS is urged to consider ways to deepen their involvement and engagement in regional 
integration outside of the formal institutions and mechanisms of CARICOM. Particularly 
in view of the representative democratic reference point of CARICOM heads vis-à-vis 
participation, which, as point to by analysis, does not appear propitious to the level of 
engagement CS envision. By deepening engagement within what CS referred to as the 
‘organic’ component of CARICOM, this may serve to better entrench the import of their 
participation. Research and advocacy that gives public ventilation to such research among 





CARICOM/Heads of Government 
 
Largely, these recommendations aimed at CARICOM/Government Heads join the 
already reverberating chorus (CPDC, 2011; Bishop, et al., 2011; Thomas T. , 2011) of 
calls to institutionalise CS participation in the formal institutions and mechanisms of 
CARICOM. The deficiencies of the current representative democratic framework under 
employ indicate the need for a ‘new’ approach informed by the principles of the 
participatory model of democracy. Thereby, giving consideration to the wider scope of 
value that CSO engagement can offer—educative, integrative, and developmental, and so 
on. Evidently, these ideals are incompatible with the existing model premised on the 
representative framework, therefore pointing to the need to shift and reconfigure the 
governance mechanisms in the region. This shift in framework must necessarily include 
the following elements:  
 
- A re-conceptualization of the role of CS as genuine development actors and genuine 
participant in the formal institutions and mechanisms RI; 
 
- A participatory framework that facilitates the formal and predictable engagement of 
civil society  (and necessarily, legally constituted); and 
 
- Explicit resource provisions that support the framework and, importantly, enables 





Through the adoption of this ‘new’ participatory model, the potential benefits are many. 
As the educative effect of CS participation takes root, through the participatory process, 
attitudinal changes would result whereby people and countries become more inclined to 
take decisions on the basis of the common good rather than on their individual ambitions. 
The integrative function would ensure synchronization of the objectives between regional 
governments and those of the people. Mandates would then reflect the consensus and 
needs of majority, and thereby prevent the possibility of perversion by powerful interest, 
whilst increasing harmony and reducing the tensions that pervade top-down decision-
making. Moreover, increased participation would allow greater opportunities for CS to 
form national and regional synergies and alliances for the collective benefit of the entire 
RI project. Developmental by engaging and empowering CS to be part of the process of 
integration regional Heads will have access to the widest pool of human resource 
expertise, that are more willing (and able) to engage the institutions and mechanisms that 
fuel the regional project. 
 
In closing, according to many, including myself, CARICOM does not lack the necessary 
resources or tools to implement CS participation based on the principles of direct model 
of democracy. Given CARICOM’s current prognosis of facing collapse the need is 
greater now, more that even, for regional Heads to make rhetoric equal to reality and, 
thereby, engage civil society to counteract the challenges the region now face, and to 
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Interview Questions: Civil Society Organizations (CS or CSO) 
 
Please tell me briefly, what is CS’s definition of the CARICOM? 
 
As a CSO, do you support Caribbean regional integration?  
 
What are the principal concerns of CSOs regarding regional integration? 
 
Please share with me, do you desire, as a CSO, to participate in the regional integration 
process? 
 
Please tell me, as a CSO, what would constitute participation in regional integration—for 
example: observer status, consultative status, etc.? 
 
List some of the essential components any framework for CS participation in RI should 
include? 
 
Can you name two or three major ways CSOs would contribute to regional development 
through participation? 
 
As a CSO, do you presently possess the capacity (resources, skills, etc.) to participate in 
the regional integration process? 
 
Using your organization as an example, can you name three or four of the main 
constraints impacting your ability to participate? 
 
Can you offer, perhaps three or four, suggestions on what is required to better equip CSO 
to participate in the regional integration process? 
 
Can you outline, briefly, any institutional arrangements that would be required for CSO 
participation in regional integration? 
 





Finally, is CARICOM a suitability mechanism for facilitating CSO participation in the 
regional integration process? 
Interview Questions: Elite Interviewees 
 
As someone familiar with CSOs in the Caribbean, can you cite two or three of the major 
ways CSOs would contribute to regional development through participation in the 
integration process? 
 
Briefly, what is your assessment of the capacity (skills, resources, etc.) of CSOs to 
participate in the Caribbean regional integration process? 
 
Using CSOs in this county as an example, can you name three or four of the main 
constraints impacting CSOs ability to participate? 
 
Please tell me briefly, what should CSO participation in regional integration look like—
for example; observer status, consultative status, etc.? 
 
Is observer status sufficient to promote the participation of CSOs within CARICOM? 
 
Likewise, is consultative status sufficient to promote the participation of CSOs within 
CARICOM? 
 
What are a few of your specific suggestions for a proposal or model appropriate for CSO 
participation in CARICOM? 
 
Can you outline, briefly, any institutional arrangements that are required for CSO 
participation in regional integration? 
 
In your assessment, is CARICOM a suitability venue for facilitating CSO participation in 
the regional integration process? 
 
Are there alternative ways in which civil society participation in the regional integration 






FIELD INTERVIEW LEGEND 
 
Participants in the interviews were assured Anonymity. In keeping with this, the legend 
below established the logic of the code name attached to the direct quotation used in 
Chapters 4, 5 and 6. Interviews were conducted in the CARICOM member countries of 
Barbados, Trinidad and Tobago, and Guyana. The codes are as follows: 
 
Country code: 
- Barbados: BB 
- Trinidad and Tobago: TT 
- Guyana: GY 
 
Interview code: 
- Interview: Int 
 
- Number code: For each country each interview was numbers sequentially. 
 
Interviews for Barbados were coded as follows: Country: Barbados, Interview Number: 
1, 2, 3… For example: BBInt1, BBInt2 
 
Interview for Trinidad and Tobago were coded as follows: Country: Interview Number: 
1, 2, 3… For example: TTInt1, TTInt2 
 
Interview for Guyana were coded as follows: Country: Guyana, Interview Number: 1, 2, 






THE LILIENDAAL STATEMENT OF PRINCIPLES ON FORWARD 
TOGETHER 
 
The Civil Society Forward Together Conference, a historic consultation between the 
representatives of Civil Society in the 15 Member States of the Caribbean Community 
and the Heads of Government held at the Ocean View Hotel, Liliendaal, Guyana on 2-3 
July 2002:  
 
RECOGNISED the increased challenges to the Caribbean Community, posed by 
globalization and the resulting complex economic, trade, environmental, social and legal 
issues.  
 
DEEPLY CONCERNED about social conditions prevailing in the Community with 
regard to increasing transnational crime linked to trafficking in illicit arms and drugs; 
money laundering; the widening negative impact of terrorism; the migration of scarce 
skills; racism; ethnic insecurity, the high incidence of male dropouts; increased violence 
against women and children; persistent and increasing poverty, and the HIV/AIDS 
pandemic eroding the Region's human capital. 
 
ALSO RECOGNISED that the objective of achieving the Caribbean Single Market and 
Economy (CSME) is not only a response to globalisation, including the impending Free 
Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA), but is of the greatest value for a more coordinated 
system to enhance the Region's competitiveness, given our historical realities. 
 
ACKNOWLEDGED that Civil Society has a vital role to play in the development of 
regional, political and social policies, the development of those programmes and 
frameworks currently in existence, their modification, where necessary, and the creation 
of new areas as required.  
 
CONSIDERED that the establishment of mechanisms for continuous dialogue between 
the Conference of Heads of Government of the Caribbean Community and Civil Society 
is an essential way to complement relevant programmes to ensure social reconstruction, 
cohesiveness, peace, poverty reduction, and equity that would enhance regional 
integration and make the Community more economically viable. 
 
AFFIRMED in this context, the importance of programmes with regard to youth, labour, 
the elderly, people with disabilities, women, men and gender relations; sport, labour, 
education and training, health and access to technology; and programmes aimed at 




AGREED on several broad principles for strengthening the relationships between the 
Caribbean Heads of Governments and national governments and the Civil Society as 
follows to: 
 
Institutionalise the Forward Together process in the form of more regular 
engagements between the Civil Society and the Heads of Government, a triennial 
engagement as suggested; 
 
Emphasize the need for more constructive participation of Civil Society 
representatives in appropriate decisions making Organs of the Community such as 
the Council for Trade and Economic Development (COTED), the Council for 
Finance and Planning (COFAP), the Council for Human and Social Development 
(COHSOD), etc; 
 
Establish a Task Force, comprising a small representative group of the Civil 
Society, coordinated by the CARICOM Secretariat, to develop a comprehensive 
regional strategic framework for carrying forward the main recommendations of 
Forward Together Conference and report to the Conference of Heads of 
Government at its next Inter-Sessional Meeting in 2003.  
 
 
The work of the Task Force should be guided by the recommendations of the three 
Working Groups at the Forward Together Conference – 
 
 
(i) Human Resource Development with Equity, including issues in relation to 
Gender, Youth and Persons with Disabilities, Migration and the Diaspora;  
 
(ii) Caribbean Single Market and Economy (CSME) - Capital Investment and 
requirements for competitiveness; and 
 










We the People of the Caribbean Community, acting through the assembled 
representatives of our Governments;  
 
RECALLING that the Conference of Heads of Government of the Caribbean 
Community at their Special Meeting in Port-of-Spain, Trinidad and Tobago, in October 
1992 adopted the recommendation of the West Indian Commission that a Charter of Civil 
Society for the Caribbean Community be subscribed to by Member States of the 
Community;  
 
CONSCIOUS that the common historical, cultural and social bonds of the people of the 
Caribbean Community underpin the commitment of the Governments and peoples of 
Member States of the Community to this Charter;  
 
DETERMINED: 
- to enhance public confidence in governance, thereby reinforcing the loyalty of all the 
people;  
- to ensure continuing respect for internationally recognised civil, political, economic, 
social and cultural rights;  
- to uphold the right of people to make political choices;  
- to create a truly participatory political environment within the Caribbean Community 
which will be propitious to genuine consultation in the process of governance;  
- to promote, foster and maintain racial harmony;  
- to uphold the principle of freedom of religion;  
- to promote economic growth and sustainable development through the wise use of the 
human and natural resources;  
- to attain economic and social justice and to pursue the goals of health, education and 
employment for all;  
- to eliminate, as far as possible, social problems such as crime and the abuse of drugs 
and other substances;  
- to enter the Twenty-First Century on the basis of the best possible governance and to 
achieve and sustain such governance by mobilising action for change; 
 
DECLARE our resolve to pay due regard to the following principles by which our 
Governments commit themselves to respect and strengthen the fundamental elements of a 




ARTICLE I-Use of Terms  
 
In this Charter, unless the context otherwise requires the following expressions shall have 
the following meanings: 
 
(a) "Social partners" shall mean the Government of a State, Associations of Employers, 
Workers Organizations and such Non-Governmental Organizations as the State may 
recognize;  
 
(b) "State" shall mean a Member State of the Caribbean Community and shall include 
Associate Members of the Caribbean Community. 
 
ARTICLE II- Respect for Fundamental Human Rights and Freedoms  
 
1. The States shall respect the fundamental human rights and freedoms of the individual 
without distinction as to age, colour, creed, disability, ethnicity, gender, language, place 
of birth or origin, political opinion, race, religion or social class but subject to respect for 
the rights and freedoms of others and for the public interest.  
 
2. Those fundamental human rights and freedoms include: 
 
(a) the right to life, liberty and security of the person;  
(b) protection for the privacy of the home and other property of the individual;  
(c) protection from deprivation of property without due process and just compensation 
within a reasonable time;  
(d) freedom of conscience, of expression and of assembly and association within the 
meaning of the constitutions of States;  
(e) freedom of movement within the Caribbean Community, subject to such exceptions 
and qualifications as may be authorised by national law and which are reasonably 
justifiable in a free and democratic society.  
 
3. The States shall promote and encourage the effective exercise of civil and political 
rights and, within the limits of their resources, economic, social and cultural rights all of 
which derive from the inherent dignity of the human person and which are essential for 
the free and full development of the person.  
 
4. The States shall keep the general public informed of the provisions of this Charter and 
of international and regional agreements and declarations in the field of human rights to 
which they subscribe. 
 
ARTICLE III-Human Dignity  
 
The States shall, in the discharge of their legislative, executive, administrative and 




ARTICLE IV-Right to Life, Liberty and Security of the Person  
 
1. Every person shall have the right to life. No person shall be deprived of his or her life 
intentionally save in accordance with national law.  
 
2. No person shall be deprived of his or her personal liberty or the security of his or her 
person except by due process of law. 
 
ARTICLE V- Equality before the Law  
 
1. All persons shall be equal before the law, be entitled to the equal protection of the law 
and to a fair and impartial hearing within a reasonable time.  
 
2. The States shall use their best endeavours to have legal assistance extended in any case 
where the interest of justice so requires.  
 
3. No person shall be favoured or discriminated against by reason of age, colour, creed, 
disability, ethnicity, gender, language, place of birth or origin, political opinion, race, 
religion or social class.  
 
4. A law shall be deemed not to be contrary to paragraph 3 if such law provides for 
special measures for the sole purpose of furthering the development and advancement of 
hitherto disadvantaged communities or sections of the population to enable them to 
develop and realise their potential to the fullest. 
 
ARTICLE VI- Political Rights  
 
1. The States shall ensure the existence of a fair and open democratic system through the 
holding of free elections at reasonable intervals, by secret ballot, underpinned by an 
electoral system in which all can have confidence and which will ensure the free 
expression of the will of the people in the choice of their representatives.  
 
2. The States shall take all appropriate measures to promote and maintain an effectively 
functioning representational system, including the holding of regular public sessions of 
representatives of the people.  
 
3. Every person shall have the right to: 
 
(a) form a political party or organisation;  
(b) join a political party or organisation of his or her choice;  
(c) attend public meetings of political parties or organisations;  
(d) participate in the activities of a political party or organisation;  
(e) give expression to his or her political beliefs in a peaceful manner;  
(f) make himself or herself available for nomination for and election to any public office 
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for which he or she qualifies. 
 
4. The provisions of this Article shall not preclude the States from taking measures 
authorised by their Constitutions to regulate persons employed in the service of the State 
with respect to their participation in the activities of a political party or organisation.  
 
ARTICLE VII-Meetings, Demonstrations and Petitions  
 
Every person shall have the right to assemble, to demonstrate peacefully and to draw up 
and present petitions, subject to such restrictions as may be imposed by national law in 
the public interest and which are reasonably justifiable in a free and democratic society.  
 
ARTICLE VIII- Freedom of Expression and Access to Information  
 
1. Every person shall have the right to the enjoyment of freedom of expression including 
the right to: 
 
(a) hold opinions and to receive and communicate ideas and information without 
interference and freely to send or receive communications by correspondence or other 
means;  
(b) seek, distribute or disseminate to other persons and the public information, opinions, 
and ideas in any form whatever. 
 
2. The right conferred by paragraph 1 of this Article shall also be enjoyed by the media.  
 
3. The exercise of the right conferred by this Article carries with it special duties and 
responsibilities and may be exercisable subject to such reasonable restrictions in the 
public interest, as may be imposed by law and are justifiable in a democratic society: 
 
(a) for the protection of the reputations, rights and freedoms of other persons; or  
(b) in the interest of defence, public safety, public order, public morality or public health. 
 
4. The States shall respect, encourage and promote the existence of a diversity of sources 
of information as a means of ensuring greater public access to information.  
 
5. This Article shall not be construed as preventing the State from requiring the licensing 
of broadcasting, transmission or other means of communication, public exhibition or 
public entertainment. 
 
ARTICLE IX- Religious Diversity  
 
The States shall recognise and respect the freedom of conscience of the individual to 
profess and practise alone or in community with others, in private or in public, his or her 
religion, belief or persuasion in accordance with the dictates of his or her own 
conscience, subject to such restrictions as may be imposed by national law in the interest 
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of defence, public order or public safety or for the protection of public health or public 
morals or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others provided that such 
restrictions are reasonably justifiable in a free and democratic society.  
 
ARTICLE X- Cultural Diversity  
 
The States recognise that: 
 
(a) each culture has a dignity and a value which shall be respected and that every person 
has the right to preserve and to develop his or her culture;  
(b) every person has the right to participate in the cultural life of his or her choice. 
 
ARTICLE XI-Rights of the Indigenous Peoples  
 
The States recognise the contribution of the indigenous peoples to the development 
process and undertake to continue to protect their historical rights and respect the culture 
and way of life of these peoples.  
 
ARTICLE XII-Women's Rights  
 
For the promotion of policies and measures aimed at strengthening gender equality, all 
women have equal rights with men in the political, civil, economic, social and cultural 
spheres. Such rights shall include the right: 
 
(a) to be elected or appointed to Public Office and to be eligible for appointment to 
positions of decision-making bodies at all levels of their society;  
(b) to be afforded equal opportunities for employment and to receive equal remuneration 
with men for work of equal value;  
(c) not to be discriminated against by reason of marital status, pregnancy, lactation or 
health-related matters which affect older women;  
(d) to legal protection including just and effective remedies against domestic violence, 
sexual abuse and sexual harassment.  
 
ARTICLE XIII- Children's Rights  
 
1. Every child has, in particular, the right: 
 
(a) not to be compelled to perform or to render services harmful to his or her physical or 
mental health, upbringing, education or social development;  
(b) to protection against economic or other exploitation, physical or mental violence, 
injury, neglect or abuse including sexual abuse;  
(c) where appropriate, having regard to factors including the child's age and mental and 
physical development, to be consulted and to have his or her view represented personally 
or by an independent person before the courts and other agencies or bodies which deal 
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with the welfare of the child. 
 
2. For the purposes of this Article and Article XV, "child" means every person below the 
age of eighteen years unless, under national law, majority is attained at an earlier or later 
age.  
 
ARTICLE XIV-Rights of Disabled Persons  
 
1. Every disabled person has, in particular, the right - 
 
(a) not to be discriminated against on the basis of his or her disability;  
(b) to equal opportunities in all fields of endeavour and to be allowed to develop his or 
her full potential;  
(c) to respect for his or her human dignity so as to enjoy a life as normal and full as 
possible.  
 
ARTICLE XV- Access to Education and Training  
 
1. The States shall ensure that every child has the right to, and is provided with, quality 
primary education.  
 
2. The States shall ensure equal access to secondary and post-secondary education and 
reasonable access to continuing adult education and training.  
 
3. Every child, irrespective of colour, creed, disability, ethnicity, gender, language, place 
of birth or origin, political opinion, race, religion or social class shall have the right to 
equal access to State or State-assisted educational institutions.  
 
4. Every child with a disability shall have the right to special education in accordance 
with his or her needs funded wholly or partially by the State up to an age determined by 
national law.  
 
5. Every State shall put into place measures to ensure that parents enable their children to 
make full use of the educational opportunities provided by the State.  
 
ARTICLE XVI- Rights of the Family  
 
The States, recognising the family as the fundamental unit of society, shall endeavour to 
ensure: 
 
(a) the fulfilment of the necessary conditions for the promotion of family life and 
effective parenting skills, bearing in mind the importance of the role of each parent;  
(b) the full development and protection of the family, including the extended family.  
 




1. The States shall adopt and implement all appropriate measures to ensure good 
governance which is just, open and accountable.  
 
2. The States recognise and affirm that the rule of law, the effective administration of 
justice and the maintenance of the independence and impartiality of the judiciary are 
essential to good governance.  
 
3. The States, recognising that integral to the concept of good governance are the 
complementary roles of government, the social partners and the citizenry, shall ensure 
that the rights and responsibilities of all are clearly established and that the appropriate 
environment for their exercise and discharge, as the case may be, is fostered.  
 
4. The States, in order to ensure morality in public affairs, agree that holders of public 
office and all those who exercise power the exercise of which affects or may affect the 
public interest, shall so order their affairs in accordance with national law that such 
ordering gives no cause for conflict to arise or to appear to arise between their private 
interests and their duties to the public, or to otherwise compromise their integrity. To this 
end, the States agree to establish a Code governing the conduct of the holders of public 
office and all those who exercise power, the exercise of which affects or may affect the 
public interest.  
 
5. The States shall undertake: 
 
(a) to foster continuously greater cost-effectiveness in their operations while being 
facilitative and supportive of the development process;  
(b) to ensure that all persons are treated fairly, humanely and equally by public 
authorities and holders of public office and all those who exercise power so as to affect 
the quality of life of our people;  
(c) to ensure responsiveness to the needs of the people as consumers in the delivery of 
goods and services. 
 
6. The States undertake to preserve and respect the existence of an independent public 
service with attractive career opportunities open to all on the basis of merit and which is 
effective, efficient, responsive, adaptive and innovative in its conduct of public 
administration.  
 
7. The States in order to further the participation of the people in the democratic process 
shall establish effective systems of ongoing consultations between the Government and 
the people.  
 
8. The States shall undertake to ensure that in the process of governance, there is no 
victimisation of any person.  
 




1. The States shall facilitate access by their peoples to resources in such a manner as to 
promote economic growth, sustainable development and full employment, especially of 
the young people, and to enhance the opportunities for the achievement by every person 
of a reasonable and secure standard of living.  
 
2. Every person shall have the right freely and on the basis of full equality to engage in 
economic activities, including the right to participate in, establish and manage his or her 
own enterprise in the commercial, industrial, agricultural, service or other sectors.  
 
3. The States undertake to collaborate with the social partners for the provision of 
creative employment for young people and the disabled and for fostering strategies for 
their employment.  
 
ARTICLE XIX- Workers' Rights  
 
1. Every worker has the right: 
 
(a) to form or belong to and participate in the activities of trade unions or other 
associations for the promotion and protection of his or her interest or the right not to 
belong to and participate in the activities of any such trade union or association;  
(b) to negotiate or bargain collectively;  
(c) not to be subjected to unfair labour practices, including intimidation and 
victimisation;  
(d) to work under safe, hygienic and healthy conditions;  
(e) to reasonable hours of work, rest, periodic holidays with pay and remuneration for 
public holidays;  
(f) to receive reasonable remuneration for his or her labour and to withhold his or her 
labour subject to such reasonable restrictions as may be imposed by national law in the 
public interest. 
 
2. The provisions of this Article shall not preclude the States from taking measures 
imposing on persons in the service of the State, restrictions which are reasonably 
justifiable in a free and democratic society.  
 
3. The States undertake: 
 
(a) to safeguard the right of workers to earn their living in freely chosen lawful 
occupations;  
(b) to recognise the desirability of workers earning a level of remuneration which would 
afford them and their families the enjoyment of a decent standard of living;  
(c) in recognition of the right of workers to collective bargaining, the responsibility to 
provide adequate machinery for the recognition and certification of trade unions enjoying 




(d) to foster and promote a harmonious and productive working environment by 
sensitising workers, trade unions and employers as to their respective and mutual 
obligations;  
(e) to provide protection for workers against arbitrary dismissal;  
(f) to provide adequate machinery for the speedy resolution of industrial disputes and the 
restoration of normalcy in the event of strikes, lock-outs and other forms of industrial 
action;  
(g) to provide an adequate period of leave with pay, or with adequate social security 
benefits for women before and after childbirth and to make it unlawful for an employer to 
terminate a woman's employment or take any other action that would unfavourably affect 
her status or promotion by reason of her pregnancy;  
(h) to establish standards to be observed by employers in providing workers with a safe 
and healthy working environment;  
(i) to provide workers with adequate social security benefits;  
(j) to ensure that every person who has attained the age of retirement and does not have 
adequate means of subsistence is provided with social and medical assistance.  
 
ARTICLE XX- Health  
 
The States shall use their best endeavours to provide a health care system that is: 
 
(a) sufficiently comprehensive to deal with all health challenges including epidemics; and  
(b) well administered, adequately equipped and accessible to all without discrimination.  
 
ARTICLE XXI- Basic Necessities  
 
The States shall endeavour to: 
 
(a) provide adequate social services and benefits for the population at large; and  
(b) ensure that the most needy persons have access to food, housing and other basic 
necessities.  
 
ARTICLE XXII- Social Partners  
 
The States undertake to establish within their respective States a framework for genuine 
consultations among the social partners in order to reach common understandings on and 
support for the objectives, contents and implementation of national economic and social 
programmes and their respective roles and responsibilities in good governance.  
 
ARTICLE XXIII- Environmental Rights  
 
1. Every person has a right to an environment which is adequate for his or her health and 




2. The States shall take steps to establish environmental standards and to monitor 
compliance with such standards.  
 
3. The States, considering the shared universal responsibility for human survival, shall 
put in place measures to ensure the protection and improvement of the environment and 
the conservation and management of its natural resources for the benefit of present and 
future generations.  
 
ARTICLE XXIV- Awareness and Responsibilities of the People  
 
The States hereby declare that the people have an important role to play in the pursuit and 
maintenance of good governance. Accordingly, the States shall build awareness, 
engender support and establish programmes to foster sound values and positive attitudes 
and shall enhance individual and institutional capacities to secure objectives, including: 
 
(a) the inculcating, nurturing and demonstration of love of one's country;  
(b) the participation in the electoral process;  
(c) the development of a positive work ethic at all levels in society in the recognition of 
the responsibilities of the people in the areas of production, the economy and the 
provision of goods and services;  
(d) the sensitising of the people to the importance of continuous skill upgrading, training 
and broadening of their skills and expertise;  
(e) the building of self-reliance and the engagement in self-help activities, whether alone 
or in community with others;  
(f) the promotion of awareness of parents to cooperate with and support the school 
system and programmes aimed at the character formation of students;  
(g) special consideration and support of the young, aged, the disabled and other 
vulnerable groups;  
(h) the resolution of interpersonal and domestic disputes by peaceful means, such as 
mediation, reconciliation and otherwise;  
(i) the caring and protection of the environment;  
(j) the preservation and protection of public property; and  
(k) the promotion, establishment and maintenance of community-based organisations.  
 
ARTICLE XXV- Reports  
 
1. The States undertake to submit periodically to the Secretary-General of the Caribbean 
Community (hereinafter referred to as the "Secretary-General") for transmission to the 
Conference of Heads of Government of the Caribbean Community, reports on measures 
adopted and progress achieved in compliance with the provisions of this Charter.  
 
2. Reports, other than special reports which may be requested by the Conference at any 
time, shall be submitted every three years on a rotating basis to be determined by the 
Conference, indicating the factors and difficulties, if any, that affect the implementation 




3. In the preparation of their Reports, States shall, in accordance with the provisions of 
Article XXII, undertake consultation with the social partners, having regard to their 
crucial role in the attainment of the objectives of this Charter.  
 
4. (1) States shall each establish a National Committee or designate a body to monitor 
and ensure the implementation of this Charter and that National Committee or body shall 
comprise: 
 
(a) representatives of the State;  
(b) representatives of the other social partners; and  
(c) such other persons of high moral character and recognised competence in their 
respective fields of endeavour. 
 
(2) The National Committee or body, as the case may be, shall review the implementation 
of this Charter, analysing any problems and difficulties experienced, and receive reports 
of allegations of breaches of, or non-compliance with, the provisions of this Charter 
attributed to the State or to one or more social partners. No allegation of breaches or non-
compliance may be brought by any individual or entity in relation to a matter which has 
been adjudicated upon by an international body, the decision of which is binding upon 
the State.  
 
(3) The National Committee or body shall notify the State or social partner, as the case 
may be, of the receipt of any allegation and request their comments thereon and the 
National Committee or body shall report to the Secretary-General on allegations received, 
together with their comments thereon, including their own views on the matter.  
 
5. (1) The Secretary-General shall submit annually for consideration by the Conference, 
in accordance with criteria established by the Conference, reports received from the 
National Committees or bodies pursuant to the provisions of paragraph 4(3) of this 
Article.  
 
(2) The Secretary-General shall inform the States and their National Committees or 
bodies of the results of the deliberations of the Conference on reports submitted pursuant 
to this Article, together with any recommendation emanating from their consideration of 
reported violations, non-compliance, difficulties or problems experienced in the 
implementation of this Charter.  
 
6. Allegations of violations or non-compliance shall not impose any obligations on a 
State to refrain from carrying out any decision of its Courts or other authorities pending 
consideration under this Article.  
 
ARTICLE XXVI- Implementation  
 




ARTICLE XXVII- Saving  
 
Nothing in this Charter shall be interpreted as impairing the provisions of any regional or 




The Conference of Heads of Government of the Caribbean Community at their Eighth 
Inter-Sessional Meeting:  
 
Reaffirming their confidence in the Caribbean Community as an association of States and 
Territories bonded by a common heritage and cooperating in the interests of their own 
peoples;  
 
Being committed to the fundamental principles of human rights and freedoms and 
conscious that this Charter should enhance the integration process;  
 
Determined to pursue the principles declared in the Charter in response to the challenges 
of the Twenty-First Century;  
 
Now therefore resolve to adopt this Charter and agree to pay due regard to its principles 
and to ensure that this Charter receives the widest possible circulation within their 
respective States and Territories.  
 






SAMPLE REGIONAL STRATEGIC FRAMEWORKS 
 
In the current context of CARICOM regional integration no framework exist at the 
regional level, that facilitates civil society participation. The follow are three proposed 
regional strategic frameworks developed by the Caribbean Policy Development Centre as 
part of ‘The CARICOM Civil Society Participation and Engagement in Regional 
Integration Project’ (2010-11). The project was funded under the Caribbean Integration 
Support Program (CISP) of the 9 European Development Fund and implements by the 
Directorate for Foreign and Community Relations, CARICOM Secretariat. The primary 
goal of the project was to create a Regional Strategic Framework and Plan of Action for 
instituting civil society participation in CARICOM, including the CSME. The report was 
concluded in 2011 and the contents submitted to the Heads of Government. None of these 
frameworks has been implemented. Please see below, the three sample frameworks 
proposed. 
 
Figure 4: Regional Level Structure – Option 1: Civil Society Council/Ministerial 
Focal Point Model 
 
Source: CPDC. (2011). National Consultations: CARICOM Civil Society Participation and Engagement in 




Figure 5: Regional Level Structure – Option 2: The National/Regional Civil Society 






Source: CPDC. (2011). National Consultations: CARICOM Civil Society Participation and Engagement in 













Figure 6: Regional Level Structure – Option 3: Enhance Regional Civil Society 
Council and Ministerial Focal Point Model 
 
 
Source: CPDC. (2011). National Consultations: CARICOM Civil Society Participation and Engagement in 
Regional Integration Project. Bridgetown, Barbados: Caribbean Policy Development Centre. 
 
